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Information privacy has been an increasingly important issue for both 
information systems (IS) researchers and practitioners.  In this thesis, three 
studies are conducted to explore the prevalent issues associated with 
information privacy.  Specifically, Study I (Chapter Two) draws on the 
hyperpersonal framework and the privacy calculus perspective to elucidate the 
interesting roles of privacy concerns and social rewards in synchronous online 
social interactions and examine the causes and the behavioral strategies that 
individuals utilize to protect their privacy.  An empirical study involving 251 
respondents was conducted in online chatrooms.  Overall, this study 
contributes to the IS literature by integrating the hyperpersonal framework and 
the privacy calculus perspective to identify antecedents of privacy tradeoff and 
predict individuals’ behavior in synchronous online social interactions.  
Study II (Chapter Three) seeks to elucidate the consequences of an 
embarrassing exposure in online social networks.  Drawing on the social 
exchange theory, this study examines the effects of information dissemination 
and network mutuality on individuals’ exchange assessment as well as how 
this assessment shapes their behavioral responses.  The results of a laboratory 
experiment involving 109 subjects provide strong evidence that information 
dissemination and network mutuality jointly influence individuals’ perception 
of relationship bonding and privacy invasion.  In addition, whereas perceived 
relationship bonding impedes both transactional avoidance and interpersonal 
avoidance, it leads to approach behavior. Further, while perceived privacy 
invasion increases transactional avoidance, it reduces approach behavior.  
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Overall, this study contributes to the IS literature by deepening the 
understanding of individuals’ behavioral responses to embarrassing exposures 
in online social networks. 
Study III (Chapter Four) develops and tests a model that explains 
online customer behavior after a privacy breach; more specifically, this study 
focuses on an online firm’s postincident recovery endeavor in mitigating the 
impact of a privacy breach on customer relationships.  Drawing on the service 
recovery literature, Study III integrates the notions of justice perceptions and 
psychological responses into a theoretical framework that describes how 
individuals react to an online firm’s postincident recovery endeavor.  The 
proposed model was tested against data collected from 1,007 actual users of 
online vendors.  The results of the analysis using structural equation modeling 
generally supported our model.  Specifically, the three types of justice 
perceptions, i.e., distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, were found 
to differently affect psychological responses, i.e., perceived breach and 
feelings of violation.  Moreover, justice perceptions were found to interact to 
influence their psychological responses in a way highly consistent with the 
proposed model.  In addition, psychological responses were shown to be 
important in shaping postincident outcomes such as post-word of mouth and 
post-likelihood of switching.  Overall, this study gives researchers and 
practitioners a useful conceptual tool for analyzing the effectiveness of 
organizational practices in mitigating the damage a privacy breach poses for 
customer relationships.     
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Overall, Study I identifies antecedents of privacy concerns and social 
rewards in synchronous online social interactions.  Study II enriches the 
information privacy literature by suggesting that embarrassing information is 
an important object of exposure in online social networking.  Study III extends 
the boundary of knowledge in the field of information privacy by developing 
nuanced accounts specific to the online privacy breach recovery domain and 
basing them on a more generalized and integrative framework.  This thesis 
concludes with Chapter Five, which includes a discussion on the contributions, 







LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Item Loadings and Cross-Loadings ........................................................... 50 
Table 2.2: Reliabilities, Correlation Matrix, and Square Roots of Average Variance 
Extracted ..................................................................................................................... 51 
Table 3.1: Means of the Five Scenarios ...................................................................... 92 
Table 3.2: Embarrassing Scenario .............................................................................. 92 
Table 3.3: Experimental Conditions ........................................................................... 93 
Table 3.4: Rotated Factor Loadings ............................................................................ 97 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................... 98 
Table 3.6: Categorization of Subjects’ Behavioral Responses ................................... 98 
Table 3.7: ANOVA and Analysis of Simple Mean Effects ...................................... 100 
Table 3.8: Mean Values of Perceived Relationship Bonding ................................... 100 
Table 3.9: ANOVA Results ...................................................................................... 101 
Table 3.10: Mean Values of Perceived Privacy Invasion ......................................... 102 
Table 3.11: Logistic Regression ............................................................................... 106 
Table 3.12: Test for Mediating Effects ..................................................................... 107 
Table 4.1: Key Prior Research on Service Recovery ................................................ 122 
Table 4.2: Properties of Measurement Scales ........................................................... 156 
Table 4.3: Results of Structural Equation Modeling Analysis .................................. 161 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Study I Research Model ........................................................................... 34 
Figure 2.2. Study I Research Model Results (Completely Standardized Solutions)... 53 
Figure 3.1. Study II Research Model .......................................................................... 79 
Figure 3.2. Study II Mock-Up Facebook Environment .............................................. 95 
Figure 3.3. Study II Mean Plot of Perceived Relationship Bonding ......................... 100 
Figure 3.4. Study II Mean Plot of Perceived Privacy Invasion ................................. 102 







CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
1.1.1 Information Privacy 
Information privacy is an increasingly important issue to both 
individuals and business.  Individuals could be the victims of various privacy 
problems, such as identity thefts, impersonations, as well as bodily harm, 
when information privacy is threatened in online social interactions.  The 
popularity of online social networks has exacerbated the issue.  Unlike other 
online social interaction environment, online social networks facilitate the 
dissemination of personal information to individuals’ actual social circles.  
Furthermore, given the diversity in social circles, personal information could 
be concurrently exposed to both known friends as well as unacquainted 
strangers. 
Whereas the disclosure of personal information is important in 
developing online relationships, information provision is typically compulsory 
in online commercial transactions.  Often, to complete transactions, online 
businesses are entrusted with personal information, such as identity 
information, contact numbers, and most importantly, credit card information.  
Consequently, when an online firm fails to recover from a privacy breach, 
individuals are likely to think the firm has violated the psychological contact 
because it is not only incompetent in safeguarding customer information but 
also is unable to remedy the issue (Wang and Huff 2007).   
Information systems (IS) research has progressed significantly in 
expanding our understanding of individuals’ predispositions, beliefs, attitudes, 
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and behavior in relation to information privacy (Dinev and Hart 2006, Son and 
Kim 2008).  Earlier studies on these topics focused on identifying the nature of 
concern for information privacy in the context of direct marketing (Smith et al. 
1996, Stewart and Segars 2002).  Subsequently, Malhotra et al. (2004) 
developed a scale of information privacy concerns specific to the Internet 
context.  IS researchers also have tried to identify the impact of privacy 
concerns on privacy-protective behaviors, such as willingness to release 
personal information, identity misrepresentation, relationship termination, 
word of mouth, and complaints (Dinev and Hart 2006, Awad and Krishnan 
2006, Son and Kim 2008, Culnan and Williams 2009).  Furthermore, several 
IS studies have explored the strategies adopted by firms in reducing privacy 
breaches (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005, Yue and Cakanyildirim 2007).  Although 
IS research deals with numerous aspects of information privacy, limited 
research has been done to understand how individuals’ behavior can be shaped 
by privacy issues in online social interactions as well as organizational 
remedies after a privacy breach incident (Elson and LeClerc 2006, Son and 
Kim 2008, Culnan and Williams 2009).  This thesis empirically investigates 
how individuals respond to privacy-related issues on synchronous online 
social interactions and online social network, as well as the recovery strategies 
undertaken by online firms after a privacy breach incident. 
1.1.2 Privacy-protective behavior in Synchronous Online Social 
Interactions: Reviews and Problems 
Synchronous online social interactions have revolutionized lives by 
enabling individuals to share cultural artifacts, manage self presentation or 
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receive feedback from peers.  For example, it was reported that, in 2011, over 
20% of Internet users had participated in various online social interactions, 
such as chatroom conversations and instant messaging (Ofcom 2011).  
Through these synchronous exchanges of information, individuals seek to gain 
immediate socio-emotional support and satisfaction in the immense and 
borderless space of the Internet. 
Despite the promising potential of engaging in online social 
interactions, an individual’s privacy is subject to public scrutiny in 
synchronous online social interactions.  The possibility of real-time 
monitoring and eavesdropping aggravates the problem, by exposing 
individuals to potential harassment and flaming, or even more extreme forms 
of aggravation such as stalking and sexual abuse.   
It has, however, been observed that despite privacy concerns, 
individuals are very willing towards the sharing of personal and intimate 
information with others, including complete strangers (Madden et al. 2007).  
Hence, it would be interesting to investigate why users’ privacy behavior is at 
times inconsistent with their privacy concerns.  Therefore, Study I investigates 
what drives individuals’ privacy-protective behavior in the context of 
synchronous online social interactions and reveals that social rewards can be 
just as compelling as privacy concerns in affecting behavior.  Furthermore, 
Study I identifies the antecedents of privacy concerns and social rewards as 
well as studies the strategies that individuals adopt to protect their privacy in 
developing online relationships.  
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1.1.3 Embarrassing Exposures in Online Social Networks: Reviews and 
Problems 
Online social networking websites provide an environment where 
individuals can easily maintain and develop social relationships by creating 
profiles with information about themselves and connecting their profiles to 
those of others (Bumgarner 2007; Ellison et al. 2011).  These connections 
facilitate the exchange of socially meaningful information (such as birthday 
wishes and jokes) and the sharing of common interests (such as arts and 
sports) (McLaughlin and Vitak 2011).  At times, for amusement, individuals 
may playfully tease each other by revealing their friends’ embarrassing 
information in online social networks (Wang et al. 2011).  Indeed, the teasing 
literature suggests that embarrassing exposures could lead to relationship 
development (e.g., Lange 2007).  
Yet it has been observed that the target of an embarrassing tease might 
not be amused but instead feel offended by the involuntary exposure resulting 
from friends’ postings about the target (Kruger et al. 2006).  Hence, it is 
interesting to investigate why targets interpret embarrassing exposure 
differently and how such interpretations influence their behavioral responses 
in online social networks.  Study II of this thesis thus focuses on elucidating 
the role of an embarrassing exposure in online social networking.  
Specifically, this study considers the way embarrassing information is 
involuntarily exposed through the posting and tagging mechanisms.  Posting 
involves the publication of information about a target on the disseminator’s 
profile.  Tagging, which is performed in addition to posting, identifies the 
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target in the information and associates the information to the target’s profile.  
In addition, to represent the role that social relationship structure plays in 
individuals’ assessment of social exchange, Study II examines the network 
mutuality between the disseminator and the target.  Whereas high network 
mutuality underscores high degree of commonality among the disseminator’s 
and the target’s social networks, low network mutuality denotes two largely 
distinct networks.  
Furthermore, Study II investigates a target’s benefit and cost 
perceptions related to an embarrassing exposure in online social networks.  In 
particular, in terms of benefits assessment, this study examines the impact of 
an embarrassing exposure on the social relationship between the disseminator 
and the target.  In terms of cost assessment, this study examines the way an 
involuntary exposure intrudes the target’s privacy.  Study II also proposes and 
empirically tests a taxonomy of behavioral responses to embarrassing 
exposures in online social networks. 
1.1.4 Customer Behavior after an Online Privacy Breach: Reviews and 
Problems 
Online privacy breach has become an increasing alarming issue.  
According to the Identity Theft Resource Center (2009), approximately 600 
breaches are publicly reported annually in the United States.  Undoubtedly, 
this unfortunate trend endangers the information privacy of customers and, at 
the same time, threatens the profitability and reputations of businesses, which 
can be illustrated by several high-profile privacy breaches (e.g., Zetter 2009, 
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Jewell 2007, FTC 2006).  On the whole, a privacy breach is highly likely to 
hurt the performance of a firm. 
Although IS research deals with numerous aspects of information 
privacy, researchers (with the notable exception of Culnan and Williams 2009) 
have rarely focused specifically on customers’ reaction to a privacy breach 
within the context of a specific business-to-customer relationship. Moreover, 
no research has been done to understand how remedial responses to a data 
breach can change online customer behavior such as word of mouth and 
likelihood of switching (Elson and LeClerc 2006, Son and Kim 2008, Culnan 
and Williams 2009).  Therefore, Study III develops and tests a model that 
explains online customer behavior after a privacy breach. 
1.2 RESEARCH FOCUS AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis explores individuals’ privacy-related behavior in both 
online social interactions and commercial transactions. In particular, Study I 
focuses on identifying antecedents of individuals’ privacy tradeoff, which 
drives their privacy-protective behavior in synchronous online social 
interactions.  Meanwhile, Study II focuses on two key aspects of embarrassing 
exposures on online social networks, namely information dissemination and 
network mutuality, to elucidate the effects of involuntary exposure on usage 
behavior.  Study III focuses on aspects of organizational remedies to 
investigate individuals’ responses after an online privacy breach. 
1.2.1 Study I: Privacy Tradeoff 
Information systems (IS) research has made some progress in 
understanding the determinants of individuals’ privacy-related behavior.  
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Overall, past studies suggest that an individual’s privacy-protective behavior is 
jointly determined by both privacy concerns and some tangible benefits 
derived from surrendering personal information.  Notwithstanding these 
findings, our understanding on the determinants of privacy-related behavior 
beyond commercial contexts remains incomplete.  Hence, our first motivation 
is to investigate what drives individuals’ privacy-protective behavior in the 
context of synchronous online social interactions.  In particular, Study I 
proposes that individuals derive certain intangible benefits from such 
interactions, which is referred to as social rewards in this paper, and that these 
intangible benefits can be just as compelling as privacy concerns in affecting 
behavior. 
The second motivation of Study I is to unravel the antecedents of 
privacy concerns and social rewards in the context of synchronous online 
social interactions.  Given the contextual differences between social 
relationship development and commercial transactions (e.g., the former 
typically has no monetary compensation), the theoretical framing of Study I 
would need to embrace certain aspects of online social interactions.  For 
example, in developing social relationships, either party can choose to remain 
anonymous or otherwise (Burgoon et al. 1989); whereas in online commercial 
transactions, individuals are usually aware of the identity of the seller.  In 
addition, the interaction approach is expected to differ.  In synchronous online 
social interactions, information is constantly being exchanged as the two 
interactants ask questions or provide answers in a to-and-fro manner.  This 
exchange of information can be misconstrued as invasive and disrespectful if 
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the other party keeps persisting (Peris et al. 2002).  In contrast, in online 
commercial transactions, such negative pursuit is less likely. Even though 
online merchants often desire to collect more information from consumers, 
they must ensure that the interaction procedure is professional and seemingly 
fair.  Furthermore, characteristics of the media used in online social 
interactions are inclined to differ from those of online commercial 
transactions.  For instance, online social interaction sites often focus on 
enriching information presentation via personalized communication and 
feedback immediacy, whereas online commercial transactions usually collect 
factual information through registration or payment forms. 
Third, though self disclosure is typical privacy-protective behavior in 
social interactions, it has been observed that individuals may occasionally 
demonstrate alternative behavior i.e., they might opt to misrepresent 
information when interacting with others (Joinson et al. 2007).  In Study I, self 
disclosure is defined as giving away true personal information whereas 
misrepresentation is about falsifying personal information. It is worth noting 
that self disclosure and misrepresentation are independent behaviors.  
Individuals may disclose extensive information about themselves truthfully 
and at the same time, adopt misrepresentation to protect themselves without 
disrupting the conversation flow.  
1.2.2 Study II: Information Dissemination and Network Mutuality 
Study II elucidates the role of an embarrassing exposure in online 
social networking by integrating the Social Exchange Theory with the teasing 
literature and privacy research. This theory posits that an individual assesses a 
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social exchange with reference to two important features of the exchange, 
namely (1) exchange behavior (i.e., the way the social exchange is conducted) 
and (2) social relationship structure (i.e., the structure of relationships between 
individuals involved in the social exchange) (Emerson 1972a; Emerson 1972b; 
Homans 1961).  Correspondingly, to explore the impact of an embarrassing 
exposure (i.e., the exchange behavior) in a social exchange, this study 
considers the way embarrassing information is involuntarily exposed through 
the posting and tagging mechanisms.  In addition, to represent the role that 
social relationship structure plays in individuals’ assessment of social 
exchange, Study II examines the network mutuality between the disseminator 
and the target.  
Furthermore, according to the Social Exchange Theory, the assessment 
of a social exchange entails the evaluation of two important components, 
namely exchange benefit and exchange cost (Blau 1986; Cook and Rice 2006).  
Whereas exchange benefit represents the resources individuals obtain from a 
social exchange, such as relational associations and recognitions, exchange 
cost involves the resources they devote to completing a social exchange, such 
as time and information (Molm et al. 2000).  Following past research on social 
exchange, this study investigates a target’s benefit and cost perceptions related 
to an embarrassing exposure in online social networks.  Specifically, in terms 
of benefit assessment, Study II relies on the teasing literature to understand the 
impact of an embarrassing exposure on the social relationship between the 
disseminator and the target.  In terms of cost assessment, this study relies on 
extant privacy research to elucidate the way an involuntary exposure intrudes 
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the target’s privacy.  This study is among the first in the information systems 
(IS) literature to evaluate both the benefit and the cost of an embarrassing 
exposure in online social networks.  
The other objective of this study is to investigate the target’s 
behavioral responses to an embarrassing exposure.  Previous IS research 
suggests that privacy invasion leads to protective behavior, such as denial of 
information requests, relationship terminations, and complaints (e.g., Culnan 
and Williams 2009; Dinev and Hart 2006; Son and Kim 2008).  However, 
there has been a paucity of research that examines individuals’ responses 
associated with involuntary exposures of embarrassing information.  While the 
privacy invasion associated with an involuntary exposure may induce 
relationship termination as well as withdrawal behavior, the humor implied by 
the exposure is known to stimulate the target’s active involvement in 
interactions (Lampert and Ervin-Tripp 2006; Petronio 2002).  To address this 
gap in prior research, Study II proposes and empirically tests a taxonomy of 
behavioral responses to embarrassing exposures in online social networks.  
1.2.3 Study III: Aspects of Organizational Remedies and Psychological 
Contract 
The objective of Study III is to enrich the IS literature by developing 
and testing a model that explains online customer behavior after a privacy 
breach; more specifically, this study focuses on an online firm’s postincident 
actions in mitigating the impact of a privacy breach.  The overarching theory 
in this study is drawn from the service recovery literature, which posits that 
customers’ specific beliefs with regard to organizational remedies determine 
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overall psychological evaluations, which in turn regulate behavior (Hoffman 
and Kelley 2000, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002, Smith and Bolton 2002).  
Specifically, the justice framework is used as a theoretical basis in identifying 
consumers’ beliefs associated with key attributes of privacy breach remedies 
(Moorman 1991, Culnan 1995).  This framework suggests that people evaluate 
privacy related issues in terms of three criteria, namely, distributive justice, 
procedural justice, and interactional justice (Culnan and Bies 2003, Malhotra 
et al. 2004).  According to the literature, these justice factors have been 
constantly shown to be salient in the context of information privacy (Alge 
2001, Zweig and Webster 2002, Ashworth and Free 2006, Son and Kim 2008, 
Poddar et al. 2009, Wirtz and Lwin 2009).  Thus, this study argues that these 
three types of justice perceptions can reasonably indicate the specific criteria 
that online customers employ in assessing organizational actions undertaken to 
remedy a breach incident.   
Meanwhile, Study III borrows the concept of psychological responses 
from prior literature to represent general thoughts and feelings relevant to the 
context of information privacy (Pavlou and Gefen 2005, Robinson and 
Morrison 2000).  Specifically, the service recovery literature suggests that 
individuals’ overall psychological evaluations are summarized into cognitive 
and emotional factors, which are represented by, respectively, perceived 
breach and feelings of violation (Morrison and Robinson 1997, Robinson and 
Morrison 2000).  Furthermore, much research shows that these psychological 
responses can be shaped by various types of justice perceptions jointly, instead 
of independently (Folger 1986, Luo 2007, Tang et al. 2008).  Thus, Study III 
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proposes not only main effects of justice perceptions but also their interaction 
effects on perceived breach and feelings of violation.  The research model of 
this study posits that, consistent with the service recovery literature, online 
customers’ psychological responses (i.e., general thoughts and feelings) 
regulate postincident outcomes that include post-word of mouth and post-
likelihood of switching.   
1.2.4 Potential Contributions  
This thesis seeks to contribute to both the academic and practitioner 
arenas by investigating information privacy issues in both online social 
interactions and commercial transaction contexts.  Specifically, by addressing 
the research gaps proposed in the previous sections, the three studies in this 
thesis are expected to make the following contributions. 
Study I contributes to the IS literature by identifying antecedents of 
privacy concerns and social rewards in synchronous online social interactions.  
Despite the prevalence of privacy research, extant studies have yielded scanty 
evidence on the causes of these tradeoffs beyond commercial contexts.  Based 
on the hyperpersonal framework (Walther 1996), this study investigates four 
antecedents of privacy concerns and social rewards, namely, perceived 
anonymity of self, perceived anonymity of others, perceived media richness, 
and perceived intrusiveness.  
Furthermore, Study I also presents new insights to prior privacy-related 
studies by extending the privacy calculus lens to the context of synchronous 
online social interactions.  This study argues that privacy concerns alone lack 
sufficient power to fully explain self disclosure behavior in online social 
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interactions, as in the case of individuals who express privacy concerns, yet 
reveal private information to strangers (Ben-Ze'ev 2003).  Study I has 
advocated and attested the role of social rewards as the intangible benefits 
individuals derive from synchronous online social interactions.  
Study II contributes to IS literature by examining factors relevant to 
online social networks that influence individuals’ bonding experience and 
privacy perception in an embarrassing exposure.  This study investigates two 
antecedents of perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion, 
namely, information dissemination and network mutuality.  Study II 
rationalizes that information dissemination (i.e., posting only vs. posting with 
tagging) exemplifies exchange behavior in initiating social exchange.  
Reflecting the way a bonding experience can be shaped by target participation, 
information dissemination illustrates how exclusion and inclusion of target 
notification determine perceived relationship bonding.  Furthermore, this study 
contends that network mutuality depicts the social relationship structure in 
which the social exchange occurs.  On one hand, network mutuality 
determines the audience type, which influences the impact of target 
notification on perceived relationship bonding.  On the other hand, network 
mutuality determines the exposure size, which influences the effect of target 
individuation on perceived privacy invasion.  Taken as a whole, the two 
antecedents of perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion 
(i.e., information dissemination and network mutuality) are particularly 
relevant to online social networks. 
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Second, Study II advances privacy-related research by examining 
perceived relationship bonding, in addition to perceived privacy invasion, as 
an important component in individuals’ assessment of an embarrassing 
exposure in online social networks.  This study reveals that, while the 
involuntary nature of the embarrassing exposure influences the perception of 
privacy invasion, the humor implied by the exposure may also induce 
relationship bonding.  Given that the exposure of embarrassing information is 
typically considered negative in past research, the findings of this study shed 
light on a multi-faceted interpretation of the phenomenon. 
Third, Study II enriches extant IS research on social interactions by 
providing a taxonomy of behavioral responses to embarrassing exposure in 
online social networks.  Drawing on the dichotomy of passive and active 
behavior, this study classifies individuals’ behavioral responses into four 
different types, namely inaction, transactional avoidance, interpersonal 
avoidance, and approach.  The findings of this study indicate that the proposed 
taxonomy is helpful in analyzing a variety of behavior commonly performed 
in response to embarrassing exposures and thus serves as a useful tool for in-
depth examination of individuals’ response behavior in online social networks. 
Study III contributes significantly to IS literature by showing how 
justice perceptions differ from each other in the context of an online firm’s 
responses to a data breach.  Specifically, this study demonstrates that 
distributive justice has positive effects on both cognitive and emotional 
evaluations.  However, we found that procedural justice affects cognitive 
evaluations (i.e., perceived breach), whereas interactional justice determines 
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emotional evaluations (i.e., feelings of violation).  Our findings bolster a 
common notion that compensation exerts profound effects on individuals’ 
overall evaluations of a situation in question.  More interesting, this study 
reveals a relatively unknown fact of justice perceptions that once 
compensation is taken into account, fair procedures control only the cognitive 
side but not the emotional side, whereas respectful treatments control the 
emotional side but not the cognitive side.  We suspect that the emergence of 
this discernible pattern from this particular study results, at least partly, from 
its lean online context in which individuals’ judgments about fairness are 
rarely intermixed with rich human relationships.  In any case, more research is 
needed to explore the distinct nature of justice perceptions that may vary with 
respect to various privacy contexts.  Overall, this study adds to the justice 
literature by showing theoretically as well as empirically the clearly 
discernible patterns behind justice perceptions, especially when these patterns 
are examined within the context of an online privacy breach 
Furthermore, Study III formally examines psychological contract 
violation in an online privacy breach.  The lack of attention to the 
psychological contract perspective is surprising when one considers that a 
privacy breach constitutes a severe breach of a psychological contract in 
online commercial transactions.  Drawing on the taxonomy proposed by 
Morrison and Robinson (1997), Study III explicitly differentiates between 
perceived breach, which represents a cognitive response, and feelings of 
violation, which indicate an emotional response. Overall, this dual approach to 
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psychological responses is effective not only in examining privacy problems 
but also in understanding other social exchange relationships.   
This thesis provides practitioners with valuable insights.  Given the 
influence of network mutuality on target's interpretation of an embarrassing 
exposure, application designers may contemplate how they can use 
information on network mutuality to their advantage.  For example, in cases 
where embarrassing content is disseminated, a target’s perception of privacy 
invasion can be mitigated if posting with tagging is discouraged for a 
disseminator who has low network mutuality with the target.  On the other 
hand, if the disseminator has high network mutuality with the target, the 
disseminator should be promptly notified regarding the option of tagging the 
target to induce the perception of relationship bonding.  
The three types of active behavioral responses identified in Study II 
alerts service providers to various user actions that go beyond inaction.  Study 
II reveals that users may file reports to the service provider to seek 
transactional avoidance.  This finding can steer online service providers 
toward designing effective mechanisms to facilitate transactional avoidance.  
For example, when users complain against a piece of content, the online social 
network provider should consider suspending the content from dissemination.  
Furthermore, Study II shows that users, despite their strong perception of 
privacy invasion, may refrain from interpersonal avoidance to avoid abrupt 
relationship termination.  To this end, this thesis advocates that service 
providers should allow individuals to gradually de-escalate their relationships.  
For example, to distance oneself from the disseminator, users should be 
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permitted to engage in gradual relationship dissolution by progressively 
excluding the disseminator from his or her online social networking activities.  
Study II also shows that users may engage in active exchange with the 
disseminator through approach behavior.  Therefore, it is important that 
service providers provide participatory features, such as threaded commenting 
and content rating, to stimulate rich interactions. 
Study III reveals important insights into how to salvage customer 
relationships damaged by privacy-related incidents.  First, Study III advocates 
that privacy breach recovery should be carefully reengineered.  Specifically, 
managers could consider creating privacy breach remedies that allow for 
recovery efforts directed at improving the psychological responses 
experienced by customers.  They should have an array of tools and resources 
available to address the specific needs of customers.  Study III shows that 
perceived breach and feelings of violation are greatly affected by 
compensation.  However, perceived breach becomes less sensitive to 
compensation when a fair procedure was in place, and feelings of violation are 
less affected by compensation when respectful interpersonal treatment was 
experienced.  This result is an important reminder that redressing privacy 
breaches means more than enacting all three aspects of privacy recovery.  
Thus, online firms must carefully consider the specific psychological 
responses to improve customers’ privacy situations. 
Study III also notes that interactional justice amplifies the effect of 
procedural justice on perceived breach.  This finding implies that when 
interactional justice is low, organizational efforts to boost procedural justice 
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are likely to be wasted and have little impact on perceived breach.  Procedural 
justice and interactional justice are similar in that both are concerned with 
“means” to ends.  Because of this resemblance, interpersonal treatment might 
be considered as a testimonial for the firm’s practices.  Although conventional 
wisdom suggests the significance of procedural justice and interactional 
justice, their synergistic power is not yet widely known.  Study III clearly 
shows that interactional justice is a necessary condition to maximize the return 
from a firm’s adherence to fair procedures.  The online environment facilitates 
information dissemination, which is vital for notifying customers about the 
process of remedying a privacy breach.  However, the lack of physical 
contacts could hinder customers’ understanding of the complex recovery 
process.  In light of this understanding, to maximize the return from adherence 
to fair procedures, online firms should consider enhancing interpersonal 
interactions in developing their privacy breach recovery capabilities.   
1.3 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This opening chapter provides an overview of the entire study context 
and the general motivations based on the current research gaps.  It highlights 
the importance of the information privacy for both online social interactions 
and electronic commerce, and raises the research questions that will be 
addressed in the studies as well as the potential contributions.  The following 
paragraphs discuss the organization of the remaining chapters in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 describes Study I in detail.  It first reviews the literature on 
the hyperpersonal framework, which is drawn upon as the theoretical basis in 
identifying antecedent pertinent in the context of synchronous online social 
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interactions.  It then discusses the privacy calculus perspective, which 
underscores the role of psychological tradeoff in driving individuals’ privacy-
protective behaviors.  A survey is conducted to test the proposed hypotheses.  
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. 
Chapter 3 reports the detail of Study II, which investigates individuals’ 
responses to involuntary embarrassing exposures on online social networks.  
This study integrates the social exchange theory with the teasing literature and 
privacy research to elucidate the impact of embarrassing exposures on 
perceived privacy invasions and perceived relationship bonding.  Furthermore, 
using the Kuhl’s (1981) classification of response behavior, this study 
proposes four types of behavioral responses to embarrassing exposures, 
namely inaction, transactional avoidance, interpersonal avoidance, and 
approach.  A laboratory experiment is conducted to test the research model. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on its theoretical and practical 
implications, limitations, as well as future research directions. 
Chapter 4 elaborates the detail of Study III.  This chapter first reviews 
on online privacy breach and the typical organizational remedies undertaken 
by online firms.  To investigate the impact of organizational remedies on 
consumer postincident behaviors, this study employs the service recovery 
literature as the overarching framework.  Furthermore, following the service 
recovery literature, we draw upon the justice framework to identify the key 
aspects of organizational remedies after an online privacy breach and the 
psychological contract theory to understanding customers’ overall 
psychological evaluation of the recovery efforts undertaken by an online firm.  
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A scenario-based survey is conducted to test the proposed research 
framework. Discussions and implications are then reported. 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by summarizing the findings and 
implications of the three studies, followed by discussion on the limitations and 




CHAPTER 2 STUDY I: PRIVACY CONCERNS AND PRIVACY-
PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOR IN SYNCHRONOUS ONLINE SOCIAL 
INTERACTIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Transcending temporal and spatial barriers, online social interactions 
have revolutionized lives by offering more than a space in which to hang out.  
They enable individuals to share cultural artifacts, manage self presentation or 
receive feedback from peers.  For example, it was reported that, in 2011, over 
20% of Internet users had participated in various online social interactions, 
such as chatroom conversations and instant messaging (Ofcom 2011).  
Through these synchronous exchanges of information, individuals seek to gain 
immediate socio-emotional support and satisfaction in the immense and 
borderless space of the Internet. 
Despite the promising potential of engaging in online social 
interactions, a survey of 1,698 Internet users in the U.S. has revealed that 
about one-third (33%) of the users were concerned about the loss of personal 
privacy (Madden and Smith 2010), particularly in the context of synchronous 
online social interactions.  As an incredible amount of information is being 
exchanged synchronously, an individual’s privacy is subject to public scrutiny.  
The possibility of real-time monitoring and eavesdropping aggravates the 
problem, by exposing individuals to potential harassment and flaming, or even 
more extreme forms of aggravation such as stalking and sexual abuse.  Unlike 
the asynchronous exchanges of information, individuals’ privacy concerns can 
be exacerbated in synchronous online social interactions.  In the asynchronous 
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environment, individuals can rely on message editing, reprocessing, or third 
party advice on privacy protection (Son and Kim 2008); however, in the 
synchronous environment, individuals are pressured to maintain the flow of 
information exchange and hence would be motivated to engage in more 
immediate behavior.  For instance, when there is a request for personal 
information, an individual has to make an immediate decision on privacy-
related behavior, and whether or not to disclose private information , and how 
to disclose it, so as to better safeguard and protect oneself (Joinson et al. 
2007).  
It has, however, been observed that despite privacy concerns, 
individuals are very willing and forthcoming towards the sharing of personal 
and intimate information with others, including complete strangers.  For 
example, in another survey of 1,623 Internet users in the U.S., nearly 40% 
explicitly expressed concerns about their privacy.  Ironically, among this 
group of respondents, a majority reported that they would still be likely to 
disclose private information, such as names, affiliations, private thoughts or 
opinions in interaction with others online (Madden et al. 2007).  Hence, it 
would be interesting to investigate why users’ privacy behavior is at times 
inconsistent with their privacy concerns.  
Indeed, information systems (IS) research has made some progress in 
understanding the determinants of individuals’ privacy-related behavior.  For 
instance, Hui et al. (2007) investigated mechanisms of privacy mitigations.  
They found that while privacy assurance mechanisms, such as privacy 
statements, reduced privacy concerns, economic incentives encouraged 
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individuals’ risk-taking behavior, e.g., disclosure of personal information to 
Internet merchants.  Thus the researchers suggested that individuals performed 
a privacy calculus psychologically when confronting privacy loss.  Likewise, 
in a study of user behavior on financial websites, Hann et al. (2007) found that 
users were willing to reveal their private information, such as household 
income and stocks portfolio, when they were compensated with sufficient 
monetary rewards.  In essence, these studies suggest that an individual’s 
privacy-protective behavior is jointly determined by both privacy concerns 
and some tangible benefits derived from surrendering personal information. 
Notwithstanding these findings, our understanding on the determinants of 
privacy-related behavior beyond commercial contexts remains incomplete.  
Hence, our first motivation is to investigate what drives individuals’ privacy-
protective behavior in the context of synchronous online social interactions.  
In particular, we propose that individuals derive certain intangible benefits 
from such interactions, which is referred to as social rewards in this paper, and 
that these intangible benefits can be just as compelling as privacy concerns in 
affecting behavior.  
Our second motivation is to unravel the antecedents of privacy 
concerns and social rewards in the context of synchronous online social 
interactions.  Given the contextual differences between social relationship 
development and commercial transactions (e.g., the former typically has no 
monetary compensation), our theoretical framing would need to embrace 
certain aspects of online social interactions.  For example, in developing social 
relationships, either party can choose to remain anonymous or otherwise 
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(Burgoon et al. 1989); whereas in online commercial transactions, individuals 
are usually aware of the identity of the seller.  In addition, the interaction 
approach is expected to differ.  In synchronous online social interactions, 
information is constantly being exchanged as the two interactants ask 
questions or provide answers in a to-and-fro manner.  This exchange of 
information can be misconstrued as invasive and disrespectful if the other 
party keeps persisting (Peris et al. 2002).  In contrast, in online commercial 
transactions, such negative pursuit is less likely.  Even though online 
merchants often desire to collect more information from consumers, they must 
ensure that the interaction procedure is professional and seemingly fair.  
Furthermore, characteristics of the media used in online social interactions are 
inclined to differ from those of online commercial transactions.  For instance, 
online social interaction sites often focus on enriching information 
presentation via personalized communication and feedback immediacy, 
whereas online commercial transactions usually collect factual information 
through registration or payment forms. 
Third, though self disclosure is typical privacy-protective behavior in 
social interactions, it has been observed that individuals may occasionally 
demonstrate alternative behavior i.e., they might opt to misrepresent 
information when interacting with others (Joinson et al. 2007). In our study, 
self disclosure is defined as giving away true personal information whereas 
misrepresentation is about falsifying personal information.  It is worth noting 
that self disclosure and misrepresentation are independent behaviors.  
Individuals may disclose extensive information about themselves truthfully 
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and at the same time, adopt misrepresentation to protect themselves without 
disrupting the conversation flow.  
Essentially, we hope to advance the discourse in this field with a more 
holistic and comprehensive understanding of privacy tradeoff and behavior in 
synchronous online social interactions.  Generally, the objectives of our paper 
are: 
(i) To extend the privacy calculus perspective to the context of 
synchronous online social interactions;  
(ii) To discover and examine the antecedents of privacy concerns and 
social rewards in privacy calculus; and  
(iii) To study the behavioral responses that individuals adopt to protect 
their privacy. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 Hyperpersonal Framework 
The main thrust of considerable prior research has been on 
understanding online relationship development, which can be intimate and 
socially desirable.  The hyperpersonal framework offers an approach to 
understanding the way in which users of mediated communications experience 
relational intimacy (Walther 1996).  Specifically, this framework underscores 
four aspects of mediated communications, which depict how senders select, 
receivers magnify, channels promote, and feedback facilitates the 
development of social relationships in the mediated environment.  First, as 
senders, users of mediated communications engage in selective self-
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presentation involving inspection, editing, and revision of information.  
Furthermore, due to the provision of limited physical cues, unintended 
nonverbal behavior and appearance information will not be accidentally 
transmitted to others.  Therefore, users may reallocate their cognitive-
behavioral resources to create a favorable impression on others.  Second, as 
receivers, users of mediated communications typically receive reduced 
physical cues that are essential in constructing initial impressions about 
partners.  Under these conditions, individuals tend to over-estimate their 
similarities and shared norms with others when interacting through mediated 
channels.  Third, the channel underscores issues with regards to how 
information is communicated between partners, e.g. richness or cue 
multiplicity of communication channels. Lastly, feedback considers how social 
relationships can be reinforced by the behavior of others in interactions.  By 
interpreting others’ behavior, users establish understanding of the interactions 
and form expectations of others.  
Extant studies have drawn on the hyperpersonal framework in 
understanding relationship development in the mediated environment.  For 
instance, the sender perspective helps explain the effects of self-awareness on 
individuals’ social attractiveness in instant messaging (Yao and Flanagin 
2006) whereas the receiver perspective sheds insights on impression 
management in teleconferencing (Walther 2007).  Channel characteristics and 
feedback are important in shaping self-presentation behavior in online dating 
websites (Ellison et al. 2011).  
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Generally, the hyperpersonal framework identifies four essential 
aspects of mediated communications, namely the sender, receiver, channel 
characteristics, and feedback, which are particularly useful in understanding 
relationship development. 
2.2.2 Privacy Calculus – Privacy Concerns 
Whereas privacy is defined as the claim of individuals to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others (Campell 1997; Westin 1967), privacy concerns refers 
to individuals’ subjective views of fairness within the context of privacy 
(Malhotra et al. 2004). Smith et al. (1996) developed the Concern for 
Information Privacy (CFIP) scale which regards privacy concerns as 
“individuals’ concerns about organizational information privacy practices” 
(p.169), such as information collection, confidentiality, errors and secondary 
usage. 
Reflecting on the origin of privacy concerns, collection refers to the 
extensiveness of personal information collected by organizations (Smith et al. 
1996; Stewart and Segars 2002). Increasingly, it induces the perception of 
intensive data logging, as well as the impression that organizations are getting 
more intrusive (Sheehan and Hoy 2000). The second factor, confidentiality, 
deliberates on the challenges posed by unauthorized accesses to personal 
information (Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 2002). Personal 
information is especially vulnerable to illegitimate explorations when 
technological protections are amiss or data policies are flimsy (Miyazaki and 
Fernandez 2001). Noting the consequences of errors, CFIP also emphasizes 
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the importance of information accuracy (Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 
2002). If it is unintentional, erroneous information could portray individuals in 
a false light, such as wrongfully diminishing their financial creditability and 
hence impairing their borrowing opportunities (Metzger 2004). The final 
factor, secondary usage, reflects on the impact of using information beyond 
individuals’ acknowledged purposes (Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 
2002; Xu et al. 2008). For instance, some banks are known to use financial 
data collected on loan applications for subsequent sales offerings, an act which 
applicants would never anticipate (Sheehan and Hoy 2000). 
Even though privacy concerns exist in both online and offline 
environments, CFIP primarily focuses on individuals’ concerns in the latter. 
Hence, Stewart and Segars (2002) acknowledge that “CFIP needs to be 
reinvestigated in light of emerging technology, practice and research” (p.37). 
In particular, Sheehan and Hoy (2000) note that the study of online privacy 
concerns should identify “underlying influences on privacy concern in the 
online environment” (p.63). Indeed, privacy concerns would not be properly 
measured when factors pertinent to the online context are left disregarded. For 
instance, the extents of personal information collection and subsequent usages 
have been fundamentally broadened with the growth in Internet usage. 
Conventionally, information about consumers was mostly collected 
anonymously, via unidentified surveys and public polls. In contrast, collection 
can be individualized using online technologies, such as website visitor 
monitoring, whereby consumers are traced in online commercial websites. 
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To address privacy issues in the online environment, Malhotra et al. 
(2004) built upon CFIP and proposed Internet Users Information Privacy 
Concerns (IUIPC) which encompasses collection, control and awareness as the 
essential factors of privacy concerns. Similar to CFIP, collection refers to 
individuals’ concerns about the approach and the amount of individual-
specific data demanded by others (Malhotra et al. 2004). The act of data 
collection forms the “foundation” of privacy concerns and is predicated on the 
principle of equity which relates to one’s gains from information exchange 
(Culnan and Bies 2003).  
Constituting the “active” component of privacy concerns, control 
refers to the degree to which individuals perceive themselves to be vested with 
control of the procedures (Malhotra et al. 2004). While CFIP hints at the 
importance of control through their emphasis on “confidentiality” and 
“secondary usage”, IUIPC singles “control” out as one of its three essential 
factors. Evidence suggests that issues with access and usage are more 
appropriately managed through “control over who has access to personal data, 
how personal data are used” (Phelps et al. 2000, p.29). In the online 
environment, individuals could be bestowed with information control 
functionally and environmentally. Functional control is related to the 
enforcement of integrity for personal information (Pavlou et al. 2007). With 
accurate information, individuals can ensure that proper impression is formed 
about them. Environmental control cogitates the ability to regulate 
unintentional self exposure (Olivero and Lunt 2004). The loss of 
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environmental control causes individuals to feel vulnerable and become 
uncomfortable (Goffman 1959).  
Constituting the “passive” component of privacy concerns, awareness 
is related to individuals’ knowledge of their privacy context such as 
organizational privacy practices for online commercial transactions (Culnan 
and Bies 2003). Evidence shows that despite the existence of security 
measures, these mechanisms might remain inconspicuous and hence 
individuals could still have privacy concerns (e.g., Hui et al. 2007; Milne et al. 
2005). Adequate contextual awareness provides individuals with justifications 
for how information is exchanged and explanations for why certain 
information is requested (Colquitt 2001). If individuals are deprived of these 
contextual information, privacy concerns would prevail (Hoffman et al. 1999). 
Malhotra et al. (2004) thus suggest that awareness can be manifested as 
informational justices which relate to the articulation of information, such as 
the availability of privacy assurances in online commercial transactions or 
identity information in online social interactions (Pavlou et al. 2007). 
2.2.3 Privacy Calculus – Social Rewards 
As Homans (1958: p.606) correctly pointed out in his Social Exchange 
Theory, “social behavior is an exchange of goods, material goods but also 
non-material ones, such as the symbols of approval or prestige. … For a 
person in an exchange, what he gives may be a cost to him, just as what he 
gets may be a reward, and his behavior changes less as the difference of the 
two, profit, tends to a maximum.” This concurs with researchers who argue 
that individuals could possibly trade some commodity (e.g., information 
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privacy) for other benefits as part of a social exchange (Acquisti 2008). This 
exchange for other benefits becomes part of what is known as a “social 
contract” (Dunfee et al. 1999), as individuals have something of value to 
others and both decide to engage in a mutually agreeable trade, abiding by the 
norm of reciprocity (Lawler and Thye 1999).  
In Social Exchange Theory, individuals are often motivated by self-
interest to transact with others to accomplish individual goals (Lawler and 
Thye 1999). These interactions are usually seen as interdependent and 
contingent on the actions of others (Blau 1964). For instance, when something 
is being offered, the receiving parties would respond in kind. Furthermore, 
individuals are assumed to always act in ways to ensure that their benefits 
commensurate, if not outweigh, their costs. Social Exchange Theory has been 
tested in various settings. For example, in a study on system implementations, 
Ridings et al. (2002) investigated the effect of responsiveness of technical 
implementation teams on the users’ adoption of new systems. Results from a 
quasi-experiment showed that the degree of responsiveness, as an indicator of 
social exchange, resulted in significant differences in the users’ assessment of 
the correctness and eventual approval of the system.   
In the context of online social interactions, individuals may engage in 
social exchanges to gain social rewards, which refer to the pleasures, 
satisfactions, and gratifications they derive from participating in a relationship 
or interpersonal interactions (Eisenberger et al. 1990; Gilbert and Horenstein 
1975). For example, Hemetsberger (2002) found that individuals in virtual 
communities engage in collaborative production of digital goods and services 
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to fulfill their social needs such as gaining social approval, social 
reaffirmation, friendship, or moral support. At times, individuals socialize in 
online chat rooms simply to mingle around, relax and enjoy. Chatting with 
others online in itself may elicit pleasure and psychological reward. 
Besides maximizing benefits, individuals are also known to minimize 
costs incurred when fulfilling personal objectives (Blau 1964). For instance, 
prior studies have often considered time and effort as part of the costs in 
developing social relationships (e.g., Altman et al. 1981; Walther 1996). By 
devoting time into social exchanges, individuals accumulate knowledge for 
reducing uncertainty about others (Afifi and Guerrero 2000). Through exerting 
effort to understand others’ expectations, individuals prudently avoid 
interactions which could be seen as inappropriate and detrimental to 
developing relationships (Parks and Floyd 1996). 
In the synchronous online environment, social exchange is 
substantially expedited and hence the costs in time and effort have been much 
discounted (Ellison et al. 2006). However, this improvement in efficiency and 
convenience might come at the expense of privacy when developing online 
social relationships. Individuals may become overly indulged in synchronous 
online social interactions and divulge too much personal and sensitive 
information (Tidwell and Walther 2002). Subjecting their private thoughts and 
feelings to others’ scrutiny, individuals could jeopardize their own beliefs and 
deflate their self esteem, especially when their revelation is subsequently 
misused, criticized or rejected (Guerrero and Afifi 1995). Wary about these 
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costly repercussions, individuals would become particularly concerned about 
their self disclosure (Dainton and Stafford 1993). 
Likewise, this cost-benefit tradeoff is also evident in online 
commercial transactions (e.g., Culnan and Bies 2003). Individuals are known 
to perform a “privacy calculus” to assess the outcomes they could receive as a 
result of mutual exchanges (cf. Laufer and Wolfe 1977). The financial 
compensations (e.g., discounts and rebates) as part of the calculus, however 
tempting, might be non-applicable beyond the commercial contexts. The 
exchange of monetary benefits in synchronous online social interactions is 
atypical, if not unprecedented. Rather, individuals are more likely to be 
seduced by the prospect of social benefits whereby personal information is 
revealed for relationship development. Hence, to extend privacy calculus 
beyond commercial transactions, we contend social rewards as the alternative 
benefit for individuals plagued with privacy concerns in synchronous online 
social interactions. 
2.3 RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
By integrating the hyperpersonal framework and privacy calculus 
perspective, we designed our proposed research model, which is presented in 
Figure 2.1.  Specifically, we hypothesize the relationships between four 
distinct aspects of the hyperpersonal framework and the privacy tradeoff.  We 





Figure 2.1: Study I Research Model  
2.3.1 Hyperpersonal Framework and Privacy Tradeoff 
This study draws upon the hyperpersonal framework in proposing four 
antecedents of privacy tradeoff, which balances the risks of privacy concerns 
with the benefits of social rewards.  The four antecedents include perceived 
anonymity of self, perceived anonymity of others, perceived media richness, 
and perceived intrusiveness.  First, according to the hyperpersonal framework, 
the sender perspective considers the effects of limited identity cues on 
individuals’ impression management.  From this perspective, individuals focus 
on the identity information they have selectively sent to others.  In 
synchronous online social interactions, individuals can largely maintain their 
anonymity by completely or partially concealing their identity information.  
Therefore, to reflect the sender perspective, perceived anonymity of self is 
examined in this study. 
Second, the hyperpersonal framework suggests that limited identity 
cues do not only establish the sender perspective but also play a key role in 
establishing the receiver perspective.  When receiving information, individuals 
will evaluate the identity information of their communication partners.  Due to 
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the lack of physical presence in synchronous online social interactions, the 
identity information individuals receive from others can often be partial and 
fragmented.  As a result, others can at times remain largely unidentifiable.  
Therefore, to reflect the receiver perspective, this study examines the impact 
of perceived anonymity of others. 
Third, the hyperpersonal framework posits that characteristics of the 
communication channel affect information exchange in online social 
interactions (Walther 1996).  Past studies have predominately focused on 
media richness, which circumscribes the richness of information delivered by 
the communication medium (e.g., Caplan and Turner 2007; Jiang et al. 2010; 
Ratan et al. 2010).  Furthermore, extant research suggests that media richness 
facilitates the development of meaningful online relationships (e.g., Dennis et 
al. 1999; Sheer 2011).  In view of the relevance of this channel characteristic, 
this study examines perceived media richness afforded by the communication 
channel. 
Lastly, Walther (1996) states that individuals interpret others’ feedback 
in social interactions to establish understanding of others, which is essential to 
developing relationships. In online synchronous social interactions, feedback 
is manifested in the way personal information is exchanged as others ask 
questions or provide answers in a to-and-fro manner.  In such an exchange, 
individuals typically maintain a psychological boundary to control access to 
their private self (Petronio 2002).  This psychological boundary is penetrated 
when individuals provide personal information in response to others’ requests.  
While allowing others to penetrate this psychological boundary is essential to 
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the development of meaningful online relationships (Gibbs et al. 2006; Kim 
and Yun 2007), it might also evoke individuals’ perception of intrusiveness 
(Vandebosch and Van Cleemput 2009; Wolak et al. 2007).  Therefore, we 
examine individuals’ perceptions of intrusiveness in this study. 
2.3.1.1 Perceived Anonymity of Self 
In synchronous online social interactions, individuals may manipulate 
their anonymity status by revealing or concealing their real names, or using 
partially or completely fake identities.  When perceived anonymity of self is 
high, individuals may experience deindividuation, which is a state of 
diminished focus on self and reduced concern for social evaluation (Postmes 
and Spears 1998).  In this case, they will perceive low accountability in their 
social interactions and possess a sense of immunity (Moral-Toranzo et al. 
2007).  Conversely, if individuals sense that others know their identity 
information, they will be held responsible for their online adventures (e.g., Ji 
and Lieber 2010; Xu et al. 2011).  
Hence, if individuals perceive themselves to be unidentifiable in online 
social interactions, they feel protected against others’ ridicules and scrutiny, 
and will become less concerned about their privacy. Thus we propose: 
H1: Higher perceived anonymity of self will reduce privacy concerns. 
High perceived anonymity of self entails deindividuation, which 
detaches individuals from their own identities and cause them to be more 
apathetic toward the relationship being developed (Schimel et al. 2001). In 
other words, their perceived anonymity of self causes them to distance 
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themselves, lower their social connectedness and reduce their interpersonal 
dependence with communication partners (McLeod 2011). Resultantly, 
individuals will perceive less social rewards from the exchange relationship. 
Furthermore, prior research suggests that being responsive to social validation 
and gaining effective social affirmation are essential toward boosting 
individuals’ socially rewarding experience (Leary and Kowalski 1990). 
However, perceived anonymity of self makes social validation and affirmation 
very difficult, if not impossible. When individuals cannot understand how they 
are valued as relational partners by others (Leary and Kowalski 1990), they 
are hindered from fostering mutual acceptance and eventually cultivating a 
socially rewarding experience. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2:  Higher perceived anonymity of self leads to a decrease in social 
rewards. 
2.3.1.2 Perceived Anonymity of Others 
When other parties are anonymous, it is impossible for individuals to 
know who they are or hold them accountable for their actions and opinions.  
Consequently, individuals face greater risks and uncertainty in their 
synchronous online social interactions.  When others refuse means of 
identification, individuals find it difficult to assimilate enough factual 
information to better understand others’ opinions (Hancock and Dunham 
2001).  In fact, evidence suggests that individuals who fail to know much 
about other parties in social interactions, are anxious and paranoid about 
losing their privacy (e.g., Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002; Viégas 2005).  
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Essentially, past studies suggest that individuals’ inability to construct 
meaningful others exacerbates privacy concerns in online social interactions.  
In addition, the other party’s identity often serves to justify the 
information that is requested. For example, if the other party reveals who he or 
she is (e.g., Mary, a mother of two kids), it does assist in enlightening 
individuals as to why that other party is always asking about their kids.  
Otherwise, individuals may erroneously misconstrue that person to be a 
pedophile, with ill intents.  When others provide adequate explanations, 
individuals will become more acceptable and tolerant towards privacy loss 
(Colquitt 2001).  In summary, perceived anonymity of others constantly poses 
challenges to individuals’ privacy concerns. Hence we posit: 
H3: Higher perceived anonymity of others will increase privacy 
concerns. 
Within the hyperpersonal framework, the identity of the other party 
provides an important basis for the commencement of online social 
interactions (Walther 1996).  Past research suggests that the identity 
information of the other party is essential to impression formation in the online 
environment.  Prior to embarking on online synchronous social interactions, 
individuals occasionally feel uncertain about others (Caplan and Turner 2007).  
In this case, individuals may find it difficult to develop meaningful 
relationships with unknown others.  In contrast, with knowledge about others’ 
identity, individuals can have better understanding of others, which is 
imperative to developing online relationships (Joinson 2001).  Hence, when 
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others are less anonymous, individuals will find the online synchronous social 
interaction more socially rewarding (Perreault and Bourhi 1999).  
Furthermore, the identity information of others enhances formation of 
a shared “interlocutory space” (Riva and Galimberti 1998, p.147).  This 
mutually shared space is critical toward a better appreciation of others.  As a 
result of meaningful communication and interaction, better relationships can 
be developed.  Otherwise, individuals would fail to benefit from the social 
rewards available in online social interactions.  Hence we hypothesize:  
H4: Higher perceived anonymity of others will reduce social rewards. 
2.3.1.3 Perceived Media Richness 
The Media Richness Theory, developed by Daft and Lengel (1986) and 
Daft et al. (1987), is used to characterize a medium’s ability to change 
understanding within a specific time interval.  The theory suggests that the 
evaluation of the richness of media can be based on four criteria, namely, the 
multiplicity of information cues, the immediacy of feedback, language variety, 
and the degree of “personalness”.  Based on these criteria, various media can 
be ranked along a media richness continuum, ranging from very rich to very 
lean.  The Media Richness Theory also advocates a media-task fit, i.e., 
equivocal messages are better communicated using rich media than lean media 
(McGrath and Hollingshead 1993).  Despite some conflicting findings that 
primarily challenge “the media-task fit”, past empirical studies consistently 
demonstrate the positive effects of rich media on social perceptions. Indeed, 
the ranking of the richness of media was found to be very similar to the 
ranking of social presence afforded by media (Carlson and Davis 1998).  
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Evidence also has suggested that increased multiplicity of cues is closely tied 
to individuals’ social communication, interpretation of communication, and 
gain of consensus (Dennis and Kinney 1998).  In summary, past research has 
suggested that the richness of the communication media would effectively 
contribute to creating the overall shared meaning and thus lead to a more 
socially fulfilling experience (Canessa and Riolo 2003).  Hence, we posit: 
H5: Higher perceived media richness will increase social rewards.1 
2.3.1.4 Perceived Intrusiveness 
In synchronous online social interactions, perceived intrusiveness is of 
particular importance to developing relationships.  Perceived intrusiveness 
refers to the extent to which individuals perceive unsolicited invasion into 
their personal space (Burgoon et al. 1989).  Past studies suggest that 
individuals generally erect psychological boundaries around their perception 
of private-self to ward off public visibility.  These boundaries are often 
penetrated as individuals’ personal space is invaded in developing 
relationships (Gibbs et al. 2006).  While invasion of these boundaries is 
inevitable in social interactions, others’ intrusiveness, in the form of 
interruption, interference, and harassment, often annoys individuals.  
Consequently, individuals lose their “rights to be left alone” and feel 
susceptible to harm on their private-self (Petronio 1991).  Hence, intrusiveness 
is undesirable and uncalled for.  This encroachment on individuals’ space and 
infringement on their personal rights trigger their concerns about privacy 
(Burgoon et al. 1989). Hence, we posit: 
                                                          
1  Since there are no theories or empirical evidence that indicate any possible relationship between perceived 
media richness and privacy concerns, we do not hypothesize on them. 
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H6: Higher perceived intrusiveness will increase privacy concerns. 
Relationships are usually developed over time as intimacy progresses 
with proper social exchange (Lawler and Thye 1999).  However, intrusiveness 
critically upsets the pattern and pace of gradual information exchange with 
interruption and haste (Petronio 2002).  Feeling pestered, pressured or 
disrespected, individuals are denied the opportunity to pause, contemplate, and 
reply accordingly.  This hurts online social interactions as conversations 
evolve into something more confrontational and abrasive.  Sometimes, 
intimate questions are asked prematurely; sometimes, inappropriate questions 
are asked unwittingly.  Whatever the case, intrusiveness is frowned upon, 
resulting in a less than rewarding social experience. 
In addition, intrusiveness would disrupt the equity in synchronous 
online social interactions.  Prior research suggests that imbalances in the 
exchange of personal information would have dire consequences (Burgoon et 
al. 1989).  High intrusiveness indicates that others are attempting to get more 
information out of the social interactions, thereby upsetting the balance 
ensuring stability (Le Poire et al. 1992).  When others increase their efforts to 
gain information over affected individuals, the latter would perceive such 
synchronous online interactions to be less socially fulfilling.  Consequently, 
this leads to a reduction in social rewards. Hence, we posit: 




2.3.2 Privacy Tradeoff and Privacy-Protective Behavior 
Extant privacy studies have shed some light on the outcomes of 
privacy tradeoff. For instance, privacy concerns are known to exacerbate 
cynical perceptions and induce worries about others’ opportunism (Milne and 
Gordon 1993).  Consequently, a relationship could be jeopardized (Dinev and 
Hart 2006).  Furthermore, individuals would feel betrayed, thereby inducing a 
sense of unfairness, inequality and emotional distress (Culnan and Bies 2003).  
They would then adopt various behavioral strategies to protect their privacy 
(Zwick and Dholakia 2004).  Although several types of privacy-protective 
behaviors have been identified in online commercial transactions (e.g., 
complaints, negative word-of-mouth, and information removal) (Son and Kim 
2008), interpersonal communication studies exemplify the provision of 
personal information to be the most relevant behavior in synchronous online 
social interactions (e.g., Toma and Hancock 2010; Walther 2007).  Generally, 
individuals regulate social interactions by resorting to reducing revelation or 
opting for deception.  Deceptive behavior could help maintain the continuous 
flow of information in synchronous online social interactions, thereby 
reducing the chances of irritating others.  In summary, the pressure for 
continuous and rapid information flow in synchronous online social 
interactions necessitates more immediate responses.  Accordingly, this study 
focuses on two types of individuals’ immediate privacy protective-behavior, 




2.3.2.1 Privacy Concerns and Self Disclosure 
In this study, we use self disclosure to refer to the act of revealing 
truthful personal information to others (Wheeless and Grotz 1976). The 
information can be descriptive and public-self oriented (e.g., name, affiliation, 
address, etc) or evaluative and private-self oriented (e.g., religious beliefs, 
political opinions, etc) (Petronio 1991). Self disclosure plays a pivotal role in 
founding social relationships (Altman et al. 1981). By gradually disclosing 
their personal information and revealing their views and opinions, ambiguities 
are resolved and expectations are aligned (Dolen et al. 2004). 
 Despite the pertinence of self disclosure and its accrual benefits, 
potential risks exist. As self disclosure often involves highly personal or 
intimate information, and at times even innermost emotions, attitudes, or 
feelings (Altman et al. 1981), individuals can become vulnerable. Others may 
wrongly judge them or react adversely to the information (Petronio 1991). 
Also, instead of being the sole owner in absolute possession of the 
information, others possess it too (Joinson et al. 2007). They can disseminate 
the information to others, use it for marketing solicitations, or even misuse the 
information (Phelps et al. 2000). Consequently, victims may suffer 
psychologically, physically or materially (Tavani and Moor 2001). 
 Hence, avoiding self disclosure becomes one of the most common 
strategies adopted by individuals to protect their privacy (Joinson et al. 2007). 
In a social interaction, when individuals face privacy threats, such as the 
unauthorized use, modification or dissemination of their private information, 
they can lower their exposure to others simply by deciding not to disclose 
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personal information. This is especially so in the case of synchronous online 
social interactions, where the communication is electronic and easy to 
terminate or avoid. Generally, high privacy concerns indicate a lack of 
confidence in the reliability and integrity of others, and this should rationally 
lead to a corresponding reduction in self disclosure since the potential risks to 
individuals are significant (Olivero and Lunt 2004). Hence we posit: 
H8: Greater privacy concerns will lead to less self disclosure. 
2.3.2.2 Privacy Concerns and Misrepresentation 
Even though potential risks may diminish any desire for self 
disclosure, individuals are occasionally repudiated the opportunity to withhold 
information (Miyazaki and Fernandez 2001) in order to proceed with an 
interaction. For example, in online commercial transactions, they must fill in 
some information designated as compulsory fields to complete membership 
registration. In synchronous online social interactions, the persistence of 
others may also make individuals feel devoid of choice, and a need to provide 
some falsified information. 
Thus, misrepresentation of information refers to the act of creating and 
conveying false information to others (Argo et al. 2006), regardless of its 
intent, be it to mislead, to deceive or simply out of fun (Walther 2007). As a 
result, misrepresentation can serve to self protect, self explore or impress upon 
others (Joinson et al. 2007). To illustrate, misrepresentation enables 
impression management by allowing individuals to manipulate others’ 
perception through shielding psychological information and camouflaging 
physical information about oneself (Leary and Kowalski 1990; Walther 2007). 
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Likewise, misrepresentation can also allow individuals to temporarily placate 
or satisfy others, thereby maintaining the flow of interactions. Based on these 
arguments, misrepresentation is used in synchronous interaction when 
individuals have to follow up on a conversation, but do not want to disclose 
their true private information.  
Furthermore, according to Social Exchange Theory, interactions are 
bound by the norm of reciprocity to engage in a fair exchange of information 
under normal social circumstances (Lawler and Thye 1999). When their 
privacy is threatened, individuals might perceive a violation of this norm and 
take necessary steps to protect themselves. In the context of synchronous 
online social interactions, when individuals experience greater privacy 
concerns, they may resort to misrepresentation to minimize the level of threat 
(Milne et al. 2005). Thus, we posit:  
H9: Greater privacy concerns will lead to greater misrepresentation. 
2.3.2.3 Social Rewards and Self Disclosure 
In social interactions, individuals are bound by the norms of 
reciprocity to engage in a fair exchange of information (Lawler and Thye 
1999).  In particular, open and sincere self disclosure forms the basic tenet of 
maintaining an intimate and rewarding relationship (Ben-Ze'ev 2003).  When 
individuals perceive a relationship to be rewarding, they will make greater 
efforts to maintain or further develop the relationship.  In particular, it is found 
that the more individuals consider others’ responses to be understanding (i.e., 
understanding the speaker’s needs, feelings, and situations), validating (i.e., 
confirming that the speaker is accepted and valued) and caring (i.e., showing 
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affection and concern for the speaker), the more would the individuals be 
inclined to indicate that they value the social bond (Schimel et al. 2001).  
Other empirical findings also support this proposition.  Tidwell and Walther 
(2002), for example, examined the exchange of personal information in 
computer-mediated communication and found that individuals revealed their 
personal beliefs, needs, and values to others with whom they have socially 
rewarding relationships.  Indeed, in a social exchange, self disclosure is 
expected when individuals return favors received from others (Lawler and 
Thye 1999).  Consequently, individuals are more likely to increase their self 
disclosure towards the source of the rewarding relationship because they 
benefit from doing so. Hence we posit: 
H10: Greater social rewards will lead to greater self disclosure. 
2.3.2.4 Social Rewards and Misrepresentation 
Social rewards and misrepresentation are negatively related. 
Individuals who perceive greater social rewards will refrain from 
misrepresentation due to potential repercussions and costs (Burgoon et al. 
1989).  Specifically, as misrepresentation is perceived to violate the mutual 
agreement of openness and authenticity with others (Argo et al. 2006), its 
discovery may bring about undesired or even disastrous consequences.  Since 
social rewards in the form of a long-term relationship necessitate truthfulness, 
individuals cannot afford to misrepresent and mislead.  Apart from these 
deterrents, individuals are also prone to refraining from misrepresentation due 
to their inclination to uphold interpersonal fairness and equal contributions 
(Colquitt 2001).  By ensuring propriety in interactions, individuals 
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demonstrate their respect for one another.  In summary, individuals are less 
willing to risk violating the exchange norms and interaction protocols when 
they are in a more rewarding relationship.  Hence, they are less likely to 
misrepresent. Thus we posit: 
H11: Greater social rewards will lead to less misrepresentation. 
2.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Online chatrooms were selected to test our research model inasmuch as 
chatrooms are reported to be one of the main socialization channels for 
individuals (Peris et al. 2002) as well as a cyberspace where users are often 
plagued by privacy issues (e.g., Finn 2004).  Prior to the main study, we 
conducted three rounds of preliminary tests to compare and evaluate different 
methods of data collection (see Appendix A).  
Addressing all the issues revealed in the preliminary tests, we 
employed an online survey questionnaire to test the effects of the independent 
variables on privacy tradeoff, which in turn, drives individuals’ privacy-
protective behavior. In privacy research, a realistic setting is crucial to data 
collection because one’s privacy-related perceptions are largely shaped by his 
or her actual experience. Thus, in order for our subjects to respond 
meaningfully to our survey questionnaire, they were asked to interact on actual 
online social interaction platforms. Following past privacy research (e.g., 
Malhotra et al. 2004, Nowak and Phelps 1992, Sheehan and Hoy 2000, Son 
and Kim 2008), we used a survey questionnaire to measure the research 
variables in Figure 2.1. 
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Respondents were students from a public university in Singapore.  In a 
study on Internet users, IDA (2007) found that “14% of 15-year-old to 24-
year-old users said they communicated via online chatrooms, but less than half 
as many, only 5% of the next age bracket (25-year-old to 34-year-old) said 
they had done this” (p.37). Compared to other age groups, the age group of the 
university student had the highest percentage of Internet usage (i.e., 99%) 
IDA2012. Moreover, the extent of Singapore students who had used the 
Internet was highly comparable to that of students in the U.S. (i.e., 98%) 
(PEW 2013). Therefore, the student samples exemplified those who often 
participate in synchronous online social interactions.  
An email invitation was sent to 768 students who had been randomly 
selected from the email directory of the university.  They were notified that 
participation was voluntary and they would be rewarded with S$25 each.  The 
registration system captured their demographic information, Internet 
experience, and general chatroom experience. A total of 251 students 
volunteered to participate.  The average age of the subjects was 22.5, and 51% 
were female. 
The study was completed in three weeks, comprising three chat 
sessions, with each lasting an hour. In the period between these sessions, 
participants were also encouraged to use the chatroom for further social 
interactions.  Thus, they were allowed sufficient time to become familiarized 
with the allocated chatroom and to develop social relationships.2  At the end of 
                                                          
2
  In order to enhance the generalizability of our results, respondents were randomly assigned to one out 
of five popular online chatrooms . The chatrooms were selected randomly from the Yahoo! Directory 
(figures in square brackets refer to the ratio of the number of survey participants in a chatroom over total 
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the third chat session, a survey was conducted to measure all research 
variables. The survey also captured demographic characteristics and other 
general items that might confound our finding. All survey items were 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix B).  We were concerned that 
the results of the survey could be confounded by multiple interaction episodes.  
For example, a respondent might be answering questions on perceived 
anonymity of self based on a particular experience whilst answering questions 
on perceived anonymity of others based on an entirely unrelated experience.  
Hence, it was decided that respondents would be first instructed to recall a 
specific experienced incident and that all their responses to the research 
variables should be based on that particular experience. 
2.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
2.5.1 The Measurement Model 
The Partial Least Squares (PLS) regression was used to test the 
research model. The measurement model was assessed by examining: (1) 
individual item reliability, (2) internal consistency, and (3) discriminant 
validity (Barclay et al. 1995). 
Measurement item factor loadings are presented in Table 2.1. To 
measure privacy concerns, we used the Internet Users’ Information Privacy 
Concerns (IUIPC) scale, which captures privacy concerns as a second-order 
variable with three first-order factors, namely awareness, collection, and 
control (Malhotra et al. 2004).  Following Chin (1998), we computed three 
sets of factor scores based on the three first-order constructs.  These three 
                                                                                                                                                        
concurrent chatroom users): (i) SpinChat [9.4%], (ii) ICQ [9.2%], (iii) JustaChat [6.0%], (iv) TalkCity 
[6.8%], (v) Yahoo!Chat [10.2%]. 
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factor scores were then considered as indicator variables for privacy concerns.  
As one of the items measuring perceived anonymity of self (i.e., PAS2) had a 
low loading of 0.46, it was omitted.  Since all remaining item loadings were 
above 0.7, the requirement for individual item reliability was met (Barclay et 
al. 1995; Chin 1998).  In addition, the composite reliabilities of the different 
measures ranged from .87 to .98 (see Table 2.2), thus indicating high internal 
consistency. 
Table 2.1: Item Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
  PAS PAO PMR PI PC SR SD MIS 
PAS1(r) 0.88 0.34 0.04 -0.09 0.23 0.00 0.04 0.00 
PAS2(r) 0.46 (*) 0.51 0.06 -0.14 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 
PAS3 0.90 0.49 0.14 -0.08 0.23 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
PAO1(r) 0.41 0.88 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 
PAO2(r) 0.33 0.81 -0.05 -0.07 0.21 -0.23 -0.26 -0.11 
PAO3 0.51 0.81 0.03 -0.12 0.27 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 
PMR1 0.12 -0.04 0.84 -0.28 -0.02 0.39 0.18 -0.12 
PMR2 0.14 -0.04 0.91 -0.29 -0.09 0.38 0.20 -0.10 
PMR3 0.01 0.02 0.74 -0.17 -0.03 0.23 0.14 -0.07 
PMR4 0.00 -0.02 0.76 -0.20 -0.06 0.27 0.13 -0.12 
PI1 -0.09 -0.07 -0.28 0.93 0.25 -0.45 -0.32 0.48 
PI2 -0.10 -0.07 -0.29 0.94 0.25 -0.46 -0.28 0.48 
PI3 -0.11 -0.13 -0.25 0.92 0.25 -0.40 -0.29 0.47 
PI4 -0.08 -0.05 -0.31 0.93 0.29 -0.46 -0.31 0.49 
PI5 -0.10 -0.10 -0.28 0.92 0.24 -0.42 -0.29 0.47 
PC-
AWA 
0.21 0.20 -0.09 0.32 0.96 -0.13 -0.23 0.17 
PC-COL 0.27 0.26 -0.05 0.24 0.97 -0.06 -0.17 0.08 
PC-CON 0.26 0.30 -0.04 0.23 0.96 -0.09 -0.19 0.10 
SR1 -0.05 -0.18 0.38 -0.40 -0.08 0.92 0.49 -0.19 
SR2 0.04 -0.19 0.42 -0.47 -0.12 0.96 0.48 -0.26 
SR3 0.07 -0.13 0.34 -0.44 -0.08 0.92 0.52 -0.22 
SD1 0.05 -0.09 0.18 -0.26 -0.18 0.48 0.77 -0.17 
SD2 0.01 -0.19 0.13 -0.15 -0.16 0.42 0.83 -0.03 
SD3 0.08 -0.07 0.16 -0.33 -0.14 0.45 0.83 -0.21 
SD4 0.07 -0.09 0.19 -0.32 -0.20 0.46 0.88 -0.23 
SD5 -0.05 -0.25 0.20 -0.26 -0.21 0.46 0.86 -0.09 
MIS1 0.00 -0.09 -0.18 0.52 0.11 -0.26 -0.18 0.94 
MIS2 -0.03 -0.13 -0.08 0.46 0.13 -0.22 -0.17 0.95 
MIS3 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 0.46 0.11 -0.20 -0.13 0.92 
Notes 
1. PAS = Perceived Anonymity of Self; PAO = Perceived Anonymity of Others;  
PMR = Perceived Media Richness; PI= Perceived Intrusiveness; PC = Privacy Concerns;  
SR = Social Rewards; SD = Self Disclosure; MIS = Misrepresentation. 
2. (*) Item deleted. 
3. (r) Reverse item. 
4. Items under awareness (PC-AWA), collection (PC-COL), and control (PC-CON) constitute the 10-item second-order IUIPC 
scale. 
The next step in assessing the measurement model involved examining 
its discriminant validity. For adequate discriminant validity, loadings of 
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indicators on their respective latent variables should be higher than loadings of 
other indicators on these latent variables and the loadings of these indicators 
on other latent variables.  The loadings and cross-loadings presented in Table 
1 demonstrate adequate discriminant validity.  Another criterion for adequate 
discriminant validity requires that the square roots of Average Variances 
Extracted (AVE) of any latent variable be greater than the correlations shared 
between the latent variable and other latent variables (Barclay et al. 1995).  
Off-diagonal elements in Table 2.2 represent correlations of all latent 
variables, while the diagonal elements are the square roots of the Average 
Variances Extracted (AVE) of the latent variables.  Data shown in Table 2.2 
therefore satisfy this requirement. 
Table 2.2: Reliabilities, Correlation Matrix, and Square Roots of Average 
Variance Extracted 
 
2.5.2 The Structural Model 
The results of the structural model are presented in Figure 2.2.  Out of 
11 hypotheses, ten are supported.  Perceived anonymity of self is found to be 
negatively related to privacy concerns (β=-0.20, p<0.01), but not social 
rewards, therefore H1 is supported and H2 is rejected. Consistent with our 
prediction, perceived anonymity of others is positively related to privacy 
concerns (β=0.20, p<0.01) but negatively related to social rewards (β=-0.24, 
p<0.01), thus supporting H3 and H4.  As anticipated, perceived media richness 





PAS PAO PMR PI PC SR SD MIS 
PAS 4.64 0.93 0.88  0.89        
PAO 4.93 1.05 0.87  -0.47 0.84       
PMR 4.53 1.26 0.89  -0.10 -0.03 0.81      
PI 4.10 1.75 0.96  0.10 -0.10 -0.30 0.93     
PC 5.31 0.95 0.98  -0.26 0.26 -0.06 0.27 0.96    
SR 4.11 1.50 0.96  -0.02 -0.18 0.40 -0.47 -0.10 0.94   
SD 3.39 1.28 0.91  -0.04 -0.18 0.20 -0.32 -0.21 0.53 0.85  
MIS 3.26 1.64 0.96  0.01 -0.12 -0.13 0.51 0.12 -0.24 -0.17 0.94 
Notes 
PAS = Perceived Anonymity of Self; PAO = Perceived Anonymity of Others; PMR = Perceived Media Richness;  
PI = Perceived Intrusiveness; PC = Privacy Concerns; SR = Social Rewards; SD = Self Disclosure; MIS = Misrepresentation. 
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exhibits a positive influence on social rewards (β=0.28, p<0.01), hence 
supporting H5. Both H6 and H7 are also supported as perceived intrusiveness 
exhibits a positive relationship with privacy concerns (β=0.31, p<0.01), but a 
negative relationship with social rewards (β=-0.40, p<0.01). The results of the 
structural model indicated that the amount of variance explained by privacy 
concerns and social rewards were 20% and 35% respectively.  
In addition, privacy concerns are found to have a negative impact on 
self disclosure (β=-0.16, p<0.01) but a positive impact on misrepresentation 
(β=0.14, p<0.05), and hence both H8 and H9 are supported.  Conversely, 
social rewards have a positive impact on self disclosure (β=0.50, p<0.01) but a 
negative impact on misrepresentation (β=-0.22, p<0.01), thus supporting both 
H10 and H11. The variance explained by self disclosure and misrepresentation 
were 31% and 13% respectively. 
In order to ensure that our findings are not confounded by other 
variables, we controlled for the possible effects of gender, age, Internet 
experience, general chatroom experience, chatroom allocation, usage 
frequency, and moral beliefs toward misrepresentation (Beck and Ajzen 
1991). All control variables, except moral beliefs toward misrepresentation, 
have an insignificant impact on the endogenous variables (see Appendix C). 
Moral beliefs are found to have a significant negative effect on 
misrepresentation (β=-0.20, p<0.01). This could be likely because individuals 
who consider misrepresentation as a moral violation are likely to refrain from 




Figure 2.2. Study I Research Model Results (Completely Standardized 
Solutions) 
Sobel tests (Sobel 1982) were next conducted to examine whether 
privacy concerns and social rewards fully mediate the effects of the four 
independent variables (i.e., perceived anonymity of self, perceived anonymity 
of others, perceived media richness, and perceived intrusiveness) on the two 
dependent variables (i.e., self disclosure and misrepresentation).3  The results 
indeed confirm such mediation effects, with one exception.  Although the 
effect of perceived intrusiveness on misrepresentation is mediated by privacy 
tradeoff in general, this mediation is realized mainly through privacy concerns 
(Sobel Z = 2.78, p< 0.05) rather than social rewards (Sobel Z = 0.20, p = n.s.).  
A plausible explanation is that when individuals consider misrepresentation, 
perceived intrusiveness alerts them about others’ unsolicited invasions, which 
prime the costs in privacy tradeoff and hardly emphasize the benefits 
individuals derive from the interaction.  As such, social rewards do not come 
into play in mediating the impact of perceived intrusiveness on 
misrepresentation.  Nonetheless, our results indicate that privacy concerns and 
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social rewards, as a whole, mediate the effects of the four antecedents on self 
disclosure and misrepresentation. 
2.5.3 Common Method Bias 
Following the recommendation of Podsakoff et al. (2003), we tested 
for possible common method bias by conducting confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) for two models.  First, a ten-factor model was estimated, which 
included eight constructs in the research model with privacy concerns 
consisting of three first-order factors.4  Each of the 35 measurement items was 
restricted to being an indicator for the respective latent factor. Fit indices of 
the first model (α2 (515) = 505.94) were as follows: α2/df = 1.02, SRMR = 
0.463, RMSEA = 0.019, NFI = 0.952, CFI = 0.996, GFI = 0.905, AGFI = 
0.864, TLI = 0.994.  Generally, these indices satisfied the recommended 
thresholds5 and hence indicate a good fit of the model to the data.  
In the second model, in addition to the ten factors examined in the first 
model, we conducted a CFA with one additional factor to represent the 
unmeasured common method.  Each of the 35 items was allowed to load on its 
respective theoretical factor construct, and all were allowed to load on the 
additional methods factor, which was constrained to be uncorrelated with the 
other ten factors.  The fit indices for the second model (α2 (513) = 505.90) 
were largely identical to those of the first model (α2/df = 1.01, SRMR = 0.463, 
                                                          
4
  The ten factors are perceived anonymity of self, perceived anonymity of others, perceived media 
richness, perceived intrusiveness, social rewards, self disclosure, misrepresentation, as well as the three 
first-order IUIPC factors, namely collection, control, and awareness. 
5
  The fit indices criteria for an acceptable model are as follows: below 3 for α2/df, below 0.05 for 
standardized root mean square residual [SRMR], below 0.06 for root mean square error of approximation 
[RMSEA], above 0.90 for normed fit index [NFI], above 0.95 for comparative fit index [CFI], above 
0.90 for goodness-of-fit index [GFI], above 0.80 for adjusted goodness-of-fit index [AGFI], and above 




RMSEA = 0.020, NFI = 0.952, CFI = 0.996, GFI = 0.905, AGFI = 0.864, TLI 
= 0.994).  Furthermore, a chi-square test comparing the first model with the 
second model indicated that the difference between the two models was not 
significant (α2 (2) = 0.04, p = n.s.), suggesting that the common method bias 
was not a serious concern. 
2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
2.6.1 Discussion of Results 
The results are in support of our hypotheses, with one exception. Our 
research objective was to provide a more holistic understanding of privacy-
related behavior by extending the privacy calculus perspective (Dinev and 
Hart 2006) to the context of synchronous online social interactions.  We 
established that as a result of the contention between privacy concerns and 
social rewards, individuals do engage in both self disclosure and 
misrepresentation.  We also attempted to achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of online synchronous social interaction by examining 
constructs that are derived from the four aspects of the hyperpersonal 
framework, namely sender’s perspective, receiver’s perspective, channel 
characteristics, and feedback (Walther 1996). Our findings confirm that 
constructs derived from these four aspects are important antecedents of 
privacy concerns and social rewards. Overall, our findings suggest that the 
four aspects of the hyperpersonal framework and privacy tradeoff are the keys 
to a better understanding of individuals’ privacy-protective behavior in 
synchronous online social interactions. This study provides researchers and 
practitioners with a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of 
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synchronous online social interactions on self disclosure and misrepresentation 
behavior. 
Although perceived anonymity of self is expected to induce 
psychological detachment, thereby hindering the development of a socially 
rewarding experience, our results exhibit no significant relationship. A 
plausible explanation is that the negative effect of psychological detachment 
on social rewards may have been counteracted by the positive effect of self 
exploration and impression management on social rewards (Walther 2007). 
Specifically, as individuals are usually bound by social expectations, any 
deviance and nonconformity could generate social disapproval (Elster 1989). 
Staying unidentified, they could be true to their innate selves without 
experiencing social sanctions, especially when their views and beliefs 
dramatically differ from others. Hence, they may feel socially relieved and 
satisfied instead. In addition, perceived anonymity of self allows individuals to 
selectively present themselves (Leary and Kowalski 1990) to impose 
impression management. When others react positively to it, individuals would 
feel better off in comparison to others. Gaining higher self esteem, they find it 
socially rewarding. In sum, self exploration and impression management may 
counteract the effects of psychological detachment and hence, perceived 
anonymity of self as a whole is not significantly related to social rewards. 
2.6.2 Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
We enrich privacy-related studies with several fresh insights.  First, we 
contribute to the IS literature by identifying antecedents of privacy concerns 
and social rewards in synchronous online social interactions.  Despite the 
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prevalence of privacy research, extant studies have yielded scanty evidence on 
the causes of these tradeoffs beyond commercial contexts.  Based on the 
hyperpersonal framework (Walther 1996), this study investigates four 
antecedents of privacy concerns and social rewards, namely, perceived 
anonymity of self, perceived anonymity of others, perceived media richness, 
and perceived intrusiveness.  On the one hand, these antecedents represent 
typical causes of privacy concerns in online synchronous social interactions.  
Specifically, perceived anonymity of self depicts the sender perspective, 
highlighting how individuals’ limited identity cues induce a sense of immunity 
in the online environment (Postmes and Spears 1998).  Perceived anonymity 
of others accounts for the receiver perspective, explaining how others’ 
fragmented identity information renders them unaccountable in online 
synchronous social interactions (Viégas 2005).  Perceived intrusiveness 
describes how feedback penetrates individuals’ psychological boundary which 
makes them feel susceptible to harm on their private selves (Kim and Yun 
2007).  On the other hand, the antecedents also represent important 
determinants of social rewards in online synchronous social interactions.  In 
particular, perceived anonymity of others explicates the receiver perspective, 
demonstrating that individuals’ perception of others is typically limited by 
fragmented identity cues (Caplan and Turner 2007).  Perceived media richness 
depicts how the channel affects information exchange in online synchronous 
social interactions (Canessa and Riolo 2003).  Perceived intrusiveness focuses 
on the way feedback upsets the pattern and pace of online social interactions 
(Petronio 2002).  Holistically, our four antecedents of privacy concerns and 
social rewards, which are based on the hyperpersonal framework and literature 
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on privacy and online social interactions, are particularly important and 
relevant to online synchronous social interactions. 
Second, we also present new insights to prior privacy-related studies 
by extending the privacy calculus lens to the context of synchronous online 
social interactions.  We argue that privacy concerns alone lack sufficient 
power to fully explain self disclosure behavior in online social interactions, as 
in the case of individuals who express privacy concerns, yet reveal private 
information to strangers (Ben-Ze'ev 2003).  We have advocated and attested 
the role of social rewards as the intangible benefits individuals derive from 
synchronous online social interactions.  This finding is vital because past 
research has predominantly applied the privacy calculus to commercial 
contexts.  Given that synchronous online social interaction sites (or similar 
sites) do not promise any pecuniary or fiscal rewards, some researchers may 
question the applicability of the theory.  As a consequence of our analyses, the 
effects of contextual differences on individuals’ privacy-related behavior (see 
Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 2002) can now be better comprehended.  
Essentially, in the absence of monetary or tangible rewards, social rewards are 
just as attractive in balancing privacy concerns and governing individuals’ 
behavior.  
Third, we argue against the propositions of some extant studies that 
view disclosure and nondisclosure as the only two possible actions stemming 
from privacy protection in the context of synchronous online social 
interactions (Petronio 1991).  Instead, we establish the presence of 
misrepresentation as well as its prevalence.  The correlation (r = -0.17) 
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between self disclosure and misrepresentation was considered small (Cohen 
1992).  This suggests that the two types of behavior do not essentially 
contradict each other as one might presume.  Adding to our findings on 
misrepresentation, we also dispel two misconceptions on misrepresentation.  
Often, individuals tend to misconstrue misrepresentation as being very 
negative and anti-normative, relating it to certain undesirable behavior with 
malicious intent (Argo et al. 2006).  Instead, we argue that individuals do 
engage in misrepresentation as a protective measure, and not necessarily with 
the intention to harm or hurt.  Furthermore, individuals often do not consider 
misrepresentation as a non-optional protective measure, but rather as a 
strategy deployed to provide some data despite privacy concerns (e.g., in 
registration on websites).  Our study suggests that individuals do misrepresent 
themselves even in the face of an option, such as the option of non self-
disclosure (e.g., in online chatrooms).  Despite this availability of choice, 
individuals prefer to provide falsified information.  In summary, our study has 
provided more understanding on these two privacy-related behaviors, i.e., self 
disclosure and misrepresentation. 
Fourth, prior studies have failed to recognize that “anonymity of self” 
and “anonymity of others” may exert different influences.  By subsuming 
these two constructs into one construct (i.e., “anonymity”) (e.g., Lea et al. 
2001), many researchers have failed to acknowledge the possible asymmetry 
of information.  Individuals could choose to remain anonymous whilst others 
are identifiable, and vice versa.  Based on our study, perceived anonymity of 
self is important to only privacy concerns whereas perceived anonymity of 
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others is crucial to both privacy concerns and social rewards.  Hence, the 
“self” and “others” perspectives of anonymity have fundamentally different 
roles in online social interactions.  
2.6.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
We acknowledge some limitations in this study.  First, we did not 
monitor the actual conversation content that transpired between the 
respondents and those in actual online chatrooms.  Neither could we dictate 
how much the respondents had actually communicated during their 
synchronous online social interactions.  Although respondents’ actual 
involvement in social interactions may vary, we attempted to mimic real life 
interactions, by including any possible kind of conversations and interacting 
patterns. 
Second, our findings are best generalized to average users in 
synchronous online social interactions. Indeed, our model assumes that 
deceptive behavior is not essentially driven by malicious motivations, such as 
cyberbullying and Internet predation.  Malevolent individuals could exhibit 
vastly different behavior due to their insidious motives.  Despite this 
inadequacy, our model strives to be applicable to the general population, 
explaining what drives their self disclosure and misrepresentation.  
Third, although one of the path coefficients affecting misrepresentation 
(β=0.14, p<0.05) and the explained variance of misrepresentation (R2 = 0.13) 
may not be very large, our results are valid. Indeed, past research involving 
actual behavior has reported similar path coefficients and explained variances.  
For example, Pavlou and Gefen (2004) examined self-reported transaction 
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behavior in online marketplaces and reported a path coefficient of 0.10 and an 
explained variance of 10%.  Likewise, in a study of actual purchase behavior, 
Verhoef (2003) reported a path coefficient of 0.14 and an explained variance 
of 12%. Hence, our results are comparable to prior studies and are thus valid. 
As an extension of our study, we propose several future directions 
worthy of pursuit.  First, there is value in investigating “objective” measures 
of self disclosure and misrepresentation, as opposed to our current reflective 
self reported measurements.  It is possible that individuals’ recall may not 
completely reflect their actual behavior due to the social desirability bias, 
which is the tendency for individuals to portray themselves in a generally 
favorable light (Holden 1994).  In view of this potential bias, a further 
investigation of actual self disclosure and misrepresentation by analyzing 
communication protocols could be a future research avenue. 
Furthermore, this study examines the causes of and reactions to 
privacy concerns and social rewards in a synchronous online social interaction 
context.  It is likely that individuals may behave differently if asynchronous 
communication is used (e.g., Facebook).  For example, individuals typically 
interact with others who are already known in asynchronous social interactions 
but interact with both known and unknown others in synchronous interactions.  
In addition, considering that individuals are not pressured into upholding a 
communication flow in an asynchronous environment, they may react 
differently to intrusive communication.  Moreover, there are also some social 
interaction features (e.g., tagging) that are available on asynchronous 
platforms, but not on synchronous sites.  Generally, we believe all these issues 
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deserve special attention in future research and our theoretical perspective of 
integrating the hyperpersonal framework and privacy calculus can be 
instrumental to these potential studies. 
Finally, this study considers privacy issues in synchronous online 
social interactions. It is worth noting that individuals might share vastly 
different types of information in developing online relationships. 
Consequently, individuals’ privacy concerns could be affected by the 
information exchanged in synchronous online social interactions. Therefore, 
future research could explore the potential impact of information sensitivity on 
individuals’ privacy concerns. Furthermore, the extent of information security 
and privacy protection mechanisms might vary in different online social 
interaction platforms. We believe that the theoretical framework presented in 
this study will provide a solid basis for examining additional antecedents of 
privacy concerns in online social interactions.  
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CHAPTER 3 STUDY II: EMBARRASSING EXPOSURES IN ONLINE 
SOCIAL NETWORKS: AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE OF 
RELATIONSHIP BONDING AND PRIVACY INVASION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Online social networking websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, 
provide an environment where individuals can easily maintain and develop 
social relationships by creating profiles with information about themselves and 
connecting their profiles to those of others (Bumgarner 2007; Ellison et al. 
2011).  These connections facilitate the exchange of socially meaningful 
information (such as birthday wishes and jokes) and the sharing of common 
interests (such as arts and sports) (McLaughlin and Vitak 2011).  At times, for 
amusement, individuals may playfully tease each other by revealing their 
friends’ embarrassing information.  For instance, Wang et al. (2011) found 
that online social network users made a laugh at friends by revealing their 
indecent pictures and making playful comments about them.  Indeed, the 
teasing literature suggests that embarrassing exposures could lead to 
relationship development.  For example, Lange (2007) found that individuals 
enhanced interpersonal affinity by publicizing friends’ mischiefs on online 
social networks and expressing mock disappointment at their embarrassing 
behavior.  The author further noted that friends, who had become the target in 
the embarrassing exposure, sometimes did enjoy the humor and feel a strong 
sense of attachment with the individuals.  
It has, however, been observed that the target of an embarrassing tease 
might not be amused but instead feel offended by the involuntary exposure 
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resulting from friends’ postings about the target.  For example, Kruger et al. 
(2006) found that a majority of the targets reported that they felt insulted as 
well as humiliated by the embarrassing exposure.  Likewise, in a survey of 
2,253 online social network users in the United States, one in five users aged 
18 to 29 expressed displeasure towards involuntary exposure and requested 
their embarrassing information to be removed (Madden and Smith 2010), 
despite the benign nature of their friends’ postings.  Hence, it is interesting to 
investigate why targets interpret embarrassing exposure differently and how 
such interpretations influence their behavioral responses in online social 
networks. 
This paper draws on the Social Exchange Theory as the overarching 
framework to elucidate the role of an embarrassing exposure in online social 
networking.  This theory posits that an individual assesses a social exchange 
with reference to two important features of the exchange, namely (1) exchange 
behavior (i.e., the way the social exchange is conducted) and (2) social 
relationship structure (i.e., the structure of relationships between individuals 
involved in the social exchange) (Emerson 1972a; Emerson 1972b; Homans 
1961).  Correspondingly, to explore the impact of an embarrassing exposure 
(i.e., the exchange behavior) in a social exchange, this paper considers the way 
embarrassing information is involuntarily exposed through the posting and 
tagging mechanisms.  Posting involves the publication of information about a 
target on the disseminator’s profile.  Tagging, which is performed in addition 
to posting, identifies the target in the information and associates the 
information to the target’s profile.  In addition, to represent the role that social 
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relationship structure plays in individuals’ assessment of social exchange, we 
examine the network mutuality between the disseminator and the target.  
Whereas high network mutuality underscores high degree of commonality 
among the disseminator’s and the target’s social networks, low network 
mutuality denotes two largely distinct networks. 
Furthermore, according to the Social Exchange Theory, the assessment 
of a social exchange entails the evaluation of two important components, 
namely exchange benefit and exchange cost (Blau 1986; Cook and Rice 2006).  
Whereas exchange benefit represents the resources individuals obtain from a 
social exchange, such as relational associations and recognitions, exchange 
cost involves the resources they devote to completing a social exchange, such 
as time and information (Molm et al. 2000).  Following past research on social 
exchange, the first objective of this study is to investigate a target’s benefit 
and cost perceptions related to an embarrassing exposure in online social 
networks.  Specifically, in terms of benefit assessment, we rely on the teasing 
literature to understand the impact of an embarrassing exposure on the social 
relationship between the disseminator and the target.  In terms of cost 
assessment, we rely on extant privacy research to elucidate the way an 
involuntary exposure intrudes the target’s privacy.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is among the first in the information systems (IS) 
literature to evaluate both the benefit and the cost of an embarrassing exposure 
in online social networks.  
The second objective of this study is to investigate the target’s 
behavioral responses to an embarrassing exposure.  Previous IS research 
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suggests that privacy invasion leads to protective behavior, such as denial of 
information requests, relationship terminations, and complaints (e.g., Culnan 
and Williams 2009; Dinev and Hart 2006; Son and Kim 2008).  However, 
there has been a paucity of research that examines individuals’ responses 
associated with involuntary exposures of embarrassing information.  While the 
privacy invasion associated with an involuntary exposure may induce 
relationship termination as well as withdrawal behavior, the humor implied by 
the exposure is known to stimulate the target’s active involvement in 
interactions (Lampert and Ervin-Tripp 2006; Petronio 2002).  To address this 
gap in prior research, we propose and empirically test a taxonomy of 
behavioral responses to embarrassing exposures in online social networks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section 
reviews previous literature and discusses the theoretical foundation for this 
study.  The research model and hypotheses are then proposed, followed by the 
introduction of research methodology and the report of the data analysis 
results.  This paper concludes with the discussion of theoretical and practical 
contributions, limitations, and avenues for future research.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we develop our theoretical perspective on embarrassing 
exposures in online social networks.  We begin by reviewing the Social 
Exchange Theory, which serves as the overarching framework in integrating 
the teasing literature and privacy research.  We then turn to the literature in 
teasing and extant research in privacy to understand individuals’ exchange 
benefit perception and exchange cost perception associated with embarrassing 
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exposures.  Finally, we review extant research in exchange response behavior 
to explore how individuals respond to embarrassing exposures. 
3.2.1 Social Exchange Theory 
A social exchange is a social interaction (or joint activity) in which two 
or more individuals are engaged in activities directed towards one another to 
exchange valuable resources, such as emotional support, time, and information 
(Homans 1958).  The basic assumption of the Social Exchange Theory is that 
individuals engage in social interactions on the basis of their perceptions that 
such interactions are mutually advantageous (Blau 1964; Cook and Rice 
2003).  
While different views of social exchange have emerged, theorists agree 
that an individual’s behavior in a social exchange is contingent on the 
behavior of others and the relationship structure in which the social exchange 
occurs.  One example is the theoretical framework proposed by Homans 
(1961), which theorizes that an individual’s response behavior in social 
exchange is shaped by the social behavior of others.  Although the focus of 
this theoretical framework is on others’ behavior in social exchange, it also 
emphasizes on the importance of exchange relationships in influencing an 
individual’s responses (see Cook and Whitmeyer 1992).  Emerson (1972a; 
1972b), in his seminal works on the Social Exchange Theory, considers social 
behavior (similar to those proposed by Homans) and social structures as the 
central subject matters in shaping social interactions.  Specifically, Emerson 
posits that the value of a social exchange is jointly determined by the 
behavioral attribute of an exchange and the structural attribute of exchange 
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networks.  The seminal works by Emerson have been widely drawn upon as 
the theoretical basis in investigating social exchange (e.g., Brass and 
Burkhardt 1993; Molm 1990).  
Following Homans (1961) and Emerson (1972a; 1972b), this study 
focuses on two important features of a social exchange, namely exchange 
behavior and social relationship structure. Exchange behavior describes 
communication actions performed by individuals in a social exchange process 
(Blau 1986; Cook and Whitmeyer 1992).  While an embarrassing exposure 
can be voluntarily initiated through exchange behavior performed by 
individuals themselves (Collins and Miller 1994), their embarrassing 
information may also be involuntarily exposed through exchange behavior 
performed by others (Ellison et al. 2011; Lenhart and Madden 2007).  In this 
study, we focus on the latter and examine two types of exchange behavior that 
can be performed by the information disseminator: Posting only and posting 
with tagging.  Posting only is an information dissemination mechanism that 
publishes content on the disseminator’s profile.  When posting only is 
performed, the content has no explicit association with the target and is 
exposed to an audience within the disseminator’s social network.  Posting with 
tagging is a dissemination mechanism that not only publishes information in 
the disseminator’s profile but also establishes an explicit association between 
the content and the target by creating a link in the content that directs the 
audience to the target’s profile.  Further, posting with tagging inserts the 
content into the target’s profile and hence exposing the content to the social 
networks of both the disseminator and the target.  When tagging is performed, 
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the disseminator also triggers a notification that alerts the target about the 
tagging. 
Social relationship structure represents the social interconnectivity in 
networks of exchange relations (Cook and Rice 2006).  In our study, the social 
relationship structure through which the disseminator is connected with the 
target is characterized by network mutuality, defined as the number of social 
connections the target has in common with the disseminator in online social 
networks.  On one hand, high network mutuality typifies tightly-bounded 
relationships between two individuals who share largely common social 
circles.  This commonality provides social assurance for benevolent 
interactions (Rempel et al. 1985), and hence individuals are particularly 
entrusting toward the social exchange (Molm et al. 2000; Wellman and 
Wortley 1990).  On the other hand, low network mutuality characterizes 
sparsely-knit relationship structures, in which individuals have largely 
independent social circles.  Such independence underscores the scarcity of 
social assurance, and hence individuals are especially prudent toward the 
social exchange (Granovetter 1973).  
3.2.2 Social Exchange and Teasing 
Teasing is a form of social exchange in which individuals are targeted 
in playful provocations, such as humorous remarks and sarcasms, which may 
involve the exposure of their embarrassing information (Keltner et al. 2001).  
Researchers suggest that teasing is typically evaluated in terms of the 
relationship bonding perceived by the target.  Accordingly, we examine 
perceived relationship bonding, which refers the extent to which an individual 
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believes that an interaction leads to improved social relationship (Beatty and 
Lee 1996; Wilson 1995), as a major benefit the target derives from an 
involuntary exposure of embarrassing information. 
Research on teasing theorizes that individuals’ perception of 
relationship bonding is highly dependent on target participation, which allows 
the target to take part in a teasing interaction (Keltner et al. 1998).  Teasing 
between friends is commonly considered a positive bonding experience when 
the tease is made with the participation of the target (Campos et al. 2007).  In a 
study examining conversational humor, Lampert and Ervin-Tripp (2006) 
examined personal humorous remarks in conversions and revealed that the 
target considered embarrassing comments among friends as bonding jokes 
when he or she was present as part of the conversation group. Nevertheless, 
teasing is at times concluded as a negative bonding experience when 
embarrassing information is exposed with the exclusion of target participation.  
In fact, the target might see such communications as rumors spread to damage 
his or her reputation (Terrion and Ashforth 2002).  For instance, Foster (2004) 
noted that individuals considered communications inappropriate when their 
private matters were being talked about behind their backs.  
The teasing literature also suggests that the effect of target 
participation on relationship bonding can be influenced by the type of 
audience of the involuntary dissemination of embarrassing information (Jones 
et al. 2005).  In online social networks, the type of audience can be determined 
by the extent of network interconnectivity between the target and the 
disseminator.  High interconnectivity typifies an audience type that consists 
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largely of the target’s social networks.  The acquainted nature of this audience 
type encourages individuals to attend to the humorous nature of the teasing 
communication (Keltner et al. 1998).  On the contrary, low interconnectivity 
depicts an audience type that consists largely of social networks unknown to 
the target.  The unknown nature of such audience type alerts individuals about 
the humiliating nature of a targeted tease.  For instance, Alberts et al. (1996) 
asserted that audience type influenced individuals’ perceptions of 
embarrassing conversations they had, such as the discussion about sex life, 
physical shortcomings, or inabilities.  Specifically, when the audience was 
made up of closely related others, individuals perceived the embarrassing 
interaction as a manifestation of affiliations.  However, when the embarrassing 
information was exposed mainly to distantly affiliated others, individuals 
considered the exposure as direct humiliation. 
In essence, the teasing literature suggests that relationship bonding is 
an important benefit individuals could experience in an involuntary exposure 
of embarrassing information; and that experience of relationship bonding 
could be influenced by both target participation and audience type. 
3.2.3 Social Exchange and Privacy 
Researchers suggest that individuals do not only consider the benefit of 
a social exchange in terms of relationship bonding but are also concerned 
about the cost in terms of privacy associated with the involuntary exposure of 
embarrassing information (Petronio et al. 1989; Solove 2006).  IS research has 
progressed significantly in enriching our understanding of privacy. Extant 
research has focused predominantly on examining privacy issues in online 
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commercial transactions (e.g., Awad and Krishnan 2006; Bélanger and 
Crossler 2011; Dinev and Hart 2006; Pavlou 2011; Smith et al. 2011). Some 
studies have investigated privacy problems (such as identity theft and stalking) 
in online social networks (e.g., Hoadley et al. 2010; Lewis et al. 2008).  
Evidence suggests that when individuals’ embarrassing information is exposed 
involuntarily, individuals’ perception of invasion of privacy becomes 
particularly aggravated (e.g., Debatin et al. 2009).  In this study, we examine 
perceived privacy invasion, which refers to the extent to which an individual 
believes that his or her personal information space is intruded by others 
(Tolchinsky et al. 1981), as the major cost individuals experience in an 
involuntary embarrassing exposure. 
The extent of privacy invasion individuals experience can be explained 
and predicted by two important mechanisms, namely target individuation and 
exposure size (e.g., Altman and Taylor 1973).  Target individuation is a state 
in which individuals are being made explicitly identifiable through distinct 
identity reference (Maslach et al. 1985).  Whereas a high level of target 
individuation connotes explicit identification of individuals and hence 
elevating individuals’ perception of privacy invasion, a low level of target 
individuation represents submergence of identity information within an 
exposure and is known to limit individuals’ perception of privacy invasion 
(Postmes and Spears 1998).  In the online environment, high target 
individuation can be imposed by making individuals’ personal profiles (in 
which identity information resides) traceable from the exposure.  For instance, 
in a study on online social networks, Raynes-Goldie (2010) found that when 
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individuals' profiles were not traceable from embarrassing content posted by 
others, they were less concerned about privacy because readers of the 
embarrassing content might not know their identity.  On the contrary, when 
their profiles were traceable in the embarrassing information, they became 
more apprehensive of privacy invasion.  
Exposure size depicts the number of recipients in audience to the 
involuntary dissemination of embarrassing information (Acquisti and Gross 
2006).  In online social networks, the size of an embarrassing exposure is 
contingent on the extent of network interconnectivity between the target and 
the disseminator.  High interconnectivity implies that the size of the exposure 
largely consists of a social network shared by the disseminator and the target.  
To illustrate, when all of the target’s social network friends are also friends of 
the disseminator, the exposure size is entirely determined by the social 
networks of the disseminator, which encapsulates those of the target.  This 
implies that the size of the embarrassing exposure can be limited by high 
interconnectivity.  In contrast, low interconnectivity hints at an exposure size 
potentially consisting of two largely distinct social networks.  This suggests 
that the size of the embarrassing exposure can be escalated by low 
interconnectivity.  Empirical evidence has substantiated the role of exposure 
size in moderating the effect of target individuation on perceived privacy 
invasion.  For example, Petronio (2002) examined the way in which exposure 
size shaped the effect of individuation on individuals’ privacy perception in 
embarrassing social interactions.  When their embarrassing information was 
discussed among a limited number of interactants, such discussions were 
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typically seen as a small-size exposure in which the embarrassing conversation 
was contained within the few interactants.  The author noted that such small-
size exposure diminished the effect of individuation on privacy invasion.  
However, when the exposure escalated beyond a limited number of 
interactants, the discussions were seen as a large-size exposure.  As a result, 
the role of individuation in elevating individuals’ perception of privacy 
invasion was amplified. 
In summary, based on past privacy research, target individuation and 
exposure size are two key influences on individuals’ perception of privacy 
invasion, which is regarded as the main cost in an involuntary exposure of 
embarrassing information. 
3.2.4 Social Exchange and Response Behavior 
The Social Exchange Theory contends that individuals’ assessment of 
benefit and cost determines their behavioral responses (Blau 1986; Cook and 
Rice 2006).  Past studies examining exchange responses suggest that 
individuals may engage in a myriad of behavior, such as expression of 
affiliation, acknowledgement, and mutual disclosure (Archer and Berg 1978; 
Collins and Miller 1994).  Kuhl (1981) classified response behavior into a 
dichotomy of passive and active behavior.  Passive behavior reflects inertia to 
act in response to social exchange.  It is essentially an inaction strategy, which 
maintains a static orientation in social exchange through ignorance, 
negligence, or procrastination (Harris and Sutton 1983; Rusbult et al. 1988).  
On the contrary, active behavior encompasses avoidance and approach 
strategies in response to social exchange (Higgins 1998).  Whereas the 
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avoidance strategy is about shunning away from interactions and keeping a 
distance from others, the approach strategy is about “going to, heading for, or 
striving after” others in social exchange (Marsh et al. 2005).  The avoidance 
strategy can be exercised at the transactional level and the interpersonal level 
(e.g., Burgoon et al. 1989; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel 2001).  At the 
transactional level, individuals engage in avoidance by excusing themselves 
from an interaction.  At the interpersonal level, avoidance strategy is 
performed in terms of relationship severance.  For example, Sias and Perry 
(2004) examined communication behavior at workplace and found that others’ 
adverse interactions induced two levels of avoidance behavior.  In particular, 
they revealed that individuals took on transactional avoidance by staying away 
from others’ phone calls and performed interpersonal avoidance through 
cutting off relational ties.  The approach strategy, in contrast, is typically 
performed through individuals’ pursuit of further interaction.  For example, 
Drew (1987) found that individuals actively approached others’ teases by 
supplying a related comment in return.  Likewise, Alberts (1992) noted that 
tease targets responded to teasing interactions by actively participating in the 
subsequent conversations. 
3.3 RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The research model integrates the Social Exchange Theory with the 
teasing research and the privacy literature to explain the consequences of an 
embarrassing exposure in online social networks (see Figure 3.1).   
Within the social exchange framework, the basic theoretical unit is the 
exchange of resources between two actors. In particular, an actor initiates the 
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social exchange by offering resources to an exchange partner through 
exchange behavior. More important, according to the social exchange theory, 
this exchange behavior is a choice behavior that the actor must choose among 
alternative behaviors that produce specific value for the partner. Indeed, 
scholars have categorically pointed out the importance of this behavioral basis 
of the social exchange theory. For example, Molm (1990) examined the 
dynamics of power in social exchange and found that individuals exercised 
their power by strategically taking on exchange behavior that produced 
monetary rewards or punishment to exchange partners. Likewise, Molm et al. 
(2003) found that given constant exchange value, individuals’ perception of 
exchange outcome was determined by how the outcome was obtained through 
the fairness of others’ exchange behavior. In the context of embarrassing 
exposures, scholars have paid special attention on the way embarrassing 
information is involuntarily disseminated. Consistent with the social exchange 
theory, embarrassing exposures occur when embarrassing information is 
involuntarily publicized through others’ communication behavior. For 
instance, Boxer and Cortes-Conde (1997) found that the way embarrassing 
information was communicated to others helped define the nature of the 
communications. While embarrassing information communicated with the 
presence of the target was considered humorous and enhanced bonding, 
communications made in the absence of the target were deemed humiliating 
and relationship threatening. Likewise, Alberts (1992) noted that playful 
exposures were directed at the target with an invitation to join the interactions, 
whereas cruel exposures were often presented with an absent victim. 
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Research examining online social networking has identified 
information dissemination to be a key technical feature that facilitates social 
interactions. For example, Greenhow and Robelia (2009) noted that posting 
and tagging enabled sustainable social interactions through information 
sharing in online social networks. Unlike information sharing in offline social 
interactions, posting and tagging disseminate information which is duplicable 
and intransient. In a study on social popularity, Zywica and Danowski (2008) 
reported that posting and tagging did not only promote self-presentation but 
also formed an important indication of social popularity on Facebook. 
Specifically, when Facebook users had more posting on their walls and 
content tagged by friends, they perceived higher popularity. Similarly, 
Carpenter and Spottswood (2013) examined online social networking behavior 
of couples and found that tagging was frequently used to convey intimacy. 
Therefore, to reflect the importance of others’ exchange behavior in an online 
embarrassing exposure, this study examines the disseminator’s behavior in 
exposing the embarrassing information.  Specifically, the exchange behavior 
of the disseminator is studied in two modes of information dissemination, i.e., 
posting only vs. posting with tagging. 
Social exchange theorists have unambiguously conceptualized network 
structure as a configuration of social relations (i.e., as a set of actors diversely 
linked in a social network), where valued items, such as symbolic, material, 
and information, are exchanged among actors. For example, according to 
Homans’ (1961, 1964) theorization of social exchange structure, whereas the 
relations between actors in direct contact with one another play an important 
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role in shaping social exchange, the indirect relationships between the two 
actors underpins the overall social exchange structure. Likewise, Emerson 
(1972ab) emphasizes on the macro orientation of social structure. In his view, 
individuals understand dyadic social exchange based on common values, 
which are implied by the patterns of connections among exchange actors. 
Extending Emerson’s emphasis of network structure in shaping social 
exchange, Cook and Whitmeyer (1992) posit that network structure might 
manifest in several key properties, such as network density (i.e., the amount of 
secondary connections between actors), structural equivalence (i.e., having 
equivalent ties to the same other actors), and structural cohesion (i.e., being 
closely tied to each other). Indeed, ample empirical studies have demonstrated 
the importance of network structure in social exchange. For example, Grosser 
et al. (2010) drew on social exchange theory to examine the effects of network 
structures on gossiping behavior. In particular, the authors focused on the 
impact of structural embeddedness, which refers to the extent that friends have 
mutual friends in common, on gossiping behavior in social networks. 
Likewise, Fox et al. (forthcoming) found that the amount of common friends 
provided Facebook users the social context in which they developed 
perceptions of romantic relationships.  
More importantly, social network research has established that network 
commonality is a key network structure attribute in understanding social 
exchange. For instance, in a study examining the exchange of product 
information on social media, Soh (2014) found that network commonality was 
the primary indicator of how the network environment was structured and 
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individuals paid special attention to network commonality in evaluating the 
value of the product information they contributed to their peers. Likewise, 
Zohar and Tenne-Gazit (2008) found that the number of paths connecting 
actors in a social network helped promote social exchange and enhanced the 
formation of organizational climate. Hence, to elucidate the role of social 
relationship structure in an online embarrassing exposure, this study examines 
the network mutuality between the disseminator and target.  In particular, we 
study two types of network mutuality, i.e., low network mutuality vs. high 
network mutuality.  
The effects of these two independent variables on individuals’ 
assessment of social exchange are investigated in terms of perceived 
relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion.  In addition, we assess 








3.3.1 Determinants of Perceived Relationship Bonding 
The teasing literature suggests that audience type influences the impact 
of target participation on individuals’ perception of relationship bonding (e.g., 
Alberts et al. 1996).  In online social networks, as mentioned earlier, network 
mutuality succinctly determines the types of audience in an involuntary 
exposure of embarrassing information.  In cases of low network mutuality, the 
target’s social network and the disseminator’s social network are largely 
distinct.  Therefore, friends of the disseminator, who are likely unknown to the 
target, form a substantial part of the audience regardless of the presence or 
absence of tags.  This unacquainted audience type induces prudence in the 
target’s interpretation of the way in which the embarrassing information is 
disseminated (Tedeschi 2001).  In particular, when the embarrassing 
information is posted with tagging, the target is made the subject of a mockery 
in front of an unacquainted audience and hence might interpret the 
embarrassing exposure as a direct humiliation (Kotthoff 2003).  Moreover, 
posting with tagging explicitly associates the embarrassing information with 
the target.  This association deprives the target from remaining anonymous in 
the exposure and hence he or she is likely to be affronted by the dissemination.  
Posting only, however, does not explicitly turn the target into the subject of a 
humiliating communication about him or her.  Furthermore, posting only 
allows the target to remain anonymous in the dissemination and hence he or 
she might not be seriously offended by the embarrassing exposure to an 
unacquainted audience.  As such, when the embarrassing information is posted 
only, the target will feel less offended than when the information is posted 
with tagging (Turner et al. 2003).  In essence, when network mutuality is low, 
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posting with tagging constitutes a direct humiliation and hence will lead to 
lower perception of relationship bonding when compared to posting only. 
On the contrary, when network mutuality is high, the social network of 
the target is highly similar to that of the disseminator.  As a result, the 
audience of the embarrassing exposure consists mainly of the target’s and 
disseminator’s mutual friends.  This acquainted audience provides the social 
assurance that the embarrassing exposure is benign and helps emphasize the 
positive impact of target notification on the target’s perception of the 
humorous interaction (Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997).  In particular, in the 
absence of target notification, as in the case of posting only, the target will be 
excluded from participating in the teasing interactions with friends.  In 
contrast, posting with tagging explicitly notifies the target about the 
embarrassing exposure, an act that ensures target participation in the teasing 
interactions among friends.  Given the acquainted audience type, the target is 
likely to consider the embarrassing exposure an unequivocal humor (Keltner et 
al. 2001).  Therefore, in high network mutuality condition, posting with 
tagging connotes stronger interpersonal affiliation and hence reinforces the 
perception of relationship bonding between the disseminator and the target 
when compared to posting only. Thus, we predict the following effects: 
H1a: In the low network mutuality condition, compared to posting 
only, posting with tagging will lead to lower level of perceived relationship 
bonding when embarrassing information is disseminated. 
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H1b: In the high network mutuality condition, compared to posting 
only, posting with tagging will lead to higher level of perceived relationship 
bonding when embarrassing information is disseminated. 
3.3.2 Determinants of Perceived Privacy Invasion 
Past privacy research suggests that the effect of target individuation on 
perceived privacy invasion is moderated by the size of an exposure (e.g., 
Petronio 2002).  In cases of low network mutuality, the target’s social network 
is mostly distinct from that of the disseminator.  As such, when the 
embarrassing information is posted only, the target is likely to conclude that 
the exposure size is limited to the disseminator’s social network (Postmes and 
Spears 1998).  Posting with tagging, however, leads to an enlarged overall size 
of exposure when compared to posting only, as the embarrassing information 
is also exposed to the social network of the target.  Furthermore, posting with 
tagging associates the target’s profile to the embarrassing information.  
Through this association, the target’s identity in the information becomes 
explicitly traceable by the audience.  This explicit traceability helps accentuate 
target individuation, which draws the audience’s attention to the target.  
Therefore, when network mutuality is low, the enlargement of exposure size 
and the individuation of the target enabled by posting with tagging will 
enhance the target's perception of privacy invasion. 
In contrast, when network mutuality is high, the target’s social network 
is highly convergent with that of the disseminator.  Therefore, posting with 
tagging is not likely to contribute to a significant gain in overall exposure size 
when compared to posting only.  High network mutuality also implies that the 
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social networks of the target constitute most of the audience.  Being the 
target’s social network friends, this audience is likely to individuate the target 
in the exposure regardless of the presence or absence of profile association 
enabled by tagging.  Therefore, when network mutuality is high, the increase 
in the target's perception of privacy invasion associated with posting with 
tagging will not be as marked as when network mutuality is low.  We thus 
predict the following hypothesis:  
H2: Compared to posting only, posting with tagging will lead to an 
increase in perceived privacy invasion and this increase is more pronounced in 
the low network mutuality condition than in the high network mutuality 
condition. 
3.3.3 Behavioral Responses 
Drawing on the Social Exchange Theory and Kuhl’s (1981) 
classification of response behavior, this study proposes four types of 
behavioral responses to an embarrassing exposure, namely inaction, 
transactional avoidance, interpersonal avoidance, and approach.  First, 
inaction refers to the target's assumption of indolence in an embarrassing 
exposure.  By taking no action, individuals demonstrate their apathy and 
disinterests regarding the exposure.  Second, transactional avoidance, refers to 
the extent to which the target actively dissociates himself or herself from the 
embarrassing information.  In online social networks, through transactional 
avoidance, individuals aim to stop the embarrassing information from being 
further disseminated.  Third, interpersonal avoidance is defined as the extent 
to which the target actively terminates his or her relationship with the 
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disseminator.  Individuals typically dissociate themselves from unsatisfactory 
relationships but enhance their relational associations with decent others.  
Lastly, approach refers to the extent to which the target actively engages in 
the social interactions associated with the embarrassing exposure.  Whereas 
transactional avoidance and interpersonal avoidance focus on detachment and 
dissociation that hinder further social exchange, approach considers the 
target’s involvement behavior that completes a social exchange.  
3.3.3.1 Perceived Relationship Bonding and Inaction 
Perceived relationship bonding is expected to reduce inaction.  
According to the social exchange framework, individuals’ emotional 
attachment to others induces obligation to offer others socio-emotional 
resources, such as approval, respect, and support (Eisenberger et al. 2001).  
Hence, when a target perceives strong relationship bonding with the 
disseminator, the target is likely to feel obligated to act up to his or her 
relational role by devoting increased socio-emotional resources to the 
disseminator.  Accordingly, the target who perceives relationship bonding will 
be less likely to assume inaction.  
Additionally, the target who perceives relationship bonding may 
refrain from not responding because inaction may wrongly hint at the target's 
impassivity toward the disseminator.  When the target responds through 
inaction, the disseminator is essentially given a “cold shoulder”, suggesting 
that the target neglects or ignores the affiliating behavior.  As a result, the 
disseminator may feel dejected and unappreciated by the target.  Moreover, 
inaction may be perceived as an indication of relationship de-escalation in 
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which the target drives the social relationship towards deterioration (Lipkus 
and Bissonnette 1996).  Therefore, when the target perceives higher 
relationship bonding, he or she will be less willing to assume inaction. 
H3: Perceived relationship bonding will reduce the likelihood of 
inaction. 
3.3.3.2 Perceived Relationship Bonding and Avoidance 
Past research suggests that perception of relationship bonding impedes 
avoidance behavior (Campos et al. 2007; Rusbult and Buunk 1993).  
Specifically, as transactional avoidance interrupts social communications, its 
enactment may bring an abrupt end to an affiliating interaction.  Hence, the 
target who perceives relationship bonding is likely to continue his or her 
association with the dissemination and/or be reluctant to dispute the 
embarrassing exposure. 
Furthermore, perceived relationship bonding represents increased 
emotional and cognitive attachment between the target and the disseminator 
(Aron et al. 1992).  The elevated level of emotional and cognitive attachment 
induces additional motivations for the target to assume a long-term orientation 
in the relationship (Agnew et al. 1998).  Therefore, when the target perceives 
higher relationship bonding, he or she will be more eager to remain in the 
relationship and less willing to engage in interpersonal avoidance. 




H5: Perceived relationship bonding will reduce the likelihood of 
interpersonal avoidance. 
3.3.3.3 Perceived Relationship Bonding and Approach 
Approach behavior is essential in maintaining the relationship bonding 
derived from a social exchange (Firestone 1977).  For example, Tidwell and 
Walther (2002) examined social exchange in computer-mediated 
communication and found that individuals maintained socially meaningful 
interactions by increasing interaction involvement, such as providing prompt 
responses, engaging in deep self-discloses, and asking personal questions.  In a 
study examining interpersonal teasing, Boxer and Cortés-Conde (1997) 
revealed that relationship bonding derived from teasing prompted interlocutors 
to maintain the interaction by teasing back at each other.  Approach behavior 
can also be understood as feedback in social exchange, in that the target 
acknowledges the social exchange initiated by the disseminator (Lawler and 
Thye 1999).  Consequently, a target with strong perception of relationship 
bonding will engage in approach behavior in response to an embarrassing 
exposure. 
H6: Perceived relationship bonding will increase the likelihood of 
approach behavior. 
3.3.3.4 Perceived Privacy Invasion and Inaction 
Perception of privacy invasion provides strong reasons for the target to 
resign from inaction.  Specifically, invasion of privacy exposes the target to 
ridicules and defamation in a social exchange (Abril 2007).  Taking no action 
against the involuntary exposure of his or her embarrassing information (by 
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keeping silent or ignoring the exposure) will not only sustain the privacy 
invasion but also express the target's apathy towards privacy invasion and 
tolerance of the exploitation.  Past studies suggest that privacy invasion 
discourages the target from assuming inaction.  For example, Debatin et al. 
(2009) examined self-disclosure in online social networks and found that 
individuals who experienced limited privacy invasion generally ignored taking 
active actions to protect their privacy.  However, those who had personally 
experienced severe privacy invasion departed from inaction and engaged in 
active responses.  Therefore, perceived privacy invasion is expected to 
dissuade the target from assuming inaction. 
H7: Perceived privacy invasion will reduce the likelihood of inaction. 
3.3.3.5 Perceived Privacy Invasion and Avoidance 
Perceive privacy invasion is expected to induce avoidance at both the 
transactional level and the interpersonal level.  At the transaction level, the 
target's perception of privacy invasion accentuates concerns about his or her 
association with the embarrassing information.  In particular, a target who 
perceives high privacy invasion is likely to believe that the embarrassing 
exposure has fundamentally intruded his or her private space in online social 
networks.  To re-establish the privacy space, the target may actively distance 
himself or herself from the embarrassing exposure (Greenberg and Firestone 
1977).  For instance, the target may mark the dissemination as spam to notify 
the service provider about the abuse.  The target may also protest against the 
dissemination by reporting it to the online social network operator.  By 
marking the dissemination as spam and/or protesting to the operator, the target 
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aims to prevent such embarrassing information from staying visible in online 
social networks. 
In addition to performing avoidance at the transactional level, a target 
who perceives high privacy invasion may actively engage in interpersonal 
avoidance through relationship dissolution (Petronio 1991).  By withdrawing 
affiliation with the disseminator, the target avoids subjecting himself or herself 
to further privacy invasion. Son and Kim (2008) offered empirical evidence to 
support such an assertion.  They found that individuals who were concerned 
about privacy withdrew their relationship with the online vendor and filed 
complaints against the vendor.  In online social networks, the target may 
simply terminate his or her social connection with the disseminator.  
Additionally, the target may lodge a report to the online social network 
operator to complain against the disseminator.  Such behavior may be 
motivated by the target’s desire to terminate the relationship with the 
disseminator.  We therefore hypothesize perceived privacy invasion as an 
important determinant of both transactional avoidance and interpersonal 
avoidance.  
H8: Perceived privacy invasion will increase the likelihood of 
transactional avoidance. 





3.3.3.6 Perceived Privacy Invasion and Approach 
Approach behavior not only draws the target towards the embarrassing 
exposure but also makes him or her vulnerable to further privacy invasion 
(Drew 1987).  When the target engages in approach behavior, the disseminator 
can be instigated by the target’s active involvement and hence engage in 
further embarrassing exposures.  Past research suggests that individuals’ 
perception of privacy invasion reduces approach behavior in online exchange.  
For instance, Youn (2005) examined online privacy protective behavior and 
revealed that Internet users coped with privacy invasions by reducing 
information provision to online firms and limiting participation in online 
transactions. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H10: Perceived privacy invasion will reduce the likelihood of approach 
behavior. 
3.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
Facebook is chosen as the online social network platform for the 
present study for two reasons: (1) It provides functionalities such as 
information posting as well as content tagging, and thus is a suitable platform 
for information dissemination; (2) it is widely used and thus findings from the 
present study may have greater generalizability to the general online social 
network user population. 
3.4.1 Experimental Design 
A laboratory experiment with 2 (Information Dissemination: Posting 
only vs. Posting with Tagging) x 2 (Network Mutuality: Low vs. High) 
factorial design was conducted to test the proposed hypotheses. Information 
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dissemination was manipulated by the exclusion and inclusion of tagging on a 
note published on the disseminator's profile.  Network mutuality was 
facilitated by manipulating the number of shared friends the target has in 
common with the disseminator.  Evidence suggests that an average Facebook 
user has 130 friends in his or her friend list and the average number of mutual 
friends shared by two Facebook friends is 35 (Eldon 2010; Mavridis et al. 
2010).  Accordingly, low network mutuality was represented by 7 shared 
friends, which is about 5% of the average number of friends a user has, 
whereas high network mutuality was represented by 65 shared friends, which 
is about 50% of the average number of friends per user. 
Our experiment involved a stimulation of an online embarrassing 
exposure using a hypothetical scenario. (Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Greenberg 
and Eskew 1993).  Hypothetical scenarios have been used in previous IS and 
privacy research (e.g., Anderson and Agarwal 2011; Grace 2009; Sheehan and 
Hoy 2000; Tragesser and Lippman 2005) and this method is particularly valid 
for this study due to three important reasons.  First, social networks are highly 
personal, so it is difficult to create such an artificial environment in a lab that 
resembles users' actual social networks experience.  Second, although a field 
experiment might better mimic an actual situation, it is not possible to 
administrate the experimental conditions that involve credible embarrassing 
treatments without impairing the realism of the treatments.  As a result, 
subjects’ true perceptions and responses might be undermined.  Lastly, if a 
survey was used, it would not be practical for subjects to report their responses 
toward an embarrassing exposure.  This is because some of them might not 
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have experienced such embarrassment in online social networks and even if 
some had, it would be extremely challenging, if not impossible, for them to 
vividly recall the entire incident in order to respond to survey questions.  
A pilot test with 20 subjects was conducted prior to the main 
experiment to assess the appropriateness of the experimental stimulus (i.e., the 
note publication scenario that exposes an embarrassing incident).  Subjects 
were instructed to go through five incidents (i.e., shopping for condoms, 
purchasing disposal underwear, kissing on the subway, reading adult 
magazine, and sleeping in lecture), which were typical embarrassing situations 
occurring at public settings and observable by others (Dahl et al. 2001; Sabini 
et al. 2001).  They were asked to imagine that each of the incidents was 
published in a Facebook note and then rated on the perceived embarrassment6 
caused by the note and judge the extent to which each incident was relevant7 
to people like themselves (Table 3.1).  
Results showed that all five scenarios were embarrassing (mean = 
6.08). No significant differences were found among the scenarios with respect 




                                                          
6
 Perceived embarrassment represents the extent to which a person is uncomfortable about the 
note publication. It was measured by three 7-point Likert scale items based on Sabini et al. 
(2000): “The note publication makes me embarrassed,” “The note publication makes me feel 
awkward,” and “The note publication makes me feel uncomfortable.”  
7
 Perceived relevance represents the extent to which a person believes that the embarrassing 
incident is meaningful to him or her. It was measured by three 7-point Likert scale items based 
on Zaichkowsky (1985): “The incident discussed in the note is important to people like 
myself,” “The incident discussed in the note matters to people like myself,” and “The incident 
discussed in the note is significant to people like myself”. 
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Table 3.1: Means of the Five Scenarios 
Incident Perceived Embarrassment Perceived Relevance M SD M SD 
A 6.23 0.68 3.54 0.73 
B 5.80 0.96 4.29 0.77 
C 5.95 0.71 4.35 0.49 
D 6.15 0.69 2.13 0.75 
E 6.28 0.69 6.03 0.73 
Notes:     
A = Shopping for Condoms B = Purchasing Disposal 
Underwear 
C = Kissing on the Subway D = Reading Adult Magazine 
E = Sleeping in Lecture  
 
In addition, the exposure scenario depicting the subjects sleeping in a 
lecture theatre (i.e., the note, see Table 3.2) was rated by the subjects as the 
most relevant (mean = 6.03), hence it was selected as the stimulus for this 
study. 
Table 3.2: Embarrassing Scenario8 
Note Title: Caught Sleeping in Lecture 
Note Content: I was sitting somewhere in the middle of the lecture theatre just now. 
After about 30 minutes of lecture, I started to feel really tired and begun stretching 
my neck. While turning my head around for the stretch, I somehow realized [subject’s 
nickname] was also in the LT!9 I was thinking that he/she was also doing some neck 
stretches, but I was wrong! I realized he/she was actually falling asleep and jerking 
his/her head left and right. Besides jerking his/her head around, he/she was dripping 
saliva from his/her mouth! Then out of a sudden, he/she banged his/her head onto the 
desk! It was a really hard hit and the whole LT was shocked by the BANG sound! I 
am sure it wakes you up for the rest of the lecture yeah? Lolx :p 
 
3.4.2 Sample and Experimental Procedures 
Subjects in this experiment were students at a large public university in 
South-East Asia.  Prior to the experiment, subjects were asked to provide 
information about demographics, Internet experience, Facebook experience, 
and their names commonly known by their friends.  They were also assessed 
                                                          
8
 The embarrassing scenario was customized for each subject by reflecting his or her 
nickname (or the name typically known by his or her friends) and gender, which were 
obtained prior to the experiment. 
9
 LT is the abbreviation of lecture theatre.  
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in terms of perceived network closeness, shyness, and sociability. One week 
before the experiment, subjects attended an online Facebook training on 
several key technical features, such as posting, tagging, and social browsing.  
Upon completing the training, subjects were given an online quiz of 20 
multiple choice questions to assess their understanding of the technology 
features.  On average, subjects provided 18 correct answers.  These results 
show that subjects had concrete understanding of the key technical features 
(i.e., posting and tagging). 
Subjects were also instructed to send friend requests to a research 
Facebook account. Subjects were informed that their profile information 
would be collected for the purpose of this study.  One day before the 
experiment, the research account was used to capture the profile information 
of each subject.  The captured information included the subject’s profile page, 
wall postings for the past three months, photo albums, and the note section.  
All subjects were shown to have experience in being tagged in contents posted 
by others.  Furthermore, they were found to have used Facebook actively for 
the past three months.  
In order to ensure sufficient power (0.8) with a medium effect size for 
a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design, 109 subjects, who did not take part 
in the pilot study, were recruited to participate in the experiment. 
Table 3.3: Experimental Conditions 
 Low Network Mutuality High Network Mutuality 
Posting Only N = 27 N = 28 




Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions (Table 3.3) in a mock-up Facebook environment that mimicked 
actual Facebook layout and technology features (e.g., sponsored 
advertisements and comment) as well as customized with the subjects’ actual 
Facebook profile information (i.e., profile names and profile pictures).  They 
were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which an imaginary friend (i.e., 
denoted by the name “X” and a unisex avatar), who shared 7 mutual Facebook 
friends (or 65 mutual Facebook friends, see P.20 for the choice of 7 vs. 65) 
with the subjects, had posted (and tagged them to) a note in the mock-up 
environment.  To ensure realism, the note was personalized with subjects' 
genders and names commonly known by others.  Subjects were told to 
imagine that the scenario was real and read through it carefully.  Afterwards, 
subjects were instructed to complete a questionnaire that contained 
manipulation checks and measurement items of the research variables.  
Subsequently, they were given the option to respond (or not to respond) to the 
note published in the mock-up environment (see Figure 3.2).  Upon 
completing their responses in the mock-up environment, subjects were 








1 = No response 2 = Mark the note as spam 
3 = Report the note to Facebook 4 = Remove the disseminator as a 
Facebook friend 
5 = Report the disseminator to 
Facebook 
6 = Write a public comment 
7 = Send a private message  
A = Note content  
 
Figure 3.2. Study II Mock-Up Facebook Environment 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.5.1 Subject Demographics and Background Analysis 
Among the 109 subjects participating in the study, 52 were females.  
The age of the subjects ranged from 18 to 25, with average Internet experience 
and average Facebook experience being 7.3 years and 3.7 years, respectively.  
The average time a subject spent to complete the entire experiment was 30.4 
minutes.  
No significant differences were found among subjects randomly 
assigned to each of the four experimental conditions with respect to age, 
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gender, Internet experience, and Facebook experience, indicating that 
subjects’ demographics were quite homogeneous across different conditions. 
3.5.2 Measurement 
The manipulation check for information dissemination was performed 
by asking subjects three true/false questions on whether the information was 
disseminated with tagging (see Appendix E for manipulation check items).  
All subjects in the posting only condition answered “false” to the three 
questions and all those in the posting with tagging condition answered “true”, 
hence suggesting that the manipulation for information dissemination was 
successful.  Manipulation check for network mutuality was conducted by 
asking subjects to rate on four items, measuring the extent to which their 
social networks overlapped with those of the disseminator.  On a seven-point 
Likert scale, subjects in the low network mutuality condition reported a mean 
value of 2.57 for the extent of network overlap (standard deviation = 0.52) and 
subjects in the high network mutuality condition reported a mean value of 5.58 
for the extent of network overlap (standard deviation = 0.57).  The difference 
was significant (t = -28.89, p <0.01), and hence the manipulation for network 
mutuality worked as anticipated. 
Five items measuring perceived relationship bonding were adapted 
from Wheeless and Grotz (1976) and Murray et al. (1996) (Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.90) (see Appendix E).  Four items measuring perceived privacy invasion 
were adapted from Fusilier and Hoyer (1980) and Alge (2001) (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.82).  Three items measuring perceived network closeness were 
adapted from Floyd and Parks (1995) (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81). Three items 
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measuring sociability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87) and three items measuring 
shyness (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83) were adapted from Cheek and Buss (1981). 
Exploratory factor analysis shows that, in general, items load well on their 
intended factors and lightly on the other factor, thus indicating adequate 
construct validity (see Table 3.4).  The correlation between perceived 
relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion was -0.18 (p =0.06). 
Table 3.4: Rotated Factor Loadings 
 PRB PPI PNC SHY SOC 
PRB1 .011 .870 .023 .029 -.003 
PRB2 -.013 .853 .032 .054 -.019 
PRB3 -.071 .870 .002 .043 -.020 
PRB4 -.026 .804 .017 .023 -.024 
PRB5 -.001 .843 .021 .035 -.027 
PPI1 .779 .119 .011 -.008 .027 
PPI2 .815 .052 .017 -.045 .043 
PPI3 .830 -.170 .025 -.051 .055 
PPI4 .787 -.093 .027 -.034 .052 
PNC1 .028 .002 .823 .017 .005 
PNC2 .018 .011 .865 .013 .009 
PNC3 .002 .021 .888 .021 .012 
SHY1 .030 -.003 .013 .768 -.310 
SHY2 .066 -.054 .018 .840 -.238 
SHY3 .045 -.045 .026 .832 -.349 
SOC1 -.012 .026 .002 -.388 .882 
SOC2 -.023 .043 .010 -.320 .850 
SOC3 -.009 .065 .013 -.318 .849 
Notes:  
PRB = Perceived Relationship Bonding; PPI = Perceived Privacy Invasion; 
PNC = Perceived Network Closeness; SHY = Shyness; SOC = Sociability. 
Given that network mutuality was only used for manipulation checks, its 











Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics  
 Min Max Mean S.D. 
PRB 1.40 7.00 4.27 1.32 
PPI 2.50 6.75 5.18 1.01 
NM 1.50 6.50 4.06 1.61 
AGE 18 25 21.35 0.68 
IN-EXP 6.00 8.5 7.30 0.52 
FB-EXP 1.5 6.0 3.7 1.04 
PNC 4.00 7.00 5.35 0.72 
SHY 1.67 5.00 3.23 1.57 
SOC 4.33 7.00 4.87 1.38 
Notes: 
NM = Network Mutuality (manipulation check) 
IN-EXP = Internet Experience 
FB-EXP = Facebook Experience 
 
Table 3.6: Categorization of Subjects’ Behavioral Responses 
Passive Response Active Response 
Inaction Transactional Avoidance Interpersonal Avoidance Approach 
(1) No response (2) Mark the note as 
spam 
(3) Report the note to 
Facebook 
(4) Remove the 
disseminator as a 
Facebook friend 
(5) Report the 
disseminator to 
Facebook 
(6) Write a public 
comment 
(7) Send a private 
message 
Notes:  
(1) to (7) are coded in binary scores (0 or 1) 
Transactional Avoidance = (2) + (3) 
Interpersonal Avoidance = (4) + (5) 
Approach = (6) + (7) 
 
Whereas subjects’ passive response (i.e., inaction) was manifested by 
their choice not to respond to the note publication, their active responses were 
classified into three behavior types (i.e., transactional avoidance, interpersonal 
avoidance, and approach).  Transactional avoidance consists of two 
communication cessation functions, namely marking the note as spam and 
reporting the note to Facebook.  Removing the disseminator as a Facebook 
friend and reporting the disseminator to Facebook are captured to reflect the 
behavior type interpersonal avoidance.  Approach comprises two participatory 
functions, namely writing a public comment and sending a private message 
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(Table 3.5).  For each response performed, subjects received a score of 1.  
Overall, a subject could receive a score of 0 and 1 for passive response, a 
score of 0, 1, or 2 for each of the three active responses. 
3.5.3 Results on Perceived Relationship Bonding 
MANOVA was conducted with perceived relationship bonding and 
perceived privacy invasion being dependent variables.10  Results show an 
overall significant difference between the four experimental groups (F (2, 104) 
= 64.44, p <0.01).11  Given the significance of the overall test, ANOVAs were 
conducted on the two dependent variables separately. 
ANOVA with perceived relationship bonding as dependent variable 
yields the significant effects of information dissemination (F (1, 105) = 8.69, p 
<0.01) and network mutuality (F (1, 105) = 153.43, p <0.01) (see Table 3.6).  
The significant interaction effect (F (1, 105) = 68.99, p <0.01) suggests that 
the effect of information dissemination on perceived relationship bonding is 
moderated by network mutuality.  Simple main effect analysis reveals that (1) 
posting with tagging is associated with significantly lower perceived 
relationship bonding than posting only under the low network mutuality 
condition (F (1, 53) = 52.52, p <0.01), and (2) posting with tagging is 
associated with significantly higher perceived relationship bonding than 
posting only under the high network mutuality condition (F (1, 52) = 18.26, p 
<0.01) (see Table 3.6 and 3.7; Figure 3.3).  Therefore, H1a and H1b are 
supported. 
                                                          
10
 The significant Box’s test suggests that the equality of variance-covariance matrices 
assumption is satisfied. 
11
 Perceived network closeness, shyness, and sociability were found to have insignificant 
effects on the two dependent variables and hence were excluded from further analysis.  
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Table 3.7: ANOVA and Analysis of Simple Mean Effects 

















ID 4.87 1 4.87 8.69 .004 
MN 85.98 1 85.97 153.43 .000 
ID * NM 38.66 1 38.66 68.99 .000 
Error 58.84 105 .56   
Total 2172.44 109    
NM = Low      
 ID 35.83 1 35.83 52.52 .000 
 Error 36.16 53 .68   
 Total 71.99 54    
NM = High      
 ID 7.97 1 7.97 18.26 .000 
 Error 22.68 52 .44   
 Total 30.65 53    
Notes: 
Dependent Variable: Perceived Relationship Bonding 
ID = Information Dissemination; NM = Network Mutuality. 
a. R Squared = .69 (Adjusted R Squared = .68) 
  
Table 3.8: Mean Values of Perceived Relationship Bonding 
 Low Network Mutuality High Network Mutuality Mean 
Posting Only 4.21 4.79 4.51 
Posting with Tagging 2.59 5.56 4.02 
Mean 3.39 5.16  
 
 





3.5.4 Results on Perceived Privacy Invasion 
ANOVA with perceived privacy invasion as dependent variable 
reveals the significant effects of information dissemination (F (1, 105) = 
100.61, p <0.01) and network mutuality (F (1, 105) = 22.24, p <0.01) (see 
Table 3.8).  The significant interaction effect (F (1, 105) = 75.47, p <0.01) 
suggests that the effect of information dissemination on perceived privacy 
invasion is moderated by network mutuality.  Simple main effect analysis 
reveals that (1) posting with tagging is associated with significantly higher 
perceived privacy invasion than posting only under the low network mutuality 
condition (F (1, 53) = 151.69, p <0.01), and (2) posting only and posting with 
tagging are not different from each other in affecting perceived privacy 
invasion under the high network mutuality condition (F (1, 52) = 1.08, p 
=0.31) (see Table 3.8 and 3.9; Figure 3.4). Therefore, H2 is supported. 
Table 3.9: ANOVA Results 

















ID 36.60 1 36.60 100.61 .000 
NM 8.09 1 8.09 22.24 .000 
ID * NM 27.45 1 27.45 75.47 .000 
Error 38.19 105 .36   
Total 2866.90 109    
NM = Low      
 ID 64.35 1 64.35 151.69 .000 
 Error 22.48 53 .42   
 Total 86.83 54    
NM = High      
 ID .33 1 .33 1.08 .305 
 Error 15.71 52 .30   
 Total 16.04 53    
Notes: 
Dependent Variable: Perceived Privacy Invasion 
ID = Information Dissemination; NM = Network Mutuality. 





Table 3.10: Mean Values of Perceived Privacy Invasion 
 Low Network Mutuality High Network Mutuality Mean 
Posting Only 3.66 5.23 4.45 
Posting with Tagging 5.81 5.39 5.61 
Mean 4.74 5.31  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Study II Mean Plot of Perceived Privacy Invasion 
3.5.5 Results on Behavioral Responses 
Overall, 43 subjects assumed the passive behavioral response (with 66 
subjects performing at least one active response).  As the passive response 
variable (i.e., inaction) was binary (with subjects' score being 0 or 1), we 
conducted binary logistic regression to test the effects of perceived 
relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion on inaction.  To facilitate 
interpretation of the results, we standardized perceived relationship bonding 
and perceived privacy invasion scores before fitting the logistic regression 
models with inaction as outcome in model A (Table 3.10).  As shown in Table 
3.10, the results of the model fit test show satisfactory fit for the data (χ2 (2) = 
34.38, p <0.01, Cox & Snell's R2 = 0.29).  Perceived relationship bonding is 
found to have a significant negative effect on inaction (β = -0.80, p <0.01).  
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The odds-ratio is 0.45, with a 95% confidence interval of 1.26 to 3.79.  This 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in perceived relationship 
bonding decreases the likelihood of assuming inaction by 55%.12  Perceived 
privacy invasion has a significant negative effect on inaction (β = -1.42, p 
<0.01).  The odds-ratio is 0.24, with a 95% confidence interval of 1.13 to 2.43.  
This suggests that a one standard deviation increase in perceived privacy 
invasion decreases the likelihood of assuming inaction by 76%.  Therefore, H3 
and H7 are supported. 
Further analyses were conducted to examine the active responses 
performed by the 66 subjects.  As the three active response variables (i.e., 
transactional avoidance, interpersonal avoidance, and approach) coded from 
the subjects’ behavioral responses were ordinal, we conducted ordinal 
regression regressions, in accordance with the guidelines set out by Peng et al. 
(2002), to test the remaining hypotheses.  To facilitate the interpretation of the 
results, we standardized perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy 
invasion scores before fitting the ordinal regression models with each of the 
three behavior types as outcomes (Table 3.10).  Following Long (2000), we 
conducted parallel lines tests for each of the outcome variables and concluded 
that the proportional odds assumption was met13. 
                                                          
12
 An odds ratio greater than 1 implies an increased likelihood; conversely, an odds ratio less 
than 1 implies a decreased likelihood. Following DeMaris (1991) and Duckworth et al. (2007), 
odds ratio less than 1 is reported in terms of likelihood percentage, which is computed based 
on (1 - odds ratio). Confidence intervals that do not contain 1 or -1 suggest that the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is significant (Peng 
and So 2002).  
13
 Ordinal logistic regression only applies to data that meet the parallel regression assumption, 
which requires equality of coefficient for all outcome categories of the dependent variable 
(McCullagh 1980). In other words, ordinal logistic regression assumes that the coefficients 
that describe the relationship between the lowest category of transactional avoidance (i.e., 
when transactional avoidance = 0) and all higher categories (i.e., when transactional avoidance 
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In model B, we conducted an ordinal logistic regression on 
transactional avoidance.  The results of the model fit test shows satisfactory 
fit for the data (χ2 (2) = 34.21, p <0.01, Cox & Snell's R2 = 0.43).  As shown in 
Table 3.10, perceived relationship bonding is found to have a significant and 
negative effect on transactional avoidance (β = -0.52, p <0.05).  The odds-ratio 
is 0.59, with a 95% confidence interval of -2.00 to -1.43.  This suggests that a 
one standard deviation increase in perceived relationship bonding reduces the 
likelihood of engaging in transactional avoidance by 41%.  Perceived privacy 
invasion has a significant positive effect on transactional avoidance (β = 2.64, 
p <0.01).  The odds-ratio is 14.01, with a 95% confidence interval of 1.35 to 
3.93.  This suggests that a one standard deviation increase in perceived privacy 
invasion increases the likelihood of engaging in transactional avoidance by 
14.01 times.  In essence, the results suggest that both perceived relationship 
bonding and perceived privacy invasion have significant influence on 
transactional avoidance, with the latter being a stronger predictor.  Therefore, 
H4 and H8 are supported.  
In model C, an ordinal logistic regression was conducted on 
interpersonal avoidance.  The results of the model fit test show that the model 
fit the data well (χ2 (2) = 30.24, p <0.01, Cox & Snell's R2 = 0.51).  Perceived 
relationship bonding is found to have a significant negative effect on 
interpersonal avoidance (β = -1.46, p <0.05).  The odds-ratio is 0.23, with a 
95% confidence interval of -4.53 to -1.18.  This suggests that a one standard 
                                                                                                                                                        
= 1 or 2) are the same as those that describe the relationship between the middle category of 
transactional avoidance (i.e., when transactional avoidance = 1) and highest category (i.e., 
when transactional avoidance = 2). Our test revealed that the difference in the coefficients was 




deviation increase in perceived relationship bonding reduces the likelihood of 
engaging in interpersonal avoidance by 77%.  However, contrary to 
expectation, perceived privacy invasion is found to have no significant 
influence on interpersonal avoidance (β = -0.59, p = 0.55).  Hence, H5 is 
supported but H9 is not. 
In model D, an ordinal logistic regression was conducted on approach.  
The results of the model fit test show that the model fit the data well (χ2 (2) = 
58.65, p <0.01, Cox & Snell's R2 = 0.62).  Perceived relationship bonding is 
found to have a significant and positive effect on approach behavior (β = 4.15, 
p <0.01).  The odds-ratio is 63.43, with a 95% confidence interval of 2.11 to 
6.18.  This suggests that a one standard deviation increase in perceived 
relationship bonding increases the likelihood of engaging in approach 
behavior by 63.43 times.  Perceived privacy invasion has a significant and 
negative effect on approach (β = -1.76, p <0.05).  The odds-ratio is 0.17, with 
a 95% confidence interval of -3.16 to -1.35.  This suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in perceived privacy invasion reduces the likelihood of 
engaging in approach behavior by 83%.  In sum, the results suggest that both 
perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion have 
significant influence on approach behavior, with the former likely being a 







Table 3.11: Logistic Regression 
 Dependent Variable 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Parallel Lines Test  
Chi-Square  0.68 2.00 4.26 
Degrees of Freedom  2 2 2 
Significance  p =0.71 (N.S.) p =0.37 (N.S.) p =0.12 (N.S.) 
Model Fit  
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square 34.38 34.21 30.24 58.65 
Degrees of Freedom 2 2 2 2 
Significance p <0.01 p <0.01 p <0.01 p <0.01 
Cox & Snell 0.29 0.43 0.51 0.62 
Threshold†  TA = 0 TA =1 IA = 0 IA = 1 AP = 0 AP = 1 
Estimate  1.11 3.38 2.23 3.94 3.12 6.38 
Standard Error  0.49 0.68 0.39 0.59 1.01 1.48 
Wald Chi-Square  5.13 24.68 33.46 44.38 9.63 18.66 






95% CI  
Lower Bound  1.49 2.05 1.47 2.78 1.15 3.48 
Upper Bound  2.06 4.71 2.98 5.10 5.09 9.27 





Estimate -0.80 -0.52 -1.46 4.15 
Standard Error 0.29 0.24 0.63 1.04 
Wald Chi-Square 7.89 4.57 4.70 15.95 
Significance p <0.01 p <0.05 p <0.05 p <0.01 
Odds-Ratio 0.45 0.59 0.23 63.43 
95% CI (1.26, 3.79) (-2.00, -1.43) (-4.53, -1.18) (2.11, 6.18) 
Perceived Privacy 
Invasion  
Estimate -1.42 2.64 -0.59 -1.76 
Standard Error 0.30 0.66 0.67 0.72 
Wald Chi-Square 23.12 16.07 0.86 6.02 
Significance p <0.01 p <0.01 p =0.38 (N.S.) p <0.05 
Odds-Ratio 0.24 14.01 0.55 0.17 
95% CI (1.13, 2.43) (1.35, 3.93) (-1.96, 0.98) (-3.16, -1.35) 
Notes: 
Model A: DV = Inaction 
Model B: DV = Transactional Avoidance (TA) 
Model C: DV = Interpersonal Avoidance (IA) 
Model D: DV = Approach (AP) 
† The threshold estimates indicate the cumulative logits when perceived privacy invasion and 
perceived relationship bonding equal zero (see Appendix F for discussion). 
 
A mediation analysis was conducted following Baron and Kenny 
(1986)’s method.  Results in Table 3.11 shown that the two mediating 
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variables, perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion, fully 
mediated the impact of information dissemination and network mutuality on 
inaction, transactional avoidance, interpersonal avoidance, and approach. 
Table 3.12: Test for Mediating Effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Inaction TA IA AP Inaction TA IA AP Inaction TA IA† AP 
ID -1.22* 1.74** 2.59** -2.01** -0.18 0.34 0.38 -0.75 -0.29 0.03 - -0.43 
NM -1.58* 3.08* -3.05** 1.67* -0.27 0.32 -0.21 0.65 -0.28 0.57 - 0.23 
Notes: 
Model 1: Unmediated model 
Model 2: Model with perceived relationship bonding 
Model 3: Model with perceived privacy invasion 
† Since perceived privacy invasion has no significant influence on interpersonal avoidance, no 
mediation test was conducted. 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
3.6.1 Discussion of Results 
The results supported all but one of our hypotheses.  This study seeks 
to understand the consequences of an embarrassing exposure in online social 
networks.  We postulate that network mutuality moderates the effect of 
information dissemination on perceived relationship bonding.  As 
hypothesized, compared to posting only, posting with tagging leads to lower 
level of perceived relationship bonding when network mutuality is low.  When 
network mutuality is high, posting with tagging results in higher level of 
perceived relationship bonding.  Furthermore, we also predict that network 
mutuality moderates the effect of information dissemination on perceived 
privacy invasion.  In line with our expectation, compared to posting only, 
posting with tagging leads to a significant increase in perceived privacy 
invasion when network mutuality is low.  When network mutuality is high, 
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posting with tagging is not significantly different from posting only in terms of 
perceived privacy invasion. 
We also establish that, in response to perceived relationship bonding 
and perceived privacy invasion, individuals either take on passive response 
such as inaction or engage in active responses in the form of transactional 
avoidance, interpersonal avoidance, and approach.  Our results show that, as 
expected, perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion 
significantly reduce (increase) passive response (active response).  
Specifically, perceived relationship bonding has a significant negative 
influence on avoidance behavior (transactional and interpersonal) and a 
significant positive influence on approach behavior.  Furthermore, our results 
show that perceived privacy invasion has a significant positive influence on 
transactional avoidance and a significant negative influence on approach 
behavior.  However, contrary to our expectation, perceived privacy invasion 
has no significant influence on interpersonal avoidance.  The results imply that 
although perception of privacy invasion is likely to induce withdrawal from an 
embarrassing exposure, it is not strong enough to elicit relationship 
dissolution.  A plausible explanation is that the target’s existing relationship 
with the disseminator dissuades him or her from engaging in relationship 
avoidance.  As noted by Rusbult and Martz (1995), individuals’ relational 
investment played an important role in their decision to maintain the 
relationship with abusive others.  Likewise, in the context of online social 
networks, the target may be unwilling to terminate a relationship despite an 
elevated perception of privacy invasion following the embarrassing exposure. 
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3.6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
Social networking is an important online activity and, at times, a major 
motive for individuals to come online (Madden and Zickuhr 2011).  Past 
studies suggest that online social networks do not only facilitate the bonding 
and bridging of social relationships but also expose individuals to privacy 
abuses (Ellison et al. 2007).  Although IS research has progressed significantly 
in understanding privacy in online social networks, its focus has been on 
privacy issues associated with exposures of identity information.  We thus 
extend the privacy literature by suggesting that embarrassing information is an 
important object of exposure in online social networking. 
This study makes several contributions to research.  First, it contributes 
to IS literature by examining factors relevant to online social networks that 
influence individuals’ bonding experience and privacy perception in an 
embarrassing exposure.  Based on the Social Exchange Theory, this study 
investigates two antecedents of perceived relationship bonding and perceived 
privacy invasion, namely, information dissemination and network mutuality.  
We rationalize that information dissemination (i.e., posting only vs. posting 
with tagging) exemplifies exchange behavior in initiating social exchange. 
Reflecting the way a bonding experience can be shaped by target participation, 
information dissemination illustrates how exclusion and inclusion of target 
notification determine perceived relationship bonding.  With respect to the 
role of individuation in privacy invasion, information dissemination illustrates 
how traceability of the target’s profile in the embarrassing exposure 
determines perceived privacy invasion.  Furthermore, we contend that network 
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mutuality depicts the social relationship structure in which the social 
exchange occurs.  On one hand, network mutuality determines the audience 
type, which influences the impact of target notification on perceived 
relationship bonding.  On the other hand, network mutuality determines the 
exposure size, which influences the effect of target individuation on perceived 
privacy invasion.  Taken as a whole, the two antecedents of perceived 
relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion (i.e., information 
dissemination and network mutuality) are particularly relevant to online social 
networks. 
Second, this study advances privacy-related research by examining 
perceived relationship bonding, in addition to perceived privacy invasion, as 
an important component in individuals’ assessment of an embarrassing 
exposure in online social networks.  Our study reveals that, while the 
involuntary nature of the embarrassing exposure influences the perception of 
privacy invasion, the humor implied by the exposure may also induce 
relationship bonding.  Given that the exposure of embarrassing information is 
typically considered negative in past research, the findings of this study shed 
light on a multi-faceted interpretation of the phenomenon. 
Third, we enrich extant IS research on social interactions by providing 
a taxonomy of behavioral responses to embarrassing exposure in online social 
networks.  Drawing on the dichotomy of passive and active behavior, we 
classify individuals’ behavioral responses into four different types, namely 
inaction, transactional avoidance, interpersonal avoidance, and approach.  
Specifically, inaction represents the target's passive disregard of the 
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embarrassing exposure.  Transactional avoidance exemplifies the target’s 
active disengagement from the embarrassing information, which manifests 
avoidance strategy at the transactional level. Interpersonal avoidance 
colligates active relationship dissolution behavior, hence illustrating the 
avoidance strategy performed at the interpersonal level.  Approach behavior 
subsumes the target’s active involvement in social interactions, which 
characterizes typical behavior to complete a social exchange.  The findings of 
this study indicate that the proposed taxonomy is helpful in analyzing a variety 
of behavior commonly performed in response to embarrassing exposures and 
thus serves as a useful tool for in-depth examination of individuals’ response 
behavior in online social networks. 
3.6.3 Practical Contributions  
Our findings also have important implications for application designers 
and online service providers.  By facilitating the traceability of the target's 
profile, posting with tagging has come under heavy criticism.  Given the 
influence of network mutuality on target's interpretation of an embarrassing 
exposure, application designers may contemplate how they can use 
information on network mutuality to their advantage.  For example, in cases 
where embarrassing content is disseminated, a target’s perception of privacy 
invasion can be mitigated if posting with tagging is discouraged for a 
disseminator who has low network mutuality with the target.  On the other 
hand, if the disseminator has high network mutuality with the target, the 
disseminator should be promptly notified regarding the option of tagging the 
target to induce the perception of relationship bonding.  
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Furthermore, this study has important implications for online service 
providers.  The three types of active behavioral responses identified in this 
study alert service providers to various user actions that go beyond inaction.  
Our study reveals that users may file reports to the service provider to seek 
transactional avoidance.  This finding can steer online service providers 
toward designing effective mechanisms to facilitate transactional avoidance.  
For example, when users complain against a piece of content, the online social 
network provider should consider suspending the content from dissemination.  
Furthermore, our study shows that users, despite their strong perception of 
privacy invasion, may refrain from interpersonal avoidance to avoid abrupt 
relationship termination.  To this end, we advocate that service providers 
should allow individuals to gradually de-escalate their relationships.  For 
example, to distance oneself from the disseminator, users should be permitted 
to engage in gradual relationship dissolution by progressively excluding the 
disseminator from his or her online social networking activities.  Our study 
also shows that users may engage in active exchange with the disseminator 
through approach behavior.  Therefore, it is important that service providers 
provide participatory features, such as threaded commenting and content 
rating, to stimulate rich interactions. 
3.6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
This study examines embarrassing exposures in a context where a note 
containing the target’s embarrassing information is disseminated through 
posting only versus posting with tagging.  We do not attempt to generalize the 
results to other forms of information dissemination in online social networks.  
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For example, the disseminator might expose the embarrassing information by 
writing it directly on the target’s wall.  In such a case, since the embarrassing 
information resides in the target’s personal profile, the effects of posting with 
tagging (i.e., notification and profile traceability) on perceived relationship 
bonding and perceived privacy invasion may be different. 
Our contributions may also be limited by using a mock-up online 
social networking website.  While the general layout and technical features of 
the mock-up website resembled those of a real online social networking 
platform, the mock-up website may not reflect the actual online social 
networking environment entirely.  However, in the actual environment, we 
could neither manipulate the experimental conditions (i.e., controlling the 
number of mutual friends the subjects and the friend share) nor capture 
subjects’ actual behavioral responses (i.e., intercepting the private messages 
the subjects sent to his or her friends).  Therefore, despite the limitation, the 
employment of this mock-up website is necessary.  Future research will be 
necessary to verify the impact of embarrassing exposures on relationship 
bonding and privacy invasion in a more natural setting. 
This study has examined the joint effects of information dissemination 
and network mutuality on the target’s perceptions of relationship bonding and 
privacy invasion, but it is yet unknown whether these two factors influence an 
individual’s intensity of online social networks usage.  It is possible that a 
target who perceives high relationship bonding may be motivated to engage in 
extensive online social interactions, hence intensifying their participation in 
online social networking.  Conversely, a target who experiences high privacy 
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invasion may resolve to general withdrawal from online social interactions, 
thus increasing his or her likelihood of resigning from online social networks.  
Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to examine individuals’ 
social network usage behavior after an embarrassing exposure. 
Furthermore, this study has focused on behavioral responses facilitated 
by online social networking websites.  In a real setting, the target might 
engage in behavior beyond the online environment.  For instance, in response 
to the embarrassing exposure, the target might actively avoid transaction by 
complaining to the disseminator in physical encounters.  Likewise, 
interpersonal avoidance might not be limited to breaking up connectivity 
within online social networks but could also escalate to relationship 
termination in the offline environment.  Approach behavior might manifest in 
the target’s active involvement during face-to-face interactions.  Hence, future 
research could investigate how an embarrassing exposure that occurs within 
online social networks influences individuals’ behavior in the offline 
environment. 
Finally, this study focuses on the effects of network mutuality on 
perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy invasion. While network 
mutuality is a key aspect of social relationship structure on online social 
networks, other forms of social structure might play some roles in forming 
privacy-related perceptions in embarrassing online exposures. For instance, 
the size of the target’s social network might elevate individuals’ perception of 
privacy invasion in an involuntary exposure since a larger network size 
essentially implies that the embarrassing exposure has a larger group of 
115 
 
audience. Likewise, the extent of information dissemination could be further 
escalated through indirect connections in online social networks. In light of 
understanding the importance of social relationship structure in shaping 
privacy related perceptions, it might be worthwhile to examine how these 
alternative aspects of exchange structure would impact individuals’ exchange 





CHAPTER 4 STUDY III: ONLINE CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR AFTER A 
PRIVACY BREACH: A THEORETICAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL 
TEST 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, privacy breaches — the theft, loss, or other forms of 
compromise of personally identifiable information such as credit card and 
Social Security numbers — have soared in the United States.  According to the 
Identity Theft Resource Center (2009), approximately 600 breaches are 
publicly reported annually in the United States.  A more sobering piece of 
news is that the publicized breaches are thought to be less than 5% of the 
breaches that actually occur (Claburn 2008).  Undoubtedly, this unfortunate 
trend endangers the information privacy of customers and, at the same time, 
threatens the profitability and reputations of businesses.  Several high-profile 
privacy breaches clearly illustrate these threats to practitioners (e.g., Zetter 
2009, Jewell 2007, FTC 2006).  For example, the computer system at TJX, 
which includes retailers Marshalls and TJ Maxx, was hacked over a two-year 
period before the breach was detected in 2006 (Acohido and Swartz 2007).  
Nearly 100 million customer records (e.g., credit and debit card numbers) 
were compromised, and the stolen data were used for various fraudulent 
activities, including an $8 million gift card scheme (Hines 2007, Jewell 2007).  
Experts estimated that TJX’s costs associated with legal settlements exceeded 
$200 million (Kerber 2007).  Additionally, lost sales resulting from damages 
to the firm’s reputation are believed to be about $200 per compromised record 
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(Ponemon 2009).  On the whole, a privacy breach is highly likely to hurt the 
performance of a firm. 
Privacy breaches are not just the outcome of carelessness.  Although 
firms may implement various organizational and technical measures to prevent 
privacy breaches, customers’ data may nevertheless leak through unforeseen 
holes (Culnan and Williams 2009).  Thus, managers should be well prepared 
for such a disaster so that their business can return to normal as quickly as 
possible (Whitman and Mattord 2008).  Identifying and addressing technical 
problems that may permit a privacy breach can be complex and may require a 
significant amount of time, money, and effort.  Nevertheless, an equal 
challenge is to repair the damaged relationships with customers after a breach 
(Culnan and Williams 2009).  Given that reputation is one of the most 
valuable assets in a networked economy, firms cannot afford to underestimate 
the potential magnitude of damage that a privacy breach poses to customer 
referrals in the form of word of mouth (Taylor et al. 2009).  Moreover, firms 
should take appropriate steps to keep their customers from switching to 
competitors after a disaster, because in this digital economy, customer loyalty 
can be easily lost (Reichheld and Schefter 2000).  To mitigate the potentially 
disastrous consequences of a data breach for customer relationships, firms 
have recourse to numerous recovery tactics.  These include, but are not limited 
to, providing monetary compensation for the privacy damages, establishing 
channels of clarification to permit effective customer feedback, and 
apologizing for the service failure.  Yet little is known about the effectiveness 
of these organizational measures in regulating word of mouth and likelihood 
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of switching, which are the metrics critical to gauging the quality of customer 
relationships.    
Information systems (IS) research has progressed significantly in 
expanding our understanding of online customers’ predispositions, beliefs, 
attitudes, and behavior in relation to information privacy (Dinev and Hart 
2006, Son and Kim 2008).  Earlier studies on these topics focused on 
identifying the nature of concern for information privacy in the context of 
direct marketing (Smith et al. 1996, Stewart and Segars 2002).  Subsequently, 
Malhotra et al. (2004) developed a scale of information privacy concerns 
specific to the Internet context.  IS researchers also have tried to identify the 
impact of privacy concerns on customer behaviors, such as willingness to 
release personal information, identity misrepresentation, relationship 
termination, word of mouth, and complaints (Dinev and Hart 2006, Awad and 
Krishnan 2006, Son and Kim 2008, Culnan and Williams 2009).  Furthermore, 
several IS studies have explored the strategies adopted by firms in reducing 
privacy breaches (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005, Yue and Cakanyildirim 2007).  
Although IS research deals with numerous aspects of information privacy, to 
the best of our knowledge, no research has been done to understand how 
organizational remedies to a privacy breach can change online customer 
behavior such as word of mouth and likelihood of switching (Elson and 
LeClerc 2006, Son and Kim 2008, Culnan and Williams 2009).   
The objective of this study is to enrich the IS literature by developing 
and testing a model that explains online customer behavior after a privacy 
breach; more specifically, our study focuses on an online firm’s postincident 
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recovery endeavor in mitigating the impact of a privacy breach.14  The 
overarching theory in this study is drawn from the service recovery literature, 
which posits that customers’ specific beliefs with regard to organizational 
remedies determine overall psychological evaluations, which in turn regulate 
behavior (Hoffman and Kelley 2000, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002, Smith 
and Bolton 2002).  Specifically, the justice framework is used as a theoretical 
basis in identifying consumers’ beliefs associated with the key attributes of 
privacy breach remedies (Moorman 1991, Culnan 1995).  This framework 
suggests that people evaluate privacy related issues in terms of three criteria, 
namely, distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice 
(Culnan and Bies 2003, Malhotra et al. 2004).  According to the literature, 
these justice factors have been constantly shown to be salient in the context of 
information privacy (Alge 2001, Zweig and Webster 2002, Ashworth and Free 
2006, Son and Kim 2008, Poddar et al. 2009, Wirtz and Lwin 2009).  Thus, 
we argue that these three types of justice perceptions can reasonably indicate 
the specific criteria that online customers employ in assessing organizational 
endeavor undertaken to remedy a breach incident.   
Meanwhile, we borrowed the concept of psychological responses from 
prior literature to represent general thoughts and feelings relevant to the 
context of information privacy (Pavlou and Gefen 2005, Robinson and 
Morrison 2000).  Specifically, the service recovery literature defines 
psychological responses as consumer’s cognitive and emotional responses 
                                                          
14
 Please note that our model is specifically designed for a situation in which a customer has 
been notified of a privacy breach and is now reacting to an online firm’s postincident actions 
in mitigating the impact of the breach on customer relationships.  Thus, the term “online 
customer behavior after a privacy breach” in this study refers to customers’ behavioral 
reactions to organizational remedies after an online privacy breach incident.     
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associated with a firm’s service recovery endevaor, which are represented by, 
respectively, perceived breach and feelings of violation (Morrison and 
Robinson 1997, Robinson and Morrison 2000).  Furthermore, much research 
shows that these psychological responses can be shaped by various types of 
justice perceptions jointly, instead of independently (Folger 1986, Luo 2007, 
Tang et al. 2008).  Thus, we propose not only main effects of justice 
perceptions but also their interaction effects on perceived breach and feelings 
of violation.  Our model posits that, consistent with the service recovery 
literature, online customers’ psychological responses (i.e., general thoughts 
and feelings) regulate postincident outcomes that include word of mouth and 
likelihood of switching.   
Our theoretical framework is intended to make several contributions to 
information privacy literature.  First, we attempt to extend justice theories by 
including psychological responses as mediating variables between justice 
perceptions and postincident outcomes.  Second, our conceptual model 
includes various interaction effects in addition to the simple linear 
relationships between justice perceptions and psychological responses.  Third, 
we differentiate perceived breach, which represents a cognitive response, from 
feelings of violation, which indicate an emotional response.  Finally, we are 
the first to offer a conceptual framework on the effectiveness of organizational 
responses to a privacy breach; in doing so, we carefully consider the 
specificity of the online privacy context under study (Cho et al. 2001, 
Zeithaml et al. 2002, Holloway and Beatty 2003, Forbes et al. 2005, Fan et al. 
2010).  Overall, our model is expected to contribute significantly to the body 
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of knowledge relating to online customer behavior after a privacy breach; 
moreover, the findings of this study will help managers develop effective 
organizational practices to retain desirable customer relationships after an 
incident.   
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Online Privacy Breach and Organizational Remedies 
An online privacy breach occurs when there is unauthorized access to 
or collection, use, disclosure or disposal of personal information (OPC 2008).  
Past studies have identified several common types of privacy breaches, 
including insider disclosure or theft (Rindfleisch 1997), selling personal data 
to third parties, or sharing information with third parties (Preston 2004).  
Given that a privacy breach endangers customers’ privacy, online firms are 
typically expected to uphold their moral responsibilities in implementing 
sound technical, structural, and procedural improvements to minimize the 
possibility of privacy breaches (Culnan and Williams 2009).  In order to 
reduce negative consequences, firms need to react proactively to a privacy 
breach so as to mitigate and recover from its consequences.  As shown in 
Table 4.1, a number of organizational remedies can be considered, and such 
options should be carefully evaluated in terms of their effects on customer 




Table 4.1: Key Prior Research on Service Recovery 
Authors Type of Service 
Online or 
Offline 
Organizational Remedies Major Findings 
Chuang and Cheng (2012) Banking Offline Gift vouchers and apology Both gift vouchers and apology enhanced customer satisfaction. 
DeWitt et al. (2008) Restaurants and 
hotels 
Offline Compensation adequacy, response time, 
and demonstration of concerns 
The effects of organizational recovery on behavioral loyalty were 
mediated by cognitive trust and emotions. 
Forbes et al. (2005) Online retailing Online Discounts, refunds, and apology Issues associated with website system were the most frequent 
type of online service failure. Tangible compensations (i.e., 
discounts and refunds) were most effective in enhancing 
customer satisfaction. 
Goodwin and Ross (1992) Various (i.e., auto 
repair, air travel, 
and restaurants) 
Offline Tangible compensation (i.e., refunds), 
voice (i.e., opportunity to express 
feelings), and apology 
The effect of compensation on satisfaction was enhanced by 
voice and apology. 
Grewal et al. (2008) Air travel and 
restaurants 
Offline Monetary compensation (i.e., cash 
vouchers and discounts) 
Compensation increased repurchase intentions. 
Holloway and Beatty 
(2003) 
Online retailing Online Service recovery efforts experienced (i.e., 
refund credits, recovery delays, and 
apology) 
Most dissatisfied online customers indicated that they deserved 
more (i.e., refunds) for the problems. They were critical of the 
service recovery (i.e., delays and lack of an apology). 






Service recovery performance (i.e., 
problem solving, prompt handling, 
providing an explanation, making an 
apology, and being courteous) 
The impact of service recovery performance on repurchase intent 
was fully mediated by satisfaction.  
Maxham (2001) Hairdressing Offline Recovery strategies (i.e., refunds, future 
discounts, and apology) 
Recovery strategies enhanced satisfaction, purchase intent, and 
word of mouth. 
Parasuraman et al. (2005) Online retailing Online E-recovery service quality (i.e., 
compensation, responsiveness, and 
contact) 
E-recovery service quality had consistently strong and positive 
correlations with perceived overall value and loyalty intentions. 
Smith and Bolton (2002) Restaurants and 
hotels 
Offline Recovery efforts (i.e., compensation, 
speed, and apology) 
The three types of recovery efforts significantly influenced 
customers’ overall satisfaction after service recovery. 
Smith et al. (1999) Restaurants and 
hotels 
Offline Recovery attributes (i.e., discounts, 
response speed, and apology) 
The three attributes of service recovery significantly enhanced 
overall satisfaction. 
Wirtz and Mattila (2004) Restaurants Offline Service recovery attributes (i.e., 
discounts, response immediacy, and 
apology) 




Although online privacy breaches share some features with privacy 
breaches in traditional retailing, they also exhibit significant differences.  For 
example, the ease of copying personal information implies that the damages of 
an online privacy breach may unfold over a long window because personal 
information can be easily reproduced, disseminated, and reused in the online 
environment (Zeithaml et al. 2002, Malhotra et al. 2004).  Furthermore, online 
transactions are often completed through self-service mechanisms, which tend 
to eliminate human interaction and limit relationship development; thus, the 
interaction between an online firm and its customers is likely to be thin and 
superficial in the context of service recovery (Meuter et al. 2000).  Overall, 
given the unique characteristics of an online privacy breach, it is necessary to 
consider the specificity of the online privacy context in examining the 
effectiveness of organizational remedies after a breach. 
4.2.2 The Service Recovery Perspective 
The service recovery literature offers a theoretical perspective for 
understanding customer behavior in response to organizational recovery 
efforts after an online privacy breach.  Specifically, the literature posits that 
customers’ specific beliefs with regard to organizational remedies determine 
their overall psychological evaluations of these measures (Hoffman and 
Kelley 2000, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002, Smith and Bolton 2002).  Central 
to this argument is the idea that customers’ judgment of a firm arises from 
their specific assessment of the key attributes of the firm’s service recovery 
effort (Bitner et al. 1990, Tax et al. 1998).  A growing volume of empirical 
evidence supports this perspective.  For instance, in a study on service 
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recovery encounters, Schoefer and Ennew (2005) paid special attention to 
customers’ beliefs associated with monetary compensation, waiting time, and 
service agent interactions.  Their results suggested that customers’ overall 
appraisal of the travel company was the consequence of their specific beliefs.  
Likewise, Maxham and Netemeyer (2002) found evidence of the importance 
of customers’ perceptions of fairness as determinants of their judgment of the 
company as a whole.  
Furthermore, according to the service recovery literature, customer 
behaviors are the salient consequences of their overall psychological 
evaluations of a firm’s endeavor in remedying a service failure (Maxham and 
Netemeyer 2002).  The main thrust of past research in examining 
organizational remedies has been to focus on how customers adjust their 
behavior in accordance with their overall judgments of firms after service 
recovery (e.g., Liao 2007, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002).  In a study 
examining service recovery in restaurants and hotels, DeWitt et al. (2007) 
showed that customers’ continued patronage depended on their post-recovery 
appraisal of the firm.  Likewise, Kau and Loh (2006) revealed that mobile 
users’ overall satisfaction after service recovery was an important driver of 
recommendation behavior. 
In essence, the service recovery literature highlights the importance of 
customers’ overall psychological evaluations in influencing their behavior 
after an online privacy breach incident; moreover, their overall psychological 
evaluations are the summary of customers’ specific beliefs with regard to 
organizational remedies in response to the online privacy breach. 
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4.2.3 Justice Framework 
A theoretical model for online privacy breach recovery needs to take 
into account factors that circumscribe the remedies undertaken by online 
firms. These factors are rooted in specific compensation, redress procedures, 
and explanations.  The service recovery literature suggests that the justice 
framework may serve as a useful starting point for looking at customers’ 
specific beliefs with regard to privacy breach remedies (Hoffman and Kelley 
2000, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002, Smith and Bolton 2002).  Justice (also 
often referred to as fairness) is indicative of how fairly an individual is treated 
by another individual or by an organization (Moorman 1991, Culnan 1995).  It 
is viewed as a key principle in a variety of social exchange relationships such 
as organization-employee (Tekleab et al. 2005, Howard 1999, Lee et al. 1999), 
faculty-student (Schmidt et al. 2003), editor-author (Gilliland and Beckstein 
1996), and firm-customer (Tax et al. 1998).  Unsurprisingly, a growing 
number of researchers have been studying the concept of justice to explain 
individuals’ behavior in the context of information privacy (Alge 2001, Zweig 
and Webster 2002, Ashworth and Free 2006, Son and Kim 2008, Poddar et al. 
2009, Wirtz and Lwin 2009).  A consistent finding of these justice-based 
privacy studies is that individuals’ perceptions about the fairness of a 
particular privacy situation affect how these individuals actually react to the 
situation under investigation.  In general, we believe that this justice 
perspective provides a valuable framework for examination of how people 
react to the recovery tactics online firms undertake after a privacy breach. 
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The justice framework identifies three types of justice, namely 
distributive, procedural, and interactional, all of which are particularly relevant 
in privacy breach recovery (Holloway et al. 2005).  First, distributive justice 
refers to the perceived fairness of compensation that a customer receives from 
a vendor (Homans 1961, Martínez-Tur et al. 2006).  Distributive justice is 
based on the notion of equity, which is the result of a mental comparison of 
inputs and outputs (Gilliland 1993).  This concept is also consistent with the 
privacy calculus or a cost-benefit analysis that is widely established in privacy 
research (Laufer and Wolfe 1977, Culnan and Bies 2003, Dinev and Hart 
2006).  Second, procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the 
procedure used in handling a customer’s question or feedback regarding a 
vendor’s reaction to a breach (Thibaut and Walker 1975).  Procedural justice 
differs from distributive justice because procedural justice is concerned with 
the fairness of the process in handling customer complaints, whereas 
distributive justice focuses mainly on outcomes (Greenberg 1990, Culnan and 
Armstrong 1999).  Finally, interactional justice refers to the perceived fairness 
of the interpersonal treatment with which the procedures are implemented 
(Bies and Moag 1986, Gilliland and Beckstein 1996).  Interactional justice is a 
concept that once was considered part of procedural justice but now is its own 
distinct category (Cropanzano et al. 2002).  In particular, procedural justice 
focuses on formal procedures, but interactional justice deals with such 
subtleties as respect, care, and politeness (Bies and Moag 1986). 
Prior research has drawn on the justice framework to study recovery 
tactics after service failure.  For instance, Goles et al. (2009) examined 
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delivery delay in commercial transactions. They found that when a seller was 
helpful in resolving the issue, patrons perceived less violation of their 
expectations and experienced fewer negative emotions compared to when the 
seller was not helpful.  Likewise, in a study on e-service recovery, Collier and 
Bienstock (2006) verified the importance of justice in recovering from 
damaged shipments and found that by ensuring distributive justice, procedural 
justice, and interactional justice, customers were more satisfied and happier 
with their online purchase experience.  In a study examining delivery failure 
recovery by online retailers, Lin et al. (2011) operationalized the three types of 
justice in terms of compensatory discounts, redelivery time, and politeness in 
e-mails.  Their results suggested that when the three attributes of service 
recovery were ensured, customers were more pleased and delighted with the 
online retailer.  Overall, past studies show that the justice framework forms a 
relevant theoretical basis for identifying the key attributes of organizational 
remedies after a service failure. 
4.2.4 Psychological Contract 
The service recovery literature theorizes that customers’ specific 
beliefs with regard to organizational remedies determine their overall 
psychological evaluations of firms (Hoffman and Kelley 2000, Maxham and 
Netemeyer 2002, Smith and Bolton 2002).  Whereas the justice perspective 
sheds light on the development of specific beliefs associated with the 
organizational remedies, the notion of psychological responses helps 
understand customers’ overall psychological evaluations of remedy strategies 
after a privacy breach.  Specifically, the psychological contract perspective 
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posits that social exchange partners establish a contract, which can be 
developed explicitly or implicitly, to delineate obligations between partners in 
the exchange (Morrison and Robinson 1997, Robinson and Morrison 2000).  
For instance, in a study examining IT outsourcing projects, Koh et al. (2004) 
found that a psychological contract could manifest in customers’ perceptions 
of the obligation of suppliers to deliver high quality services, demonstrate high 
professionalism, and establish clear authority structures.  Likewise, Kingshott 
and Pecotich (2007) noted that the psychological contracts that distributors 
constructed centered mainly on the suppliers’ responsibility to ensure fair 
dealing and good faith in a business exchange.  
Violation of a psychological contract occurs when an exchange partner 
fails to uphold its obligations. To illustrate, in online shopping, customers 
generally expect a retailer to ship a functional product and fulfill the delivery 
within a stated period (Parasuraman et al. 2005).  More important, customers 
typically expect their personal information, which is often required to 
complete online purchases, to be safeguarded by the retailer and used 
exclusively for the transaction (Culnan and Armstrong 1999).  Consequently, 
when an online firm fails to recover from a privacy breach, customers are 
likely to think the firm has violated the psychological contact because it is not 
only incompetent in safeguarding customer information but also is unable to 
remedy the issue (Wang and Huff 2007).   
According to the psychological contract perspective, when a contract is 
not honored, individuals react psychologically with cognitive and emotional 
responses (Morrison and Robinson 1997, Robinson and Morrison 2000).  A 
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cognitive response occurs as a result of a deliberate calculation of whether the 
firm’s treatment meets or falls short of the psychological contract (Pavlou and 
Gefen 2005).  The service recovery literature suggests that a cognitive 
response is predominately shaped by compensation adequacy and procedural 
fairness.  Although adequate compensation ensures equity in offsetting 
damages associated with the privacy breach, fair procedures assure a formal 
process that leads to an equitable outcome (Culnan and Bies 2003).  In 
contrast, an emotional response transcends a mere cognitive appraisal of an 
event and relates instead to feelings of distress associated with the firm’s lack 
of faithfulness and oversight (Schoefer and Ennew 2005).  Past research that 
examined service recovery suggests that an emotional response can be 
especially sensitive to reparation and interpersonal treatment.  Inadequate 
reparation not only contributes to customers’ perceptions of a breach of the 
psychological contract but also triggers feelings of contract violation 
(Grégoire and Fisher 2008).  Poor interpersonal treatment is experienced when 
customers undergo bad social interactions, such as personal slights, demeaning 
offenses, or disrespectful actions, which are known to arouse a sense of 
violation (Barclay et al. 2005).  In the literature, these cognitive and emotional 
dimensions are represented, respectively, by perceived breach and feelings of 
violation (Morrison and Robinson 1997, Robinson and Morrison 2000).  We 
define perceived breach as an overall cognitive judgment concerning a 
particular privacy-related incident as well as the measures taken by a company 
in addressing the incident (Pavlou and Gefen 2005).15  Feelings of violation 
                                                          
15
 The concept of perceived breach does not represent one’s perception about the extent of a 
privacy breach itself.  Rather it indicates a deliberate judgment of whether the firm has 
fulfilled its responsibilities to recover from a breach incident.    
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are defined as the emotional state of betrayal or distress that a customer feels 
toward a vendor after a privacy breach recovery (Morrison and Robinson 
1997).   
In sum, used as the overarching framework in this study, the service 
recovery literature postulates that customers’ specific justice perceptions with 
regard to organizational remedies determine overall psychological evaluations, 
which are summarized into perceived breach and feelings of violation.  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that customers’ overall psychological 
evaluations, in turn, regulate their behavior after service recovery. 
4.3 RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
By drawing on the service recovery literature, we proposed our 
conceptual model, which is presented in Figure 4.1.  In general, the model 
shows that customers’ justice perceptions as specific beliefs determine 
psychological responses as overall evaluations, which in turn, influence 
postincident outcomes.  We first developed research hypotheses concerning 
the relationships between justice perceptions and psychological responses 
(H1-H3).  Subsequently, we offer theoretical explanations of the impact of the 
interaction between justice perceptions on psychological responses (H4-H5).  
Finally, we hypothesize the effects that psychological responses have on 






Figure 4.1. Study III Research Model 
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4.3.1Justice Perceptions and Psychological Reactions 
Distributive justice is especially important in reducing perceived 
breach of psychological contract in online privacy breach recovery.  In the 
online environment, to complete commercial transactions, customers are 
typically required to provide personal information to online firms with which 
they often lack a history of interpersonal relations (Culnan and Armstrong 
1999).  As a result, customers in general assume that the online firm will 
safeguard their information (Bart et al. 2005).  A privacy breach essentially 
challenges customers’ cost assessment by exposing them to unforeseen 
damages such as identity theft and credit card fraud (Zeithaml et al. 2002).  
Although many are dissatisfied by the unexpected privacy loss, customers are 
likely to react less negatively when the online firm, despite the lack of 
interpersonal relationships, ensures distributive justice in privacy breach 
recovery (Holloway et al. 2005).  Distributive justice is often maintained 
through the provision of monetary compensation, such as refunds, rebates, and 
future discounts.  In online privacy breach recovery, an adequate monetary 
compensation is particularly important because it categorically restores the 
balance of personal information exchange (Li et al. 2011). Indeed, recent IS 
studies offer empirical evidence that monetary compensation is particularly 
important in shaping customers’ cognitive response to privacy issues in the 
online environment.  For instance, Xie et al. (2006) found that monetary 
compensation helped address the disutility of personal information disclosure 
in online transactions.  Likewise, in a study on location-based services, Xu et 
al. (2009) revealed that distributive justice addressed users’ negative 
perceptions associated with the exposure of locality information to online 
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companies.  In essence, by compensating for the costs inflicted by a privacy 
breach, distributive justice restores equity in online transactions and hence 
alleviates customers’ negative perceptions towards the breach of psychological 
contract.  Thus, we hypothesize that perceived breach will decrease (increase) 
as distributive justice increases (decreases).   
H1 (a): Distributive justice will be related negatively to perceived 
breach. 
The appraisal-tendency framework posits that negative emotions arise 
from individuals’ appraisal of responsibility for negative events (Lerner and 
Kelter 2000).  Especially, when others are responsible for the negative events, 
individuals experience negative emotions, such as anger, dejection, and 
agitation.  Similarly, customers often experience strong negative emotions in 
online privacy breaches.  This is because when customers provide personal 
information in online transactions, they generally expect the online firms to be 
responsible in properly managing their information (Wang and Huff 2007).  
As a result, in recovery from an online privacy breach, customers’ appraisal of 
a firm’s responsibility for the privacy loss arouses negative emotions.   
Distributive justice is especially important in addressing customers’ 
feelings of violation in online privacy breach recovery.  Given the lack of 
personal relationships in online commercial transactions, customers may be 
highly anxious about the firm’s commitment to safeguarding their privacy.  By 
ensuring distributive justice, customers could ascertain the online firm’s 
faithfulness in upholding its responsibility in the recovery and hence reduce 
their feelings of displeasure or hostility (Clayton 1992; Markovsky 1988).  
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Furthermore, distributive justice helps ensure adequate reparation, which is a 
key remedy for customers’ emotional feelings triggered by online privacy 
breaches.  Evidence suggests that distributive justice is of particular 
importance to customers’ emotional responses about online privacy issues.  
For instance, Hann et al. (2007) found that monetary compensations reduced 
customers’ feelings of insecurity and vulnerability that stemmed from online 
privacy failures.  Thus, we hypothesize that feelings of violation will decrease 
(increase) as distributive justice increases (decreases).   
H1 (b): Distributive justice will be related negatively to feelings of 
violation. 
Although compensation may not satisfy all victims of a privacy breach, 
these victims often want to ensure that procedural justice is maintained in 
service recovery, i.e., that the process in which they are compensated is 
consistent, fair, and reasonable (Rahim et al. 2000; Brockners et al. 1994).  
According to the psychological contract perspective, customers’ cognitive 
response (i.e., perceived breach) is predominately determined by the outcome 
and the procedure that leads to the outcome (Morrison and Robinson 1997).  
In particular, the procedural justice literature argues that when customers 
perceive a high degree of fairness in the outcome allocation procedure, they 
believe outcome equity is ensued (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996).  Because a 
fair procedure helps assure equity restoration, procedural justice is likely to 
have a prominent impact on cognitive response (Folger and Konovsky 1989).  
Indeed, past research suggests that procedural justice in online service 
recovery is especially important in evoking a cognitive response because 
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service representatives and customers usually do not physically meet each 
other (Holloway and Beatty 2003).  Since customers are separated from the 
actual recovery process in the online environment, they often have limited 
access to the procedures this process entails.  Consequently, customers may be 
forced to rely entirely on the firm’s website to learn about the recovery 
policies.  Difficulty in obtaining information through the firm’s website leads 
customers to question the justice of service recovery procedures and 
intensifies their dissatisfaction with the firm (Cho et al. 2001). 
Research has shown that procedural justice ranks among the most 
essential practices that online companies can use to placate customers whose 
privacy is at risk (e.g., Collier and Bienstock 2006).  In online privacy breach 
recovery, procedural justice manifests in terms of organizational mechanisms 
through which customers can be informed about the recovery process, such as 
how the privacy breach was identified, what information was leaked, and what 
safeguards are in place to resolve the privacy failure (Stevens 2010).  A high 
degree of procedural justice helps overcome the lack of physical interaction by 
increasing the transparency of privacy breach recovery procedures and 
assuring customers about the firm’s fair practices in addressing privacy issues 
(Culnan and Bies 2003).  As a result, when customers perceive a high degree 
of procedural justice in privacy breach recovery, they conclude that the online 
firm is taking steps to ensure equity in the recovery.  Thus, in online privacy 
recovery, it is reasonable to expect that fair procedures (e.g., thorough 
descriptions of the decision-making processes) reduce customers’ perceived 
breach of a psychological contract.  Therefore,  
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H2: Procedural justice will be related negatively to perceived breach.  
The psychological contract perspective posits that the personal 
interaction process individuals experience plays a prevailing role in shaping 
emotional responses (Morrison and Robinson 1997).  According to this 
perspective, feelings of violation are particularly sensitive to negative social 
experience and hence do not require deliberate reflection (Rousseau 1989).  
Similarly, in the service recovery context, ample evidence suggests that 
interactional justice plays a key role in shaping customers’ emotional reactions 
associated with service recovery.  For example, Chebat and Slusarczyk (2005) 
surveyed bank customers on their service recovery experience and found that 
their negative emotions could be reduced when they received respectful and 
pleasant treatment from bank staffs.  In addition, Moorman (1991) 
demonstrated, after controlling for distributive and procedural justice, that 
interactional justice has a positive impact on job satisfaction.  Customers who 
feel they are not treated with respect are likely to regard a situation as 
unacceptable and also to have negative feelings toward the vendor.   
The effects of interactional justice on emotions are particularly evident 
in recovery endeavor from an online privacy breach (Gu 2010).  This is 
because an online privacy breach not only entails explicit damage, such as 
financial loss and wasted time, but also engenders immense negative 
emotions, such as anger, hurt, and frustration (Lewicki and Bunker 1996).  
Furthermore, given the lack of established interpersonal relationships, 
customers are especially likely to feel disregarded by the online firm and 
develop aversive feelings (Bart et al. 2005).  Lack of apologies not only 
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worsens customers’ distress, but also makes them doubt the online firm’s 
sincerity in accepting responsibility (Holloway and Beatty 2003).  In essence, 
when an online business does not handle privacy breach recovery with 
interactional justice, customers are likely to experience negative emotions.  
Therefore, we propose that interactional justice is negatively related to 
feelings of violation.      
H3: Interactional justice will be related negatively to feelings of 
violation. 
4.3.2 Interactions between Justice Perceptions 
Referent cognitions theory (RCT) offers an explanation for the joint 
effect of distributive justice and procedural justice on subsequent cognitive 
reactions (Folger 1986).  Specifically, this theory states that individuals tend to 
evaluate outcomes (i.e., distributive justice) based on whether fair procedures 
are followed (i.e., procedural justice).  When people have a high opinion of the 
fairness of the procedures followed, they would be less sensitive to outcome 
equity in service recovery.  However, if they perceive the procedures as unfair, 
they are more likely to focus on attaining an equitable outcome (Brockner et 
al. 1994).  Thus, according to RCT, the question of whether fair procedures 
were faithfully followed moderates the way people cognitively evaluate 
outcome equity.  In particular, RCT predicts that when procedural justice is 
ranked higher, the effect of distributive justice on cognitive response becomes 
weaker; in contrast, when procedural justice is ranked lower, its effect 
becomes stronger.   
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RCT is considered an informative perspective in explaining individual 
behavior in recovery from an online privacy breach.  Whereas relationships in 
traditional business settings are predominately built through personal 
interaction, they are typically maintained online with little person-to-person 
contact.  Indeed, customers often interact with an online firm through self-
service technology.  Thus, in the absence of direct contact, procedural justice 
is considered the actual reflection of the online firm’s compliance with 
principles of fair information practice (FIP) (Culnan and Bies 2003).  When 
procedural justice is high, customers can be assured that the online firm has 
followed the industry guidelines and privacy laws in providing equitable 
compensation, thereby reducing their sensitivity toward distributive justice 
(Tang et al. 2008).  However, when procedural justice is amiss, equitable 
compensation for the firm’s negligence cannot be guaranteed; hence, 
customers’ sensitivity toward distributive justice is likely heightened.  Taken 
together, in the domain of online privacy breach recovery, customers who are 
satisfied with organizational procedures tend to perceive the monetary reward 
as acceptable; therefore, procedural justice could complement distributive 
justice in affecting perceived breach. Thus,  
H4: The relationship between distributive justice and perceived breach 
will decrease (increase) as procedural justice increases (decreases).  
The cognitive appraisal model of emotion holds that the effect of 
outcome appraisal on emotions is moderated by the judgment of the outcome 
allocation experience (Montada 1994).  According to the model, an 
individual’s emotional response begins with an appraisal of an outcome as 
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either harmful or beneficial (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996).  Essentially, when 
the outcome is undesirable, negative emotions emanate.  This outcome 
appraisal is coupled with an experience appraisal, which involves an 
evaluation of the way individuals are treated in the course of receiving the 
outcome (Weiss et al. 1999).  In service recovery, customers typically expect 
to be treated with respect and dignity; otherwise they would blame not only 
the service representative but also the firm for being irresponsible (Chebat and 
Slusarczyk 2005).  Because the assignment of blame has a strong effect on 
negative emotions (Ortony et al. 1988), when customers experience poor 
interpersonal treatment, the effects of the outcome assessment on customers’ 
emotional response will be emphasized.  The earlier discussion leads us to 
expect that customers who are treated respectfully would more likely consider 
the monetary reward reasonable, and thereby, interactional justice could 
complement distributive justice in affecting feelings of violation.   
In online privacy breach recovery, when interactional justice is high, 
customers would find the service representative sincere and helpful in 
addressing the privacy failure incident.  As the service representative 
represents the online firm in privacy recovery, customers would be assured 
that the firm is accepting its responsibility, and hence their emotional response 
will be less aroused by distributive justice.  By contrast, when interactional 
justice is low, customers would find the service representative disrespectful 
and lacking empathy.  Consequently, they might become especially angry that 
the online firm is not accepting its responsibility.  In such a case, they are 
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more likely to consider the firm irresponsible and thus increase the impact of 
distributive justice in arousing feelings of violation.  Thus,  
H5: The relationship between distributive justice and feelings of 
violation will decrease (increase) as interactional justice increases (decreases). 
4.3.3 Determinants of Postincident Outcomes 
Customer behavior takes on a myriad of forms such as repurchases, 
paying a premium, and interest in alternatives (Dick and Basu 1994, 
Bendapudi and Berry 1997, Kim and Son 2009).  Nevertheless, two behavioral 
outcomes, namely, word of mouth and likelihood of switching, have been the 
focus of attention among researchers and practitioners (Zeithaml et al. 1996).   
Word of mouth refers to the extent to which an individual intends to 
recommend, or say positive things about, a service to others (Srinivasan et al. 
2002).  Serving as a reference is risky because it involves the potential of 
tarnishing the social image or credibility of the person making the reference.  
Thus, a referral represents the ultimate form of a customer’s dedication to a 
firm (Jones and Sasser 1995).  In this regard, research shows that word of 
mouth — which represents a customer’s willingness to recommend a firm’s 
product or service to others — is a more powerful predictor of a firm’s 
revenue growth than customer loyalty, customer satisfaction, or intent to 
repurchase (Reichheld 2003).  Moreover, the significance of word of mouth is 
being amplified in the Internet age because opinions spread freely with few 
barriers of time, space, or socioeconomic status (Reichheld and Schefter 
2000).  A number of IS studies have been conducted to explain individuals’ 
willingness to recommend within the context of online business (Gefen 2002, 
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Kim et al 2002, Mithas et al 2006, Kim and Son 2009).  Furthermore, word of 
mouth has been the focus of much information privacy research designed to 
gauge the effect of privacy perceptions on customer behavior (Son and Kim 
2008, Taylor et al. 2009).  In particular, Culnan and Williams (2009) argued 
that service providers are essentially in “the reputation business,” and thus it is 
important for them to cultivate “a culture of privacy” (p. 683).  Therefore, it is 
important to examine the determinants of word of mouth for a better 
understanding of online customers’ reactions to privacy breach recovery.       
Likelihood of switching is defined as the extent to which a customer 
intends to leave his or her current vendor (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Acquiring 
a new customer is expensive because of such “one-time” activities as 
advertising, promotions, account setup, etc. (Reichheld and Sasser 1990).  A 
firm loses the opportunity to maximize the return from the initial investment if 
the new customer defects without subsequent transactions.  Thus, customer 
retention is said to be one of the most critical factors affecting the bottom line 
of a business (Reichheld and Schefter 2000).  In fact, Reichheld and Sasser 
(1990) showed that a 5% decrease in defection rates leads to an increase in 
profits of 25% to 85%.  Moreover, the one-time costs of acquiring an online 
customer are known to be considerably higher than the costs of acquiring a 
traditional customer (Reichheld and Schefter 2000).  Accordingly, it is 
important for an online firm to understand the mechanism that keeps a 
customer from switching to an alternative vendor.  An increasing number of IS 
researchers are trying to understand what facilitates or deters one’s switching 
to an alternative online service (Chen and Hitt 2002, Kim and Son 2009, Ray 
142 
 
et al. 2011).  Similarly, some studies of information privacy have paid 
attention to the causal link between privacy perceptions and switching 
behavior (Elson and LeClerc 2006, Son and Kim 2008).  Thus, it is important 
to investigate how privacy breach recovery affects online customers’ intention 
to switch to another vendor.   
As shown in Figure 4.1, two types of postincident outcomes are 
examined in this study, namely, post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of 
switching.16  Post-word of mouth refers to the level of word of mouth activity 
after a vendor fails to protect personal information.  Similarly, post-likelihood 
of switching refers to the likelihood of switching after a vendor fails to protect 
personal information.  Although preincident outcomes drive postincident 
outcomes, customer behavior may not stay the same as before after personal 
information is compromised.  Specifically, our model posits that in the context 
of online privacy, customers’ overall psychological evaluations of a firm’s 
recovery practices, i.e., perceived breach and feelings of violation, affect 
behavioral outcomes, i.e., post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of 
switching.  The service recovery literature suggests that in online service 
failures and recovery settings, customer behaviors are mainly a function of 
customers’ overall psychological evaluations of recovery practices (Hoffman 
and Kelley 2000, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002).  This is because in the 
online context, customers rarely have human contact with an online firm, and 
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 In IS literature, individuals’ privacy-protective responses are classified into three categories: 
(1) information provision (e.g., refusal, misrepresentation), (2) private action (e.g., negative 
word of mouth, removal of personal information), and (3) public action (e.g., complaining) 
(Son and Kim 2008).  The postincident outcomes examined in this study correspond to the 




the lack of personal interaction makes it difficult for them to build a close 
relational bond.  As a result, customers tend to base their behavioral decisions 
on their overall psychological evaluations, i.e., perceived breach and feelings 
of violation, instead of on other long-term relational considerations (e.g., trust 
and loyalty).   
Subscribing to this rationale, we expect perceived breach to affect both 
post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of switching after a privacy breach 
recovery.  Past research has clearly demonstrated the impact of perceived 
breach on customer behavior.  For instance, in the context of online privacy, 
Poddar et al. (2009) found that because online exchanges lack physical 
contact, online customer behavior in the presence of a privacy threat is 
influenced more by what people think about the situation than by their prior 
relationship with the online vendor.  This finding is consistent with Oliver’s 
(1999) claim that when relational bonds are not strongly established, cognitive 
factors play a dominant role in regulating customer behavior (Forbes et al. 
2005).  Thus, we hypothesize that in a situation in which an online firm 
attempts to recover from a breach incident, perceived breach will affect 
customer behaviors such as post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of 
switching.     
H6 (a): Perceived breach will be negatively related to post-word of 
mouth.  




The discussion mentioned previously indicates that emotional 
responses such as feelings of violation are more likely to be salient in online 
privacy settings than in other contexts as the determinants of customer 
behavior.  Empirical evidence suggests the important role of feelings of 
violation on online customer behavior in the context of information privacy 
(Son and Kim 2008, Youn 2009).  For example, Son and Kim (2008) showed 
that individuals’ feelings toward information privacy drive information 
privacy-protective actions (e.g., refusal, negative word of mouth, complaints).  
Along the same line, Youn (2009) also found that affective components affect 
privacy protection behaviors (e.g., confrontation and avoidance).  Taken 
together, it is reasonable to argue that emotional responses to privacy breach 
recovery affect whether online customer say positive things to others and 
whether they eventually switch to an alternative vendor.   
H7 (a): Feelings of violation will be negatively related to post-word of 
mouth.  
H7 (b): Feelings of violation will be positively related to post-
likelihood of switching. 
4.3.4 Controlled Effects 
We included in the model a number of control variables that might 
affect online customer behavior.  The literature on information privacy holds 
that older people worry more than younger people about their privacy (Culnan 
1995, Malhotra et al. 2004).  In addition, women have been shown to be more 
concerned than men about privacy (Milne and Rohm 2000).  Thus, age and 
gender are included as control variables in the study.  Meanwhile, to reflect 
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customer experience and usage of a website, we included experience and 
website usage.  Experience refers to the time elapsed since a customer’s first 
use of a website, whereas website usage reflects frequency.  Several studies 
have shown that both of these variables influence customer behavior (Sun et 
al. 2006, Soderlund 2002, Humphrey et al. 2004).  Besides individual 
characteristics, we incorporated in the model two types of beliefs, namely 
perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use.  Perceived usefulness is 
defined by the utilitarian value that an individual receives from using an online 
vendor.  Such benefits include thorough descriptions of products, variety of 
product offerings, price discounts, and personalized services (Mathwick et al. 
2001).  In contrast, perceived ease-of-use refers to the degree to which a 
customer finds that dealing with the online vendor is effortless (Davis et al. 
1989).  This encompasses the navigation of websites, the layout of Web pages, 
the convenience of finding information and ordering products, and similar 
activities.  Much research shows that these types of beliefs, identified in the 
widely known technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis et al. 1989), play 
an important role in determining online customer behavior (Koufaris 2002, 
Devaraj et al. 2002, Gefen et al. 2003).     
Customers inevitably take a risk when they release their personal 
information to a vendor.  In such a risky environment, trust in a vendor is 
known to play an important role in regulating customer behavior (Gefen et al. 
2003, van der Heijden et al. 2003).  In IS research, trusting beliefs and risk 
beliefs have often been chosen to represent the trust-risk notion.  Trusting 
beliefs are defined as the degree to which a customer believes that a vendor 
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will behave in a trustworthy way.  Specifically, trusting beliefs are assumed to 
reflect three dimensions, namely, benevolence, integrity, and competence 
(McKnight et al. 2002).  Meanwhile, risk beliefs refer to the degree to which a 
customer foresees a high potential for loss associated with transactions with a 
vendor (Malhotra et al. 2004).  In particular, risk beliefs in this study are 
thought to represent financial, performance, and psychological losses involved 
in transactions with an online store (Murray and Schlacter 1990).  Trust and 
risk factors have been shown to exert significant effects on behavioral 
outcomes such as cooperation (Morgan and Hunt 1994), attitudes toward 
online purchasing (van der Heijden 2003), willingness to buy (Jarvenpaa and 
Tractinsky 1999), and intended use (Gefen et al. 2003).   
In addition, loyalty and switching costs were chosen in this study as 
control variables because of their potential effect on online customer behavior.  
Whereas loyalty refers to a consumer’s deeply held affective commitment 
toward a vendor (Beatty and Kahle 1988, Oliver 1999), switching costs refer 
to the time, money, and psychological and physical effort associated with the 
process of switching from one vendor to a new one (Burnham et al. 2003, 
Jones et al. 2002).  Loyalty is shown to affect such variables as usage 
intention, word of mouth, and likelihood of switching (Taylor and Hunter 
2002, Henning-Thurau et al. 2002, Kim and Son 2009).  Research also shows 
that switching costs affect various outcomes such as the search for alternatives 
and willingness to pay a premium (Weiss and Heide 1993, Zauberman 2003, 
Kim and Son 2009).  As shown in Figure 4.1, loyalty and switching costs as 
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well as other variables mentioned previously are controlled for to explain both 
psychological responses and postincident outcomes. 
Meanwhile, much research suggests that prior decisions serve as the 
basis for the formation of subsequent decisions (Kim and Malhotra 2005, Kim 
2009).  Thus, postincident outcomes are likely to be determined, at least to 
some extent, by pre-word of mouth and pre-likelihood of switching that were 
made before the privacy-related incident.  Consequently, the model includes 
pre-word of mouth and pre-likelihood of switching as control variables.  In 
addition, we also controlled for the effects of justice perceptions on 
postincident outcomes to determine if there are spillover effects that go 
beyond the mediating effects of psychological responses.  
4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Research Setting 
This research employed a scenario-based experiment that integrates the 
characteristics of field surveys and lab experiments (Malhotra 2004).  In 
privacy research, a real-world environment is critical to data collection 
because one’s sense of privacy is shaped, to a large extent, by the relational 
bond with the other party (Petronio 1991).  Thus, we ensured that subjects had 
a realistic sense about doing business with an online vendor in order for them 
to respond meaningfully to our questionnaire.  Meanwhile, although our study 
focuses on customers’ reactions to privacy breaches, it is impractical to 
presume that all the subjects suffered a significant privacy problem with the 
vendor in question.  Accordingly, we relied on the simulation of a privacy-
related incident using a scenario-creation method that has been widely used in 
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privacy research (e.g., Nowak and Phelps 1992, Sheehan and Hoy 2000).  In 
summary, we used a survey questionnaire to measure customers’ perceptions 
about an actual store while manipulating their treatment through hypothetical 
scenarios.   
In this study, subjects were given a Web-based survey questionnaire.  
In the questionnaire, the subjects were first asked to indicate the name of an 
online vendor they had used in the past year.  In information privacy research, 
online vendors have often been used as partners with which individual 
customers interact for the social exchange of personal information (Malhotra 
et al. 2004, Dinev and Hart 2006, Son and Kim 2008).  Following the tradition 
of this stream of research, we also chose online vendors as our study context.  
Consequently, if a subject had not used an online vendor in the past year, that 
person was excluded from further consideration.  The questionnaire then asked 
the remaining subjects to express their perceptions about the online vendor.  In 
particular, we measured research variables such as trusting beliefs, risk beliefs, 
loyalty, switching costs, pre-word of mouth and pre-likelihood of switching.     
After measuring the subjects’ perceptions of the online vendor, we 
randomly presented one of the eight scenarios to each of the subjects.  The 
scenarios asked the subjects to imagine that they had just received an e-mail 
from the online vendor that they had named earlier.  The message of the e-
mail was that hackers had stolen their credit card information.  The e-mail 
message contained a description of the specific remedial steps taken by the 
online vendor.  These steps addressed three categories of justice, i.e., 
distributive, procedural, and interactional.  For each category of justice, we 
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developed high and low conditions.  Thus, the experimental design is a 2x2x2 
fully crossed between-subjects arrangement.  Once a scenario was presented, 
the subjects were instructed to answer the subsequent questions based on the 
given scenario.  The research variables specific to the scenario were 
distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, perceived breach, 
feelings of violation, post-word of mouth, and post-likelihood of switching.   
4.4.2 Data Collection 
An initial version of a Web-based survey questionnaire was developed 
to check the accuracy, suitability, and usability of the survey system.  We 
created only two scenarios for a pilot test, and each questionnaire was 
associated with one of the two scenarios.  In one scenario, the experimental 
conditions were all high on the three categories of justice.  In contrast, in the 
other scenario, all three justice categories were manipulated to be low.  This 
arrangement helped us evaluate the validity of justice manipulation as well as 
the quality of the questionnaire and its instructions by using only two 
scenarios instead of the eight that would have been required for a 2x2x2 
standard factorial design.  To recruit subjects for a pilot test, we used a market 
research firm that maintains a panel of U.S.-based Internet users.  We 
collected responses from 45 subjects for the high condition and from 41 
subjects for the low condition.  Based on the subjects’ responses and 
comments, we further clarified items, scenarios, and instructions in the 
questionnaire.    
For the main study, we developed eight different survey questionnaires 
that contained experimental conditions that varied across the three categories 
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of justice (i.e., a 2x2x2 factorial design).  We used the same market research 
firm to collect the data necessary for the main test.  A sample frame of panel 
members between the ages of 30 and 59 was drawn up.  The rationale behind 
the selection of this middle-aged group was that loss of personal information 
was expected to carry more realistic implications for this mature group than 
for the students often used in other studies.17  An e-mail invitation — 
including a link to a Web-based survey questionnaire with one of the eight 
case scenarios — was sent to 6,539 U.S.-based members who had been 
randomly selected from the panel pool.  Subjects were notified that 
participation was voluntary and that only aggregate data that contained no 
personally identifiable information would be used.  A small cash reward 
deposited to PayPal or similar online accounts was offered for a completed 
response.  The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the eight groups.  
The Web-based survey ran for two weeks, and we collected 1,036 responses, 
representing a complete response rate of 15.8%.  However, 29 responses were 
not usable because they did not meet the age criterion.  As a result, a total of 
1,007 usable responses were considered for data analysis, which yielded an 
effective response rate of 15.4%.  The response rate, although not high, was 
                                                          
17
 According to PEW (2009), the middle-aged group (30 to 59 years old) makes up about 58% 
of the Internet population in the U.S., while the younger group (younger than 29) and the 
elderly group (older than 60) represent about 31% and 11% of the Internet population.  
Furthermore, according to the Census Bureau (2008), the average income for the middle-aged 
group is about $46,908, whereas average incomes for the younger and elderly groups are, 
respectively, about $23,334 and $37,051.  These statistics indicate that the segment from 30 to 
59 years old makes up a majority of Internet users,  and it is relatively well off.  In fact, the 
Federal Trade Commission (2009) indicates that 71% of fraud complaints (i.e., credit card and 
government benefits fraud, and personal identity thefts) are reported by the middle-aged 
group, whereas the younger and elderly groups account, respectively, for 21% and 8% of the 
complaints.  Hence, the middle-aged group is more sensitive to the security of personal 
financial data, and loss of privacy information, such as the breach of credit card information 
used in our scenario, is more relevant to this group. 
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quite typical of survey research.  For example, other researchers have reported 
similar response rates when e-mail was used to recruit participants (e.g., Son 
et al. 2006, Hui et al. 2007, Pavlou and Gefen 2004).  The sample was split 
into early and late respondents and t-tests found no difference in the means of 
any research variables. The average age of subjects was 48, and 55% were 
female.  The range of average ages across the eight groups spanned from 
47.92 to 48.79.  Female were found to consist of 47% to 62% of the groups.  
No significant differences existed between the eight groups in terms of age 
and gender (ps > 0.05).  We compared the profiles of both respondents and 
nonrespondents in terms of age and gender and found no statistically 
significant differences between the two groups (ps > 0.05). 
4.4.3 Measures and Scenarios 
To measure the research variables, we adapted existing scales whose 
psychometric properties are established in the literature (see Appendix G for 
measurement items and scenarios).  These measures were grouped into three 
parts in the survey questionnaire, i.e., Parts A, B, and C.  The first part 
measures individuals’ perceptions about an online vendor.  These measures 
were not specific to any scenarios.  In Part B, one of the eight scenarios was 
presented, and then the subsequent measures were designed to be specific to 
the particular scenario.  Finally, Part C included measures such as 
demographic characteristics and other general items that are not specific to a 
scenario.   
Part A. We used three items adapted from Agarwal and Karahanna 
(2000) to measure perceived usefulness.  Three perceived ease-of-use items 
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also were borrowed from Agarwal and Karahanna (2000).  The trusting beliefs 
scale, which consists of four items, was adapted from the 11-item McKnight et 
al. (2002) scale.  To capture risk beliefs, three items were adapted from 
Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky (1999).  Three items were adapted from Kim and 
Son (2009) to capture loyalty.  The three switching costs items were adapted 
from Kim and Son (2009).  Pre-word of mouth was measured with three items 
adapted from Kim and Son (2009).  To capture pre-likelihood of switching, 
three items were developed based on the measures of “alternative/switching 
experience” in Jones et al. (2002). 
Part B. The scenarios in this study described various situations in 
which customers were informed via e-mail about a compromise of their credit 
card information.18  In the distributive justice category, we manipulated the 
amount of a cash coupon offered by the vendor as part of an apology.19  
Specifically, subjects in the high distributive justice condition would receive a 
$100 cash coupon as an apology, whereas those in the low distributive justice 
condition would receive a $10 cash coupon. In the procedural justice category, 
ease or difficulty of finding contact information for customer service was 
manipulated.  In particular, in the high procedural justice condition, subjects 
would be told that the contact information of the online store would be easily 
found on its homepage, but they would be required to spend some time to 
                                                          
18
 Disclosure of credit card information is classified as a type of privacy breach (Culnan and 
Williams 2009).  In the case of such a security breach, companies must immediately report the 
incidence to customers in an e-mail or letter (Privacy Rights Clearing House 2013).   
19
 We chose $100 versus $10 for the high versus low values for distributive justice.  
According to U.S. Law (FTC 1986), individuals’ financial liability for an unauthorized credit 
card transaction is capped at $50.  This evidence shows that $100 is considered adequate 
compensation for financial liability, whereas $10 is inadequate.  In fact, TJX compensated its 
customers affected by privacy breaches with vouchers up to $60 (Schuman 2007).  Thus, we 
believe that the levels of compensation supplied in the scenarios are realistic.  The soundness 
of these experimental manipulations will be revisited in Section 4.2.  
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locate the information in the low procedural justice condition. Finally, in the 
interactional justice category, we varied the apologetic tone of a script of a 
voice message left on a customer’s phone by a service representative of the 
vendor. Specifically, in the high interactional justice condition, subjects would 
receive a voice message that was apologetic and offered explanation about the 
incident, whereas they would a voice message with brief explanations in the 
low interactional justice condition. After a particular scenario, the measures 
specific to the particular scenario were followed.  First of all, distributive 
justice was measured with three items adapted from Blodgett et al. (1997) and 
Price and Mueller (1986).  The procedural justice scale consisted of three 
items adapted from Moorman (1991).  We used four items adapted from 
Blodgett et al. (1997) and Moorman (1991) to measure interactional justice.  
The three perceived breach items were modified from a scale created by 
Pavlou and Gefen (2005).  Feelings of violation were measured with three 
items, two of which were borrowed from the anger scale developed by 
Bonifield and Cole (2007), and the other was borrowed from the feelings of 
violation scale created by Robinson and Morrison (2000).  Post-word of mouth 
and post-likelihood of switching were measured with the same scales of pre-
word of mouth and pre-likelihood of switching, respectively.   
Part C. We included a three-item fantasizing scale adapted from 
O’Guinn and Faber (1989) as a way to represent a marker variable.  This 
marker variable was intended to help assess the extent of common method 
variance (CMV) (Lindell and Whitney 2001, Malhotra et al. 2006).  Finally, 
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other variables such as age, gender, experience, and website usage were 
measured with single-item scales.     
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.5.1 Measurement Model 
We used six different fit indices to evaluate model fit: the comparative 
fit index (CFI), the nonnormed fit index (NNFI), the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), and the adjusted goodness of fit 
(AGFI).  According to the literature, the fit indices criteria for an acceptable 
model are as follows: CFI ≥ 0.95, NNFI ≥ 0.95, RMSEA ≤ 0.06, SRMR ≤ 
0.08; GFI ≥ 0.90, and AGFI ≥ 0.80 (Hu and Bentler 1999, Bearden et al. 1993, 
Gefen et al. 2000).  Our measurement model included 15 multi-item factors 
with 47 corresponding indicators.  In addition to the multi-item factors, the 
model included four one-item variables such as age, gender, experience, and 
website usage.  The results of CFA showed that the measurement model was a 
highly satisfactory fit for the data: χ2 (1057) = 2059.67, p <0.001, CFI = 0.99, 
NNFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.031, SRMR = 0.021, GFI = 0.93, AGFI = 0.91.  
Table 4.2 shows the means, standard deviations, composite reliability (CR), 
average variance extracted (AVE), and correlations of the measures based on 
the measurement model.    
Besides model fit, we checked the convergent validity of the scales.  
Convergent validity is considered satisfactory if the factor loading of an 
indicator is 0.60 or higher (Chin et al. 1997).  We inspected the output of 
LISREL 8 and found that among the indicators examined, the lowest loading 
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was 0.68.  This result indicated an acceptable convergent validity for the 
measures.  Subsequently, we examined the discriminant validity of the scales.  
Specifically, as a way to check if two scales were empirically differentiable, 
we performed a chi-square difference test for each pair of the factors (Bagozzi 
and Yi 1988).  The results of the chi-square difference tests indicated that none 
of the pairs was considered statistically the same, which supported 
discriminant validity.  In addition to convergent and discriminant validity, we 
also evaluated the reliability of the scales.  The reliability of the scales was 
examined through two criteria, namely, CR and AVE.  Reliability is said to be 
acceptable when CR ≥ 0.70 and AVE ≥ 0.50 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988, Fornell 
and Larcker 1981).  As Table 4.2 shows, the minimum CR and AVE values, 




Table 4.2: Properties of Measurement Scales 
      Correlation 
 ME SD CR AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. AGE 48.41 6.90 na na  1                   
2. GEN 1.55 0.50 na na  -0.07 1                  
3. EXP 5.63 3.71 na na  -0.02 -0.07 1                 
4. WU 5.16 1.68 na na  -0.07 -0.02 -0.30 1                
5. PU 5.01 1.43 0.94 0.84  -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.33 1               
6. PE 5.98 1.03 0.86 0.67  -0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.35 -0.37 1              
7. TRUST 5.89 1.06 0.93 0.78  -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.32 -0.39 -0.62 1             
8. RISK 2.47 1.45 0.94 0.84  -0.16 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 -0.29 -0.40 1            
9. LOY 4.87 1.57 0.95 0.86  -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.53 -0.46 -0.46 -0.58 -0.18 1           
10. SC 2.96 1.62 0.92 0.79  -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 -0.22 -0.03 -0.07 -0.30 -0.31 1          
11. WOM 5.98 1.16 0.96 0.88  -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.41 -0.37 -0.60 -0.79 -0.34 -0.59 -0.09 1         
12. LOS 2.85 1.47 0.92 0.79  -0.17 -0.10 -0.03 -0.19 -0.05 -0.24 -0.44 -0.51 -0.35 -0.02 -0.45 1        
13. DJ 2.93 1.76 0.95 0.86  -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 -0.15 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 -0.17 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 1       
14. PJ 4.44 1.82 0.93 0.82  -0.01 -0.07 -0.00 -0.12 -0.16 -0.22 -0.26 -0.06 -0.24 -0.11 -0.22 -0.08 -0.41 1      
15. IJ 4.73 1.72 0.97 0.90  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.20 -0.22 -0.29 -0.08 -0.22 -0.11 -0.24 -0.10 -0.57 -0.66 1     
16. PB 4.68 1.86 0.96 0.88  -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.47 -0.29 -0.35 1    
17. FV 4.70 1.78 0.94 0.84  -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.25 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 -0.40 -0.29 -0.49 -0.51 1   
18. PWOM 3.68 1.89 0.99 0.96  -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.21 -0.15 -0.13 -0.20 -0.02 -0.29 -0.19 -0.25 -0.06 -0.65 -0.56 -0.62 -0.54 -0.47 1  
19. PLOS 4.67 1.80 0.97 0.91  -0.10 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 -0.19 -0.12 -0.13 -0.30 -0.46 -0.40 -0.45 -0.61 -0.54 -0.69 1 
Notes 
• n = 1,007.  
• ME = mean; SD = standard deviation; CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
• AGE = age; GEN = gender; EXP = experience; WU = website usage; PU = perceived usefulness; PEOU = perceived ease of use; TRUST = trusting beliefs; RISK = risk 
beliefs; LOY = loyalty; SC = switching costs; WOM = pre-word of mouth; LOS = pre-likelihood of switching; DJ = distributive justice; PJ = procedural justice; IJ = 
interactional justice; PB = perceived breach; FV = feelings of violation; PWOM = post-word of mouth; PLOS = post-likelihood of switching.  
157 
 
Finally, we assessed the extent of CMV using the marker-variable 
technique (Lindell and Whitney 2001, Malhotra et al. 2006).  As discussed 
earlier, our choice for the marker variable in this study was fantasizing.  This 
marker variable was thought to be largely irrelevant in the context of 
information privacy (e.g., Son and Kim 2008), and thus its relationships with 
other variables are deemed to imply common method variance.  According to 
Lindell and Whitney (2001), the smallest correlation (in absolute terms) 
between the marker variable and other variables is a conservative estimate of 
CMV.  To calculate correlations, we again performed CFA while adding 
fantasizing to the original measurement model.  The result showed that the 
smallest correlation with fantasizing was -0.01 (p = ns), indicating that CMV 
was not substantial in this particular study.  Taken together with the desirable 
psychometric properties shown previously, our measures were considered 
appropriate for subsequent data analyses.20  
4.5.2 Manipulation Checks 
To check whether our experimental manipulation of justice items 
worked, we compared the means of justice perceptions (i.e., distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice) across different experimental conditions.  
First, we compared the means of distributive justice between the high and low 
distributive justice groups.  Whereas the mean value in the high group was 3.5, 
the mean value in the low group was 2.4.  The mean difference between the 
groups was found to be statistically significant (p < 0.001).  Second, we 
                                                          
20
 To further assess the validity of our measures, we performed exploratory factor analysis on 
the research factors shown in Figure 7.  Appendix H reports the details of our analysis, 
including its results.  The results provided additional support for the convergent and 
discriminant validity of our measures.   
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compared the means of procedural justice between the high and low 
procedural justice groups.  The result indicated that subjects in the high 
treatment group provided significantly higher ratings (i.e., 5.2) than those in 
the low treatment group (i.e., 3.7) (p < 0.001).  Finally, we tested mean 
differences in interactional justice between the high and low interactional 
justice groups.  As expected, the means of interactional justice differed 
significantly between the high (i.e., 5.0) and low (i.e., 4.5) conditions (p < 
0.001).  Overall, these results indicate that all three manipulations worked as 
anticipated.     
4.5.3 Test of Proposed and Alternative Models 
To test the proposed model, we used a structural equation modeling 
(SEM) tool, LISREL 8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996).  In the structural model, 
justice perceptions and control variables were treated as exogenous variables, 
whereas psychological reactions and postincident outcomes were specified as 
endogenous variables.  We estimated interaction effects using the means of 
latent variable scores (MLVS) technique (Jöreskog 1998) with the residual 
centering method (Lance 1988).  It should be noted that the structural errors of 
the factors that belong to the same category were allowed to correlate.  Thus, 
the errors of perceived breach and feelings of violation were specified to 
correlate.  The same procedure was applied to the pairing of post-word of 
mouth and post-likelihood of switching.  In addition to the proposed model, 
two alternative models were tested.  The first alternative model was the same 
as the proposed model except that the effects of justice perceptions on 
psychological responses and postincident outcomes were excluded.  The 
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second alternative model also mirrored the proposed model except that it 
excluded the effects of psychological responses on postincident outcomes.  
These alternative models were examined as a way to evaluate the relative 
importance of justice perceptions and psychological responses in determining 
postincident outcomes (Vandenberg and Grelle 2009).  
Table 4.3 presents the results of the alternative and proposed models.  
The results of SEM showed that the proposed model was a reasonable 
representation of the phenomenon.  In particular, the fit indexes were well 
within the acceptable ranges [χ2 (1157) =2211.14, p <0.001, CFI = 0.99, NNFI 
= 0.99, RMSEA = 0.030, SRMR =0.022, GFI = 0.93, AGFI = 0.90].  In 
addition, we found that the proposed model explained a significant amount of 
the variation in the endogenous variables.  Specifically, the model accounted 
on average for about half of the variance because SMCs range from 29% to 
65% (see Table 4.3).  Meanwhile, the first alternative model without the 
effects of justice perceptions fit the data poorly according to SRMR [χ2 (1181) 
=2798.85, p <0.001, CFI = 0.99, NNFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.037, SRMR 
=0.111, GFI = 0.91, AGFI = 0.88].  Moreover, it accounted for less than 7% of 
the variance in perceived beach (4.0%) and feelings of violation (6.8%); this 
implies the importance of justice perceptions in understanding psychological 
responses.  Meanwhile, this model explained about 50% of the variation on 
average in the behavioral outcomes.  A chi-square test showed that the 
proposed model represents the data better than the first alternative model [∆χ2 
(24) = 587.71, p <0.001].  The second alternative model without the effects of 
psychological responses generally fit the data better than the first alternative 
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model [χ2 (1161) =2463.25, p <0.001, CFI = 0.99, NNFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 
0.033, SRMR =0.111, GFI = 0.91, AGFI = 0.88].  Nevertheless, it did not 
perform better than the proposed model in terms of fit [∆χ2 (4) = 252.11, p 
<0.001].  As shown in Table 4.3, the proposed model accounts for 60% of the 
variance in behavioral outcomes on average, but the second alternative model 
explains only 51% of the variation in behavioral outcomes .  These results 
imply that psychological responses play a significant role in regulating 
postincident outcomes.  As a whole, our results suggest that the proposed 
model was superior to the partial models in terms of both fit and explained 
variance.     
4.5.4 Test of Research Hypotheses 
We took a conservative approach when testing research hypotheses 
because of a relatively large sample size (n = 1,007). Large samples tend to be 
sensitive to the statistical significance of even a small effect.  Instead of using 
a standard 0.05 significance level, therefore, we adopted a more stringent level 
of significance of 0.01 (one-tailed) (Lang and Secic 2006).  Despite such 
conservative testing, we found the data fully supported all of the hypotheses 
proposed in this study.  Table 4.4 summarizes the results of the hypothesis 
tests.21 
  
                                                          
21
 In order to check the robustness of the results, we reran the proposed model by specifying 
the three types of justice perceptions as dummy variables.  Appendix J shows the results of 
structural equation modeling analysis.  As shown in Appendix J, these results with dummy 
variables are highly comparable to the original results.     
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Table 4.3: Results of Structural Equation Modeling Analysis 
Antecedents 
 Alternative Model 1 Alternative Model 2 Proposed Model 
 PR PI PR PI PR PI 
 PB FV PWOM PLOS PB FV PWOM PLOS PB FV PWOM PLOS 
Control 
variables 
AGE  -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.07* -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.07** 
GEN  -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
EXP  -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
WU  -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 
PU  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08* -0.07** -0.04 -0.01 -0.07* -0.07** -0.04 
PEOU  -0.15** -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.11** -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11** -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
TRUST  -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.03 -0.07 -0.11** -0.12* 
RISK  -0.14*** -0.26*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.19*** -0.31*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.18*** -0.30*** -0.09** -0.07* 
LOY  -0.08 -0.02 -0.17*** -0.10** -0.04 -0.03 -0.10** -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11*** -0.07* 
SC  -0.01 -0.03 -0.09** -0.09** -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05* -0.07** 
Preincident 
Outcomes 
WOM    -0.16*** -0.02   -0.22*** -0.03   -0.20*** -0.00 
LOS    -0.11*** -0.24***   -0.01 -0.34***   -0.03 -0.28*** 
Justice 
perceptions 
DJ      -0.41*** -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.34*** -0.41*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.11*** 
PJ      -0.11** -0.00 -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.11** -0.01 -0.20*** -0.12*** 




DJ x PJ      -0.10* -0.04* -0.01 -0.03 -0.10* -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
DJ x IJ      -0.01 -0.10** -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10** -0.03 -0.02 
PJ x IJ      -0.09* -0.01* -0.04 -0.04 -0.09* -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Psychological 
responses 
PB    -0.38*** -0.43***       -0.22*** -0.36*** 
FV    -0.32*** -0.32***       -0.13*** -0.23*** 
SMC (R2)   -0.04 -0.07 -0.48 -0.51 -0.30 -0.35 -0.60 -0.42 -0.29 -0.34 -0.65 -0.55 
Notes: 
• n = 1,007.  
• DJ = distributive justice; PJ = procedural justice; IJ = interactional justice; PB = perceived breach; FV = feelings of violation; PWOM = post-word of 
mouth; PLOS = post-likelihood of switching; AGE = age; GEN = gender; EXP = experience; WU = website usage; PU = perceived usefulness; PEOU = 
perceived ease of use; TRUST = trusting beliefs; RISK = risk beliefs; LOY = loyalty; SC = switching costs; WOM = pre-word of mouth; LOS = pre-
likelihood of switching. 
• Standard deviations within parenthesis 
• * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
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Effects of Justice Perceptions. We proposed earlier that three types of 
justice perceptions would influence perceived breach and feelings of violation 
(H1, H2, and H3).  As shown in Table 4.4, distributive justice has significant 
effects on both perceived breach and feelings of violation (H1 supported).  In 
addition, as expected, procedural justice exhibited a significant impact on 
perceived breach (H2 supported).  Finally, consistent with our hypothesis, 
interactional justice was a significant antecedent of feelings of violation (H3 
supported).  Notably, procedural justice had little impact on feelings of 
violation, and interactional justice had no impact on perceived breach.  These 
results support our claim that procedural justice relates to cognitive elements, 
whereas interactional justice reflects the emotional aspects of a psychological 
contract breach.   
Interactions between Justice Perceptions. We predicted earlier that the 
effect of distributive justice on perceived breach would decrease with an 
increase in procedural justice.  As expected, we found that procedural justice 
moderated the relationship between distributive justice and perceived breach 
(H4 supported).  Moreover, in line with our expectations, we found that 
interactional justice indeed moderated the relationship between distributive 




Table 4.4: Tests of Research Hypotheses 







H1a DJ   PB  -0.41 < 0.001 Supported 
H1b DJ   FV  -0.29 < 0.001 Supported 
H2  PJ   PB  -0.11 < 0.01 Supported 
H3  IJ   FV  -0.31 < 0.001 Supported 
H4 DJ x PJ   PB  -0.10 < 0.01 Supported 
H5 DJ x IJ   FV  -0.10 < 0.01 Supported 
H6a PB   PWOM  -0.22 < 0.001 Supported 
H6b PB   PLOS  -0.36 < 0.001 Supported 
H7a FV   PWOM  -0.13 < 0.001 Supported 
H7b FV   PLOS  -0.23 < 0.001 Supported 
Notes: 
• n = 1,007.  
• † Hypothesis tests were performed based on a level of significance of 0.01. 
• DJ = distributive justice; PJ = procedural justice; IJ = interactional justice; PB 
= perceived breach; FV = feelings of violation; PWOM = post-word of 
mouth; PLOS = post-likelihood of switching. 
 
Our findings also show that the effect of procedural justice on 
perceived breach would increase with an increase in interactional justice 
(parameter estimate = -0.09, p < 0.05).  It is important to note that the 
interaction between procedural justice and interactional justice was rarely 
observed in traditional settings in which relationships were based on face-to-
face contacts (Tax et al. 1998, Skarlicki et al. 1999).  A plausible explanation 
is that interactional justice is treated as a cue for the authenticity of procedural 
justice, especially in the context of online privacy breach recovery in which 
customers are separated from the actual recovery process.  In particular, as 
service representatives represent the online firm in privacy recovery, 
customers’ understanding of the complex recovery process can be 
supplemented by their interactions with the representatives.  Whereas high 
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quality interactions provide a glimpse of the firm’s policies to ensure fairness 
in the recovery, poor interaction experience may raise doubts of whether or 
not fair procedures are followed, and hence reduce customers’ sensitivity to 
procedural justice.  Appendix I shows three plots for the interaction effects 
found in this study.  The figures clearly show that the interaction between 
procedural justice and interactional justice is distinctly different from that 
between distributive justice and procedural justice and also from that between 
distributive justice and interactional justice.  
Effects of Psychological Responses. We proposed that post-word of 
mouth and post-likelihood of switching would be affected by perceived breach 
(H6) and feelings of violation (H7).  As hypothesized, perceived breach 
influenced both post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of switching (H6 
supported).  Likewise, we found that feelings of violation had significant 
effects on postincident outcomes (H7 supported).    
Controlled Effects. We found that pre-word of mouth had a significant 
effect on post-word of mouth (0.20, p < 0.001, two tailed) whereas pre-
likelihood of switching exerted a significant effect on post-likelihood of 
switching (0.28, p < 0.001, two-tailed).  Each of the justice perceptions had 
significant effects on both post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of 
switching.  However, none of the interactions between justice perceptions had 
any significant impact on postincident outcomes, which implies the important 
role of psychological responses in a theoretical framework.    
As indicated in Table 4.3, individual characteristics — i.e., age, 
gender, experience, and website usage — generally have little impact on 
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psychological responses and postincident outcomes.  Only one of 16 paths 
proved significant, and this exception occurred between age and post-
likelihood of switching (estimate = -0.07, p < 0.01, two-tailed).  These results 
imply that older people are less likely to switch to alternatives at the 
postincident stage, but except for the age effect, individual characteristics 
generally do not have impact on online customer behavior.  Unlike individual 
characteristics, however, customers’ perceptions at the preincident stage such 
as perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, trusting beliefs, risk beliefs, 
loyalty, and switching costs were significantly related with at least one of the 
endogenous variables.  These results suggest that preincident perceptions 
largely mediate the impact of individual characteristics on online customer 
behavior.   
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this study was to develop and empirically test a 
model that explains the role of an online firm’s postincident recovery 
endeavor in mitigating the impact of a privacy breach on customer 
relationships.  Drawing on the service recovery literature, we integrated the 
notions of justice perceptions and psychological responses into a theoretical 
framework describing how individuals react to an online firm’s postincident 
actions.  The proposed model was tested on data collected from 1,007 actual 
users of online vendors.  The results of SEM analysis generally supported our 
model.  As expected, three types of justice perceptions were sharply distinct 
from each other in their main and interaction effects on psychological 
responses.  In addition, consistent with our hypotheses, psychological 
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responses were shown to play an important role in shaping postincident 
outcomes in the online context.  Overall, our findings suggest that justice 
perceptions and psychological responses are the keys to a better understanding 
of online customer behavior after a privacy breach.  This study provides 
researchers and practitioners with a conceptual tool for analyzing the 
effectiveness of organizational practices in mitigating the damaging effect of a 
privacy breach on customer relationships.   
4.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
4.6.1.1 Three Types of Justice Perceptions 
The notion of justice and its related perceptions, i.e., distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice, have been shown to be useful in 
explaining customers’ privacy-related predispositions and behavioral 
consequences (Malhotra et al. 2004, Son and Kim 2008).  However, most of 
these past studies treated justice perceptions only abstractly without reference 
to any specific firms or organizational practices.  Our study is meaningful in 
that it is the first to examine individuals’ justice perceptions that are specific to 
an online firm and to its remedies.  Furthermore, past research lacks a 
systematic investigation into the subtle difference between three types of 
justice perceptions.  This study contributes significantly to information privacy 
literature by showing how justice perceptions differ from each other in the 
context of an online privacy breach recovery.  Specifically, this study 
demonstrates that distributive justice has positive effects on both cognitive and 
emotional evaluations.  However, we found that procedural justice affects 
cognitive evaluations (i.e., perceived breach), whereas interactional justice 
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determines emotional evaluations (i.e., feelings of violation).  Our findings 
bolster a common notion that compensation exerts profound effects on 
individuals’ overall evaluations of a situation in question.  More interesting, 
this study reveals a relatively unknown fact of justice perceptions that once 
compensation is taken into account, fair procedures affect only the cognitive 
side but not the emotional side, whereas respectful treatments affect the 
emotional side but not the cognitive side.  We suspect that the emergence of 
this discernible pattern from this particular study results, at least partly, from 
its lean online context in which individuals’ judgments about fairness are 
rarely intermixed with rich human relationships.  In any case, more research is 
needed to explore the distinct nature of justice perceptions that may vary with 
respect to various privacy contexts.  Overall, this study adds to the justice 
literature by showing theoretically as well as empirically the clearly 
discernible patterns behind justice perceptions, especially when these patterns 
are examined within the context of an online privacy breach recovery. 
4.6.1.2 Interactions Between Justice Perceptions on Psychological 
Responses 
Another contribution of this study to the information privacy literature 
is the interactions between justice perceptions that are unique to our context of 
an online firm’s reactions to a privacy breach.  As hypothesized, procedural 
justice somewhat complements distributive justice.  Customers with an 
opportunity to be involved in the recovery process tend more than excluded 
customers to perceive the monetary reward as acceptable.  Thus, a high level 
of procedural justice compensates, to some extent, for a low level of 
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distributive justice.  Similarly, interactional justice complements distributive 
justice.  High interactional justice implies that an online firm is committed to 
taking responsibility for a privacy incident (Ahmad 2002).  In such a situation, 
customers are less likely to doubt the fairness of compensation than they are 
otherwise.  Procedural justice and interactional justice are distinct in their 
interaction effects because procedural justice moderates the effect of 
distributive justice on perceived breach, but interactional justice moderates the 
effect of distributive justice on feelings of violation.  As proposed by the 
psychological contract perspective, the cognitive-emotion taxonomy that 
differentiates procedural justice and interactional justice seems to hold well, 
even for explaining their interactions with distributive justice on psychological 
responses.     
Although not hypothesized in this study, the interaction between 
procedural justice and interactional justice is shown to exist on perceived 
breach.  In fact, this interaction between procedural justice and interactional 
justice was rarely observed in traditional settings in which relationships are 
based on face-to-face contact (Tax et al. 1998, Skarlicki et al. 1999).  We 
reason that interactional justice is similar to procedural justice in that both are 
more concerned with means than with ends.  For this reason, people often 
consider each of the “relationship-oriented” justice perceptions as a cue for the 
authenticity of the other dimension (Martínez-Tur et al. 2006).  Especially in a 
domain in which relational bonds are unstable, people are known to evaluate 
the two types of justice perceptions together instead of independently (Luo 
2007).  Therefore, when interactional justice is lower, online customers are 
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less likely to be sensitive to the question of whether or not fair procedures are 
followed.  This is because in the case of low interactional justice, their 
reactions are likely to be generally unenthusiastic regardless of the level of 
procedural justice.  Meanwhile, when interactional justice is higher, online 
customers will be more sensitive to the level of procedural justice.  Thus, in 
the online privacy domain, the effects of procedural justice on perceived 
breach will be stronger when interactional justice is higher.  Consistent with 
this reasoning, procedural justice is shown to be largely synergistic with 
interactional justice; that is, the impact of procedural justice is not maximized 
when interactional justice is low.  Our findings will add to the growing 
literature on justice perceptions and their complex effects on individuals’ 
overall evaluations.    
4.6.1.3 Perceived Breach and Feelings of Violation 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to formally 
examine psychological contract violation in an online privacy breach.  The 
lack of attention to the psychological contract perspective is surprising when 
one considers that a privacy breach constitutes a severe breach of a 
psychological contract in online commercial transactions.  Drawing on the 
taxonomy proposed by Morrison and Robinson (1997), we explicitly 
differentiated between perceived breach, which represents a cognitive 
response, and feelings of violation, which indicate an emotional response.  Our 
findings show that feelings of violation are indeed distinct from perceived 
breach (r = 0.51).  Moreover, the emotional factor (i.e., feelings of violation) is 
found to affect post-word of mouth (parameter estimate = -0.13, p < 0.001) as 
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well as post-likelihood of switching (parameter estimate = 0.23, p < 0.001) 
after controlling for its cognitive counterpart (i.e., perceived breach).   We 
should note that Pavlou and Gefen (2005) earlier introduced the notion of a 
psychological response in their effort to examine the buyer-seller relationship 
in the context of online auctions.  Their study, however, focused mainly on the 
cognitive aspects of a breach and paid less attention to its emotional factors.  
Our results indicate that the current theory needs to be expanded to include 
both cognitive and emotional responses.  We believe that our dual approach to 
psychological responses is effective not only in examining privacy problems 
but also in understanding other social exchange relationships.   
4.6.1.4 Extending Justice Theories by Including Psychological Responses 
Although both justice perceptions and psychological responses are 
known to explain potential conflicts arising from social exchange relationships 
(Gilliland 1993, Pavlou and Gefen 2005), those concepts have rarely been 
integrated into a coherent, unified framework.  To integrate these two views, 
the present study draws on the service recovery literature, which posits that 
customers’ specific beliefs with regard to organizational remedies determine 
overall psychological evaluations, which in turn, regulate behavior (Hoffman 
and Kelly 2000, Maxham and Neyemeyer 2002).  Specifically, our conceptual 
model postulates that customers’ specific justice perceptions determine overall 
psychological evaluations, which are summarized into perceived breach and 
feelings of violation.  Furthermore, these psychological evaluations play a key 
role in shaping customer behavior after an online privacy breach recovery.   
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An interesting result was that when perceived breach and feelings of 
violation were excluded from the model, no interactions were significant in 
determining postincident outcomes.  This result implies that a conceptual 
model that emphasizes the justice perspective but excludes psychological 
responses is likely to yield a limited view of online customer behavior in a 
situation in which individuals react to an online firm’s postincident recovery 
endeavor to recover customer relationships from a privacy breach.  To the best 
of our knowledge, no prior studies have combined justice perceptions and 
psychological responses and then show the efficacy of this integrative 
approach in the special context of online customer behavior after a privacy 
breach.   
4.6.1.5 The Specificity of the Online Privacy Breach Context 
The issues surrounding an online privacy breach and disaster recovery 
differ substantially from those in traditional retailing (Holloway and Beatty 
2003, Forbes et al. 2005).  For example, security and privacy issues are 
considered particularly serious and critical in the online environment 
(Zeithaml et al. 2002, Malhotra et al. 2004).  Moreover, although personal 
relationships are lacking in the online setting, they are vital to the offline 
service experience and equally important to online businesses in maintaining 
customer relationships in the postincident stage (Fan et al. 2010).  Drawing on 
both the privacy and service recovery literature, we argue that these 
characteristics specific to online privacy breach and recovery setting make 
justice perceptions particularly relevant in our study context.  In fact, we 
observed clearly discernible patterns among justice perceptions and their 
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interactions that are predicted by our integrated theoretical framework.  We 
suspect that in the offline environment the effects of justice perceptions on 
psychological responses would be more complex than those found in this 
study.  This is because in such a traditional setting justice perceptions and 
psychological responses are more likely to be affected by a history of 
interpersonal relations accumulated over the course of business interactions 
and failure recoveries.                 
Moreover, our model includes several hypotheses related to the 
interactions of justice perceptions that are tightly intertwined with the online 
privacy breach and recovery domain under study.  Our findings suggest that in 
line with our predictions, procedural justice and interactional justice act more 
or less complementary to distributive justice.  In contrast, we found that 
procedural justice is synergistic with interactional justice (see Appendix I).  
Note that these interesting interaction effects were seldom shown in other 
contexts.  We argue that the online privacy breach context examined in this 
study causes participants to carefully evaluate each dimension of justice 
perceptions without being affected by ongoing face-to-face interactions 
common in organizational and traditional retail settings.  Taken together, we 
extend the boundary of knowledge in the field of information privacy by 
developing nuanced accounts specific to the domain in question and basing 
them on a more generalized and integrative framework 
4.6.2 Managerial Implications 
Our findings provide practitioners with valuable insights into how to 
salvage customer relationships damaged by privacy-related incidents.  First, 
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we advocate that privacy breach recovery should be carefully reengineered.  
Specifically, managers could consider creating privacy breach remedies that 
allow for recovery efforts directed at improving the psychological responses 
experienced by customers.  They should have an array of tools and resources 
available to address the specific needs of customers.  Recall that, in our study, 
perceived breach and feelings of violation were greatly affected by 
compensation.  However, perceived breach became less sensitive to 
compensation when a fair procedure was in place, and feelings of violation 
were less affected by compensation when respectful interpersonal treatment 
was experienced.  This result is an important reminder that redressing privacy 
breaches means more than enacting all three aspects of privacy breach 
recovery.  Thus, online firms must carefully consider the specific 
psychological responses to improve customers’ privacy situations. 
It is also worth noting that interactional justice amplified the effect of 
procedural justice on perceived breach.  This finding implies that when 
interactional justice is low, organizational efforts to boost procedural justice 
are likely to be wasted and have little impact on perceived breach.  Procedural 
justice and interactional justice are similar in that both are concerned with 
“means” to ends.  Because of this resemblance, interpersonal treatment might 
be considered as a testimonial for the firm’s practices.  Although conventional 
wisdom suggests the significance of procedural justice and interactional 
justice, their synergistic power is not yet widely known.  Our study clearly 
shows that interactional justice is a necessary condition to maximize the return 
from a firm’s adherence to fair procedures.  The online environment facilitates 
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information dissemination, which is vital for notifying customers about the 
process of remedying a privacy breach.  However, the lack of physical 
contacts could hinder customers’ understanding of the complex recovery 
process.  In light of this understanding, to maximize the return from adherence 
to fair procedures, online firms should consider enhancing interpersonal 
interactions in developing their privacy breach recovery capabilities.   
4.6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
We examined online customers’ reactions to a particular firm with 
which the customers had had actual experience.  This approach contrasts with 
the approach of past studies in which individuals’ attitudes and behavior were 
examined without reference to any real business (Son and Kim 2008, Dinev 
and Hart 2006, Stewart and Segars 2002).  As a result, our findings are 
generally expected to be more realistic and practical than those of prior 
studies.  However, this study employed hypothetical scenarios to simulate 
privacy incidents; such simulation is unavoidable to some degree, but 
nevertheless impairs the study’s realism.  We believe, all things considered, 
that the research methodology adopted in this study is reasonable.  However, 
the findings of this study need to be corroborated by other field studies in 
which actual breaches and organizational responses are examined in real-life 
settings.  
Another limitation relates to the cross-sectional nature of the data.  Our 
model primarily implies a longitudinal analysis that examines customers’ 
behaviors separately before and after a privacy breach.  Although the model 
does not necessarily preclude a cross-sectional analysis as performed in the 
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present study, more conclusive inferences from our findings require their 
evaluation against a future longitudinal study.  On a related issue, we used a 
survey questionnaire to measure pre- and postincident outcomes; 
consequently, CMV was considered a potential threat to the validity of our 
findings.  As noted earlier, we explicitly checked for CMV and found it was 
not particularly problematic.  Nevertheless, the findings of this study should 
be viewed with this potential bias in mind.    
Furthermore, our findings are not necessarily generalizable to other 
settings.  For example, the present study dealt with a case in which a firm 
notifies online customers of a breach.  However, in some cases, the media may 
report an incident before a firm contacts its customers.  Our findings cannot be 
generalized to such a situation in which customers receive the news of a 
breach from sources other than the firm responsible for handling the incident.  
Caution should be exercised when the model is applied to settings other than 
the one analyzed here. 
In order to accurately describe online customer behavior, we tried to 
incorporate as many relevant factors as possible (including control variables) 
into the model.  Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that variables 
were omitted that could change the study’s result.  For example, this study did 
not take into account perceived value or service quality, which are known to 
be significant determinants of online customer behavior (Devaraj et al. 2002, 
Kim et al. 2005).  In addition, privacy concern is considered one of those 
potentially important factors.  Our decision to exclude privacy concern from 
the model was deliberate and based on a research finding that trusting and risk 
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beliefs fully mediate the impact of privacy concern on behavioral intention 
(Malhotra et al. 2004).  Given that trusting and risk beliefs are already 
controlled for, we believe that the impact of privacy concern on postincident 
outcomes will be minimal, if any, in our study.  Yet our findings should be 
interpreted carefully until the impact of privacy concern is known.    
In this study, procedural justice is conceptualized as the fairness of 
decision-making procedures.  This conceptualization of procedural justice can 
manifest itself in many ways, such as accessibility (e.g., ease of finding a 
representative), speed (e.g., time taken to perform a procedure), flexibility 
(e.g., adaptability of procedures to suit individual needs), process control (e.g., 
ability to express views freely), etc. (Tax et al. 1998).  However, in our 
scenarios, the notion of procedural justice was operationalized with a focus on 
accessibility and speed while other facets — for example, flexibility and 
process control —  were not taken into account.  Thus, readers should be 
cautious when they attempt to generalize our findings beyond the specific 
aspects of procedural justice examined in this study.   
It is also worth noting that the high interactional justice group (i.e., 5.0) 
and the low interactional justice group (i.e., 4.5) had the lowest mean 
difference.  In this study, interactional justice was manipulated by the tone of 
the service representatives in phone calls, which were used as a supplement to 
the main message delivered through e-mails.  This manipulation of 
interactional justice is not unrealistic because a significant portion of 
customers would want to call the company to ask for more information on the 
privacy breach.  Nevertheless, although the two conditions of interactional 
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justice differed significantly (p < 0.001), the role of interactional justice could 
have been more evident, given better manipulation.  
This study opens up a number of exciting avenues for further research.  
First, three types of justice perceptions were examined to capture different 
aspects of perceived fairness.  However, the justice literature suggests still 
another dimension of justice, namely, informational justice (Greenberg 1990, 
Colquitt 2001).  As a concept separate from interactional justice, informational 
justice is concerned with whether the factors involved in a decision are 
properly explained.  This concept of emphasizing fair communication is 
thought to differ from other justice perceptions related to outcomes (i.e., 
distributive justice), procedures (i.e., procedural justice), and interpersonal 
treatment (i.e., interactional justice).  Although informational justice has not 
been accepted as widely as other justice perceptions, it certainly has the 
potential to broaden our understanding of customer behavior in the context of 
information privacy.   
Additionally, this study focuses on the ways the justice perceptions 
could be facilitated in an online privacy breach recovery. In particular, 
distributive justice was facilitated by the amount of cash coupon 
compensation. Procedural justice was administrated by the availability of 
contact information on the firm’s website. Interactional justice was applied 
through apologies and explanations. While this study explored the typical 
ways in which justice perceptions could be facilitated, future research could 
explore other technological characteristics that could help ensure fairness in 
online privacy breach recovery. 
178 
 
Furthermore, this study shows the significance of emotion in privacy-
related behavior.  In the present study, one’s emotion is represented by a 
single factor called “feelings of violation.”  Yet customers’ emotional 
responses are likely to manifest more subtle and complex patterns than what is 
captured by a one-dimensional variable.  In fact, research shows a variety of 
emotional responses — for example, happiness, pride, anger, and sadness — 
that are related to perceived fairness and thus deemed relevant in the context 
of information privacy (Ruth et al. 2002).  We encourage researchers to 
identify emotional factors that may be important to privacy research and 
examine how such emotions differentially affect behavioral outcomes.   
Finally, in this study, we only focused on a firm’s “immediate” 
reactions to a breach.  However, maintaining customer relationships requires 
“long-term” efforts (Reichheld 2003).  Thus, it is important to examine the 
overall effectiveness of such ongoing efforts over time.  Especially, the 
temporal sequence of organizational measures could matter in determining 
their effectiveness.  For example, a tactic designed to boost word of mouth is 
likely to be effective only when a prior action to prevent customers from 
switching to an alternative provider works.  If a firm’s immediate reaction to a 
breach falls short of keeping current customers, subsequent measures are 
unlikely to succeed.  Taken together, further research could examine whether, 
and if so how, customers’ perceptions and behavior change over time in the 




CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
This thesis focuses on privacy issues in the contexts of online social 
interactions and commercial transactions.  The three studies provide insights 
on individuals’ privacy trade-off, behavioral responses to embarrassing 
exposures as well as psychological responses to organizational remedies.  
Specifically, Study I draws on the hyperpersonal framework and the privacy 
calculus perspective to elucidate the roles of privacy concerns and social 
rewards in synchronous online social interactions.  In particular, this study 
examines the causes and the behavioral strategies that individuals utilize to 
protect their privacy.  Results indicate that individuals utilize both self 
disclosure and misrepresentation to protect their privacy and that social 
rewards help explain why individuals may not behave in accordance with their 
privacy concerns.  
Study II draws on the social exchange theory to explain the 
consequences of an embarrassing exposure in online social networks.  
Specifically, this study examines the effects of information dissemination and 
network mutuality on individuals’ exchange assessment as well as how this 
assessment shapes their behavioral responses.  Results suggest that 
information dissemination and network mutuality jointly determine 
individuals’ perceptions of relationship bonding and privacy invasion.  
Additionally, whereas perceived relationship bonding impedes both 
transactional avoidance and interpersonal avoidance, it leads to approach 
behavior.  Further, while perceived privacy invasion increases transactional 
avoidance, it reduces approach behavior.  
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Study III focuses on an online firm’s postincident recovery endeavor in 
mitigating the impact of a privacy breach on customer relationships.  Drawing 
on the service recovery literature, this study integrates the notions of justice 
perceptions and psychological responses into a theoretical framework that 
describes how individuals react to an online firm’s postincident recovery 
endeavor.  Results indicate that the three types of justice perceptions (i.e., 
distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice) differently 
affect psychological responses (i.e., perceived breach and feelings of 
violation).  Moreover, justice perceptions are found to interact to influence 
their psychological responses, which are shown to be important in shaping 
postincident outcomes such as post-word of mouth and post-likelihood of 
switching. 
Overall, the three studies are believed to provide a solid understanding 
on individuals’ privacy-related behavior across different contexts. It is worth 
to note that the three studies of this thesis closely resemble the theoretical 
underpinning of the APCO framework (Smith et al. 2011). According to this 
framework, individuals’ privacy-related psychological responses (i.e., 
perceptions, emotions, and beliefs) can be influenced by a divergent collection 
of antecedents specific to different contexts. Furthermore, the APCO 
framework underscores the importance of examining behavioral outcomes, 
which are driven by individuals’ privacy related psychological responses. 
More important, the authors have explicitly noted the essentiality of 
considering privacy issues in different contexts. In this thesis, the three studies 
provide a focused perspective on privacy issues across online social 
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interactions and commercial transactions contexts. Collectively, by 
considering antecedents and outcomes in online social interactions and online 
commercial transactions, this thesis provides a useful macro understanding 
that would be salient across multiple disciplines and contexts. In particular, 
Study I identifies antecedents of privacy concerns and social rewards in 
synchronous online social interactions.  Despite the prevalence of privacy 
research, extant studies have yielded scanty evidence on the causes of these 
tradeoffs beyond commercial contexts.   Based on the hyperpersonal 
framework (Walther 1996), this study investigates four antecedents of privacy 
concerns and social rewards, namely, perceived anonymity of self, perceived 
anonymity of others, perceived media richness, and perceived intrusiveness.  
Holistically, our four antecedents of privacy concerns and social rewards, 
which are based on the hyperpersonal framework and literature on privacy and 
online social interactions, are particularly important and relevant to online 
synchronous social interactions.  Additionally, this study also presents new 
insights to prior privacy-related studies by extending the privacy calculus lens 
to the context of synchronous online social interactions.  Essentially, in the 
absence of monetary or tangible rewards, social rewards are found to be just as 
attractive in balancing privacy concerns and governing individuals’ behavior. 
  
Furthermore, as discussed in Study II, this thesis enriches IS research 
on social interactions by providing a taxonomy of behavioral responses to 
embarrassing exposure in online social networks.  Drawing on the dichotomy 
of passive and active behavior, Study II classifies behavioral responses into 
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four different types, namely inaction, transactional avoidance, interpersonal 
avoidance, and approach.  The proposed taxonomy is expected to be helpful in 
analyzing a variety of behavior commonly performed in response to 
embarrassing exposures and thus serve as a useful tool for further examination 
of individuals’ response behavior in online social networks. 
Study II also makes important implications for application designers.  
In particular, by facilitating the traceability of the target's profile, posting with 
tagging has come under heavy criticism.  Given the influence of network 
mutuality on target's interpretation of an embarrassing exposure, application 
designers may contemplate how they can use information on network 
mutuality to their advantage.  For example, in cases where embarrassing 
content is disseminated, a target’s perception of privacy invasion can be 
mitigated if posting with tagging is discouraged for a disseminator who has 
low network mutuality with the target.  On the other hand, if the disseminator 
has high network mutuality with the target, the disseminator should be 
promptly notified regarding the option of tagging the target to induce the 
perception of relationship bonding.  
Finally, Study III extends justice theories by including psychological 
responses to better explain potential conflicts arising from social exchange 
relationships.  Specifically, this study draws on the service recovery literature, 
which posits that customers’ specific beliefs with regard to organizational 
remedies determine overall psychological evaluations, which in turn, regulate 
behavior.  Furthermore, Study III enriches existing understanding on online 
privacy breach recovery by formally examining psychological contract 
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violation in an online privacy breach incident.  Overall, the inclusion of both 
cognitive and emotional responses is expected to be effective not only in 
examining privacy problems but also in understanding other social exchange 
relationships. 
The findings in Study III also imply that online firms must carefully 
consider the specific psychological responses to improve customers’ privacy 
situations.  In particular, this study clearly shows that interactional justice is a 
necessary condition to maximize the return from a firm’s adherence to fair 
procedures.  The online environment facilitates information dissemination, 
which is vital for notifying customers about the process of remedying a 
privacy breach.  However, the lack of physical contacts could hinder 
customers’ understanding of the complex recovery process.  In light of this 
understanding, to maximize the return from adherence to fair procedures, 
online firms should consider enhancing interpersonal interactions in 
developing their privacy breach recovery capabilities.   
The findings of this thesis should be viewed with some limitations in 
mind.  First, this research assumes that individuals’ behavior in online social 
interactions is not essentially driven by malicious motivations, such as 
cyberbullying and Internet predation.  Malevolent individuals could exhibit 
vastly different behavior due to their insidious motives.  Despite this 
inadequacy, this research strives to be applicable to the general population. 
The contributions of this thesis may also be limited by using a mock-
up online social networking website in Study II.  While the general layout and 
technical features of the mock-up website resembled those of a real online 
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social networking platform, the mock-up website may not reflect the actual 
online social networking environment entirely.  However, in the actual 
environment, we could neither manipulate the experimental conditions (i.e., 
controlling the number of mutual friends the subjects and the friend share) nor 
capture subjects’ actual behavioral responses (i.e., intercepting the private 
messages the subjects sent to his or her friends).  Therefore, despite the 
limitation, the employment of this mock-up website is necessary.  Future 
research will be necessary to verify the impact of embarrassing exposures on 
relationship bonding and privacy invasion in a more natural setting. 
Another limitation is that Study III examined online customers’ 
reactions to a particular firm with which the customers had had actual 
experience.  This approach contrasts with the approach of past studies in 
which individuals’ attitudes and behavior were examined without reference to 
any real business (Son and Kim 2008, Dinev and Hart 2006, Stewart and 
Segars 2002).  As a result, findings of Study III are generally expected to be 
more realistic and practical than those of prior studies.  However, this study 
employed hypothetical scenarios to simulate privacy incidents; such 
simulation is unavoidable to some degree, but nevertheless impairs the study’s 
realism.  Therefore, the findings of this study need to be corroborated by other 
field studies in which actual breaches and organizational responses are 
examined in real-life settings.  
This thesis opens several interesting research opportunities.  First, 
there is value in investigating “objective” measures of behavior in online 
social interactions, as opposed to our current reflective self reported 
185 
 
measurements in Study I.  It is possible that individuals’ recall may not 
completely reflect their actual behavior due to the social desirability bias, 
which is the tendency for individuals to portray themselves in a generally 
favorable light (Holden 1994).  In view of this potential bias, a further 
investigation of actual self disclosure and misrepresentation by analyzing 
communication protocols could be a future research avenue. 
Furthermore, Study II of this thesis has focused on behavioral 
responses facilitated by online social networking websites.  In a real setting, 
the target might engage in behavior beyond the online environment.  For 
instance, in response to the embarrassing exposure, the target might actively 
avoid transaction by complaining to the disseminator in physical encounters.  
Likewise, interpersonal avoidance might not be limited to breaking up 
connectivity within online social networks but could also escalate to 
relationship termination in the offline environment.  Approach behavior might 
manifest in the target’s active involvement during face-to-face interactions.  
Hence, future research could investigate how an embarrassing exposure that 
occurs within online social networks influences individuals’ behavior in the 
offline environment. 
Finally, Study III only focused on a firm’s “immediate” reactions to a 
breach.  However, maintaining customer relationships requires “long-term” 
efforts (Reichheld 2003).  Thus, it is important to examine the overall 
effectiveness of such ongoing efforts over time.  Especially, the temporal 
sequence of organizational measures could matter in determining their 
effectiveness.  For example, a tactic designed to boost word of mouth is likely 
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to be effective only when a prior action to prevent customers from switching 
to an alternative provider works.  If a firm’s immediate reaction to a breach 
falls short of keeping current customers, subsequent measures are unlikely to 
succeed.  Taken together, further research could examine whether, and if so 
how, customers’ perceptions and behavior change over time in the context of 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY I PRELIMINARY TESTS OF DIFFERENT 
SURVEY METHODS 
 Three rounds of preliminary tests were conducted to compare and 
evaluate data collection methods. Several issues were revealed. In the first 
round, we sought realism by soliciting participation from existing online 
chatrooms. Recruitment messages were broadcast in selected public chatrooms 
which directed interested users to a questionnaire hosted on a well-known 
online survey website.22 Although such a sampling method could utilize 
chatroom users’ actual experiences, it was challenging to recruit participants. 
This was because many users treated such recruitment messages as a 
“nuisance” or “spam” and some were even concerned that the posted URL link 
might direct them to malicious sites. Consequently, this method suffered from 
poor participation. Furthermore, a scan of the questionnaire responses showed 
that a considerable proportion of respondents did not devote sufficient thought 
and care to their answers. For example, many of them provided the same 
answers (e.g., an indication of “4” for all questions on a 7-point Likert scale). 
Hence, this first attempt was considered unsuccessful. 
 In order to encourage participation and improve the quality of data 
collected, we conducted a second round of testing. This time, we recruited 
participants from a public university. Thirty-two participants were invited to a 
computer laboratory. Instead of partaking in online chat sessions, they were 
asked to recall and describe any privacy-related experience that they had had 
online. Based on the incident, they filled up a questionnaire. This method 
suffered from another problem i.e., our post-survey interviews revealed that 
most participants were unable to recall a particular online chat experience due 
to the lack of recency. Hence, the responses gathered did not accurately reflect 
their perceptions over a particular interaction, but several possibly unrelated 
privacy episodes which they could recall.  
 To resolve this issue on recall, we conducted a third round of testing. 
Participants were asked to perform an online chat in an assigned public 
chatroom prior to answering the online questionnaire. Although this method 
resolved issues identified in the previous tests, two additional issues surfaced. 
First, some participants expressed a lack of familiarity with the allocated 
chatrooms, resulting in much time and effort spent on familiarizing themselves 
rather than engaging in social interactions. Second, most participants reported 
that a single session was inadequate for the development of meaningful social 
relationships or to encounter any privacy concerns. Bearing in mind all the 
lessons learned from the three preliminary tests, we embarked on our main 
study. 
                                                          
22
  www.surveyconsole.com 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY I MEASUREMENT ITEMS  
All items are based on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree). 
Perceived Anonymity of Self (PAS): adapted from Pinsonneault and Heppel (1997) 
(1) Prior to this particular experience, I believe the other party knew about me. (r) 
(2) Prior to this particular experience, I believe that it was possible for the other party 
to trace my true identity through my IP address or my chat history. (r)* 
(3) Prior to this particular experience, I believe I was anonymous to the other party. 
Perceived Anonymity of Others (PAO): adapted from Pinsonneault and Heppel 
(1997) 
(1) Prior to this particular experience, I knew about the other party. (r) 
(2) Prior to this particular experience, it was possible for me to trace the identity of 
the other party through the IP address or chat history. (r) 
(3) Prior to this particular experience, the other party was anonymous to me. 
Perceived Media Richness (PMR): adapted from Carlson and Zmud (1999) 
(1) I believe that the online chatroom I was using allowed me and the other party to 
communicate through a variety of different cues (such as emotional tone, attitude 
or formality) in our messages. 
(2) I believe that the online chatroom I was using allowed me and the other party to 
use rich and varied language (such as numeric data, pictures, or non-word 
expressions that have meanings) in our interaction. 
(3) I believe that the online chatroom I was using allowed me and the other party to 
tailor (customize) our messages to our own personal requirements. 
(4) I believe that the online chatroom I was using allowed me and the other party to 
give and receive timely feedback. 
Perceived Intrusiveness (PI): adapted from Burgoon et al. (1989) 
(1) I felt that the other party was intrusive. 
(2) The other party asked me questions that I felt intruded on my privacy. 
(3) The other party was overly persistent in getting me to respond. 
(4) The other party did not respect my need for personal space. 
(5) I felt that the other party was harassing me during the interaction. 
Privacy Concerns: adapted from Malhotra et al. (2004) 
Awareness (PC - AWA)  
(1) In the particular experience, I believed the other party should disclose reasons 
for wanting my personal information. 
(2) In the particular experience, I believed it was important that I was aware of and 
knowledgeable about how the other party would use personal information that I 
had disclosed to him or her. 
(3) In the particular experience, I believed that the privacy policy of the online 
chatroom I was using should be clear and conspicuous. 
Collection (PC - COL) 
(1) In the particular experience, I thought twice when the other party asked me for 
personal information. 
(2) In the particular experience, it bothered me when my online chat partner asked 
me for personal information. 
(3) In the particular experience, I was concerned that the other party was trying to 
collect too much information from me. 
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(4) In the particular experience, I believed that giving away personal information to 
my online chat partner could threaten my privacy. 
Control (PC – CON) 
(1) In the particular experience, my privacy was really a matter of my right to 
exercise control and autonomy over how my information was collected, used 
and shared by the other party. 
(2) In the particular experience, the control of my personal information lay at the 
heart of my privacy. 
(3) In the particular experience, my privacy was invaded when control over my 
personal information was lost or unwillingly reduced. 
Social Rewards (SR): developed based on Eisenberger et al. (1990) and Gilbert and 
Horenstein (1975) 
(1) In the particular experience, I believed that the interaction would fulfill my social 
needs (for example, companionship, approval, acceptance, respect, status) in 
some way. 
(2) In the particular experience, I believed that the interaction would help me 
cultivate a good relationship with the other party. 
(3) In the particular experience, I believed that I could derive satisfaction from 
interacting with the other party. 
Self Disclosure (SD): adapted from Wheeless and Grotz (1976) 
(1) In the particular experience, I revealed a great amount of information about 
myself to the other party. 
(2) In the particular experience, I gave out intimate information to the other party. 
(3) In the particular experience, I shared a variety of information about myself to the 
other party. 
(4) In the particular experience, I disclosed information openly to the other party. 
(5) In the particular experience, I revealed very personal thoughts, feelings and 
experiences to the other party. 
Misrepresentation (MIS): developed from Nichols and Greene (1997) 
(1) In the particular experience, I deliberately lied about myself to the other party. 
(2) In the particular experience, I deliberately gave inaccurate information about 
myself to the other party. 




(1) * Item deleted.  
(2) (r) reverse item.  
(3) Privacy concerns are analyzed as a second-order latent variable. Factors scores are first computed by 
constructing first-order latent variables and related to their respective block of manifest variables (i.e., 
Awareness: PC-AWA1 to PC-AWA3, Collection: PC-COL1 to PC-COL4, and Control: PC-CON1 to 
PC-CON3). Subsequently, the second-order latent variable is constructed by relating them to the blocks 




APPENDIX C: STUDY I PATH COEFFICIENTS OF CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
 
 GEN AGE IE GCE CA UF MB 
Privacy Concerns 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.11 
Social Rewards 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Self Disclosure 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.05 
Misrepresentatio
n 
-0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.20** 
Notes 
GEN = Gender; AGE = Age; IE = Internet Experience; GCE = General Chat room Experience; CA = 
Chat room Allocation; UF = Usage Frequency; MB = Moral Beliefs Toward Misrepresentation. 









  Self Disclosure  Misrepresentation 




-2.32* Yes  2.48* Yes 
Social Rewards1 - -  - - 
PAO Privacy 
Concerns 
-2.10* Yes  2.41* Yes 
Social Rewards -2.53* Yes  2.45* Yes 
PMR Privacy 
Concerns2 
- -  - - 
Social Rewards 4.37** Yes  -2.20* Yes 
PI Privacy 
Concerns 
-2.99** Yes  2.78* Yes 
Social Rewards -4.19** Yes  0.20 No 
Notes 
PAS = Perceived Anonymity of Self; PAO = Perceived Anonymity of Others;  
PMR = Perceived Media Richness; PI = Perceived Intrusiveness 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
1
 No hypothesized relationship between perceived anonymity of self and social rewards 
2




APPENDIX E: STUDY II MEASUREMENT ITEMS 
All items are based on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree). 
Information Dissemination (ID) (True/False) 
(1) I am tagged in the note published by X. 
(2) X has tagged me to the note. 
(3) The note published by X has become a "Notes about me" because it is 
tagged to my profile. 
Network Mutuality (NM) 
(1) My online social network overlaps considerably with that of X. 
(2) X and I have many common friends in the online social network. 
(3) My online social network is highly similar to that of X. 
(4) Many of my friends are also friends of X in the online social network. 
Perceived Relationship (PRB): adapted from Wheeless and Grotz (1976) and 
Murray et al. (1996) 
(1) After reading the note I feel very close to X. 
(2) After reading the note, I am willing to disclose a great deal of positive and 
negative things about myself, honestly and fully, to X. 
(3) After reading the note I am extremely happy with my relationship with X. 
(4) After reading the note I think my relationship with X is very strong. 
(5) After reading the note, I do not feel that my relationship with X is 
successful. (r) 
Perceived Privacy Invasion (PPI): adapted from Fusilier and Hoyer (1980) and 
Alge (2001) 
(1) I feel comfortable with the note about me being made public in this way. 
(r) 
(2) I feel X needs to exercise greater controls to limit this kind of note 
publication. 
(3) I feel that the note is none of anybody’s business but my own.  
(4) I feel my exposure in the note was an invasion of my privacy. 
Control Variables 
Sociability (SO): Adapted from Cheek and Buss (1981) 
(1) I like to be with people 
(2) I welcome the opportunity to mix socially with people. 
(3) I prefer working with others rather than alone. 
 
Shyness (SH): Adapted from Cheek and Buss (1981) 
(1) I am socially somewhat awkward. 
(2) I don’t find it hard to talk to strangers. 




Perceived Network Closeness (PNC): Adapted from Floyd and Parks (1995) 
(1) I frequently contact my friends in Facebook. 
(2) I frequently share confidences with my friends in Facebook. 
(3) I frequently get help from my friends in Facebook. 
 
• Age: (Years old) 
• Gender: (1 = male; 2 = female) 
• Internet Experience: “How long have you been using the Internet?” 
(Years) 




(r) reverse items. 
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APPENDIX F: STUDY II THRESHOLD ESTIMATES 
In model B, the first threshold estimate (TA = 0) is 1.11, which indicates that 
the predicted probability of score of 0 on transactional avoidance is higher 
than that of scores of 1 and 2 when both perceived relationship bonding and 
perceived privacy invasion are zero. The second threshold estimate (TA = 1) is 
3.38, which indicates that the predicted probability of score of 0 and 1 is 
higher than that of score of 2 when both independent variables are zero. 
In model C, the first threshold estimate (IA = 0) is 2.23, which indicates that 
the predicted probability of score of 0 on interpersonal avoidance is higher 
than that of scores of 1 and 2 when both perceived relationship bonding and 
perceived privacy invasion are zero. The second threshold estimate (IA = 1) is 
3.94, which indicates that the predicted probability of score of 0 and 1 is 
higher than that of score of 2 when both independent variables are zero. 
In model D, the first threshold estimate (AP = 0) is 3.12, which indicates that 
the predicted probability of score of 0 on approach is higher than that of scores 
of 1 and 2 when both perceived relationship bonding and perceived privacy 
invasion are zero. The second threshold estimate (AP = 1) is 6.38, which 
indicates that the predicted probability of score of 0 and 1 is higher than that 





APPENDIX G: STUDY III MEASURES AND SCENARIOS*      
 
[Part A] 
Perceived Usefulness (PU) 
• Using this online store enhances my effectiveness. 
• Using this online store enhances my productivity. 
• Using this online store improves my performance.  
Perceived Ease-of-Use (PEOU) 
• Interacting with this online store does not require a lot of mental effort. 
• I find it easy to get the online store to do what I want it to do.  
• I find the online store easy to use. 
Trusting Beliefs (TRUST) 
• This online store is trustworthy. 
• I believe that this online store keeps its promises and commitments. 
• I trust this store to keep customers' best interests in mind. 
• This online store has sufficient expertise and resources to do business 
on the Internet.  
Risk Beliefs (RISK) 
• There is a high potential for loss involved in transactions with the 
online store.   
• There is too much uncertainty associated with transactions with the 
online store. 
• Transactions with the online store would involve many unexpected 
problems. 
Loyalty (LOY) 
• I consider myself to be highly loyal to the online store. 
• I feel loyal towards the online store. 
• It means a lot to me to continue to use the online store. 
Switching Costs (SC) 
• Switching to a new online store would involve some hassle. 
• Some problems may occur when I switch to another online store. 
• It would be complicated for me to change to another online store. 
Pre-word of Mouth (WOM) 
• I will say positive things about this online store to other people. 
• I will recommend this online store to anyone who seeks my opinion. 




Pre-likelihood of Switching (LOS) 
• I will look for an alternative online store for better service. 
• I will think about switching to an alternative online store.  




Imagine you have just received an e-mail from the online store that you 
indicated earlier (e.g. Amazon.com, eBay.com, Yahoo!Shopping, 
Overstock.com, DealsDirect.com, etc).  In the email, the online store says 
that your credit card information has been stolen out by some hackers. 
• Distributive Justice  
High: The e-mail clearly states that the online store is offering you a 
$100 cash coupon as an apology. 
Low: The e-mail clearly states that the online store is offering you a $10 
cash coupon as an apology. 
• Procedural Justice  
High: You feel like contacting the online store for further clarification. 
You find it very easy to obtain its contact information from the online 
store's homepage. 
Low: You feel like contacting the online store for further clarification. 
After navigating through the online store's website for some time, you 
finally obtain its contact information. 
• Interactional Justice  
High: When you return home, you find a voice message left on your 
phone by a service representative of the online store. The service 
representative sincerely apologizes to you for the incident and explains 
the details of how the incident occurred. 
Low: When you return home, you find a voice message left on your 
phone by a service representative of the online store. The service 
representative explains briefly how the incident occurred. 
Distributive Justice (DJ) 
• I am being fairly rewarded for the risk to my personal information.  
• Taking everything into consideration, the online store’s offer is quite 
fair.  
• Given the circumstances, I feel that the online store offers adequate 
compensation. 
Procedural Justice (PJ) 
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• It is easy to figure out who to talk to in this online store regarding the 
problem.  
• There are opportunities to request clarification or additional 
information.  
• The online store allows me to provide feedback regarding the problem.  
Interactional Justice (IJ) 
• I am treated with courtesy and respect. 
• The online store seems to care about the customer.  
• The online store treats me with kindness and consideration.  
• The online store shows concern for my rights as a customer.  
Perceived Breach (PB) 
• The online store has failed to meet its obligation to me. 
• The online store has done a poor job of meeting its obligations to me. 
• The online store has neglected the most important obligations to me. 
Feelings of Violation (FV) 
• I feel extremely frustrated by how I was treated by this service provider. 
• The more I think about it, the more hostile I feel towards the website. 
• I feel a great deal of anger toward this website 
Post-Word of Mouth (PWOM) 
The same as the WOM scale.  
Post-likelihood of Switching (PLOS) 
The same as the LOS scale.  
[Part C] 
Fantasizing (FAN) 
• I daydream a lot. 
• When I go to the movies I find it easy to lose myself in the film. 
• I often think of what might have been. 
Control Variables 
• Age: (Years old) 
• Gender: (1 = male; 2 = female) 
• Experience: “How long have you been using the online store?” 
(Years) 
• Website Usage: “I am a frequent customer of this online store.” 
(Seven-point scale anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree”) 
Note: * Unless otherwise indicated, the anchors for all items were 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree.   
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APPENDIX H: STUDY III EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
We performed exploratory factor analysis on the research factors shown in Figure 4.1.  
Table H1 shows the factor loadings and cross-loadings.  The results indicated that the nine-
factor solution explained a total of 91.39% of variance.  The convergent and discriminant 
validity is established because factor loadings exceed 0.7 and cross-loadings are lower than 
0.4 (Malhotra 2004).  Thus, more confidence can be placed on the validity of our scales.    
Table H1: Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
 Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DJ1 .751 .170 .131 -.131 -.145 .235 -.125 -.013 .095 
DJ2 .848 .210 .144 -.158 -.183 .232 -.150 .026 .077 
DJ3 .849 .213 .140 -.134 -.196 .235 -.149 .006 .067 
IJ1 .214 .785 .317 -.192 -.095 .188 -.128 .104 -.059 
IJ2 .246 .815 .277 -.194 -.097 .215 -.139 .117 -.021 
IJ3 .219 .819 .313 -.177 -.099 .219 -.148 .098 -.034 
IJ4 .234 .770 .303 -.183 -.105 .239 -.146 .105 -.015 
PJ1 .146 .215 .754 -.067 -.095 .204 -.144 .066 -.020 
PJ2 .118 .263 .881 -.104 -.065 .170 -.100 .086 -.025 
PJ3 .132 .267 .803 -.065 -.089 .191 -.131 .113 -.019 
FV1 -.150 -.188 -.111 .768 .184 -.102 .170 -.020 .040 
FV2 -.105 -.144 -.069 .895 .178 -.148 .175 -.012 .090 
FV3 -.136 -.114 -.053 .851 .224 -.155 .207 -.002 .078 
PB1 -.198 -.086 -.066 .191 .847 -.153 .210 -.023 .059 
PB2 -.149 -.075 -.102 .200 .868 -.180 .220 -.003 .044 
PB3 -.148 -.066 -.077 .217 .823 -.182 .243 -.028 .062 
PWOM1 .294 .216 .247 -.175 -.220 .739 -.308 .139 .029 
PWOM2 .280 .210 .236 -.172 -.211 .784 -.314 .137 .012 
PWOM3 .296 .205 .234 -.150 -.212 .763 -.317 .130 .024 
PLOS1 -.148 -.134 -.139 .227 .263 -.295 .774 -.024 .189 
PLOS2 -.138 -.109 -.135 .207 .272 -.267 .813 -.021 .174 
PLOS3 -.152 -.113 -.134 .221 .246 -.257 .806 -.009 .164 
WOM1 -.004 .081 .080 -.032 -.022 .085 -.030 .903 -.213 
WOM2 .003 .090 .086 -.021 -.015 .062 -.008 .922 -.219 
WOM3 .028 .055 .057 .023 -.007 .100 -.016 .876 -.202 
LOS1 .062 -.043 -.013 .091 .034 .003 .082 -.219 .839 
LOS2 .069 -.018 -.025 .050 .045 .009 .105 -.214 .895 
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APPENDIX J: STUDY III ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
In order to check the robustness of the results, we reran the proposed model by 
specifying the three types of justice perceptions as dummy variables.  The 
results of CFA showed that the model fit the data satisfactorily: χ2 (817) = 
1645.35, p <0.001, CFI = 0.99, NNFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.032, SRMR = 
0.020, GFI = 0.94, AGFI = 0.91.  However, the model with dummy variables 
was found to explain less variation in psychological responses and 
postincident outcomes than the model with continuous variables.  In particular, 
the dummy-variable model accounted for 9% of perceived breach, 13% of 
feelings of violation, 49% of post-word of mouth, and 51% of likelihood of 
switching.  These values were considerably lower than those reported at the 
column of the proposed model in Table 4.3.  Nevertheless, the results of 
research hypotheses based on the dummy-variable model were generally 
comparable to those based on the continuous-variable model. Table J1 shows 
the new results of research hypotheses based on the dummy-variable model. 
As shown in Table J1, all of the hypotheses are supported by the data except 
one (H1b).  Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that our findings are almost 
equivalent regardless of the operationalization of justice perceptions.     
Table J1: Tests of Research Hypotheses (Justice Perceptions as Dummy 
Variables)  






H1a DJ   PB  -0.08 < 0.01 Supported 
H1b DJ   FV  -0.07  ns Not supported 
H2  PJ   PB  -0.15 < 0.001 Supported 
H3  IJ   FV  -0.07 < 0.01 Supported 
H4 DJ x PJ   PB  -0.16 < 0.001 Supported 
H5 DJ x IJ   FV  -0.12 < 0.01 Supported 
H6a PB   PWOM  -0.37 < 0.001 Supported 
H6b PB   PLOS  -0.43 < 0.001 Supported 
H7a FV   PWOM  -0.31 < 0.001 Supported 
H7b FV   PLOS  -0.32 < 0.001 Supported 
Notes: 
• n = 1,007.  
• † Hypothesis tests were performed based on a level of significance of 0.01. 
• DJ = distributive justice; PJ = procedural justice; IJ = interactional justice; 
PB = perceived breach; FV = feelings of violation; PWOM = post-word of 
mouth; PLOS = post-likelihood of switching. 
 
 
